Đỗ Hoàng* The article was originally published in International Studies, No 1 (132), 3/2023

Pieces  of Biden’s Indo-Pacific Visions via US Policy Documents in 2022
Photo: Reuters.

Under the Trump administration, the US already had some policy documents referring to the Indo-Pacific, such as the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS),[1] the Department of Defense's Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,[2] and the Department of State's report on the implementation of Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2019.[3] These documents addressed the vision for the region, which (i) emphasizes a “free and open” region (the word “free” can be interpreted by US officials as more of freedom of navigation and overflight, upholding the rule of law and national sovereignty rather than values of liberal democracy[4]); (ii) pays more attention to Northeast Asia than Southeast Asia and the role of Pacific Island nations was somewhat vague; (iii) emphasizes “principled realism” (interpreted by US officials as a more realistic version of classical realism) and the Trump’s principle of “America First”;[5] (iv) lacks an economic pillar when the US withdrew from the TPP, and multilateral diplomacy was negatively described; (v) considers China as a “revisionist power” and a challenge on par with Russia, which prompted the US to focus on military deterrence and the trade war in its competition with China.

Meanwhile, under the Biden administration, a series of documents and statements related to the region were issued in 2022 alone, such as the new Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) on February 11,[6] the Blinken Statement on the New Approach to China on May 26,[7] the Pacific Partnership Strategy (PPS) on September 29,[8] the National Security Strategy (NSS) on October 12,[9] and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) on October 27.[10] These documents can be considered as “pieces” which form a panorama of US new policy in the Indo-Pacific, with many new highlights in terms of regional positioning and policy implementation.

Specifically, the documents show that the US considers the Indo-Pacific as the most strategically important region in the new world order which is connected to other regions, regardless of the conflict in Ukraine. The documents also manifest a more comprehensive approach toward the region than that of the Trump administration. Specifically, the US pay attention to the region's inherent values rather than just focusing on China. The US also aims to enhance its presence in the region across a comprehensive set of sectors by introducing the economic pillar after withdrawing from the TPP, expanding the scope of maritime security to other domains below and above the sea, focusing more on non-traditional security issues, etc. Additionally, the US has introduced new measures to implement these policies, most notably the The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, the Partners in the Blue Pacific , and the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) with the Quad.

Positioning the region

First, the documents show that the US considers the Indo-Pacific as an important region in the new world order.

The US does not specifically describe the new order, but the documents, especially the NSS, suggests that the US views the post-Cold War world order as over and a new order is taking shape. While competition between major powers will be intense, it will not lead to a Cold War 2.0. Non-democratic “revisionist” countries like China and Russia pose the greatest threat to the US. Russia is an “immediate threat” due to the Ukraine conflict, but China is the most serious long-term challenge as it is the only country with both the intent and power to change the balance of power. Global problems are now considered national security challenges for the first time. Regions are increasingly interdependent in terms of security, hence crises in one region can quickly spread to others.

In this context, the Indo-Pacific is seen as both the root and the most visible manifestation of the changes in the global situation. The region witnesses the acute competition between major powers (the NSS affirms that the Indo-Pacific is where major power competition is most acutely shaped[11] and where “historic obstacles”[12] in a “decisive decade” emerge). Challenges from China and Russia are closely tied to the Indo-Pacific. Non-traditional issues such as pandemics, supply chain disruption (energy and food), and climate change are present in the region (the NSS emphasizes that the Indo-Pacific is the epicenter of the climate crisis).[13] US allies and partners worldwide are increasingly paying attention to the Indo-Pacific (the IPS states that European allies are increasingly turning their own attention to the Indo-Pacific, and the bipartisan Congress agrees that the US needs to timely catch up with this trend).[14]

Second, the Indo-Pacific is the top priority in Biden's policy documents, both in form and content.

In terms of form, there is an increase in the number of policy documents and statements related to the Indo-Pacific. The US has released an exclusive strategy for Pacific Island nations for the first time (although there is already a separate part about the Pacific in the IPS). Trump’s NSS stressed more on Europe (the word “Europe” mentioned 29 times; the “Indo-Pacific” only 4 times), while Biden’s NSS clearly mentions the Indo-Pacific 32 times (which is more than 19 times for Europe). Furthermore, the Pacific Island nations rank 3rd in Biden’s list of areas of priority, while this area was put just before the bottom (Africa) in Trump’s NSS.

In terms of content, while the Trump administration referred to the Indo-Pacific as “the single most consequential region”,[15] the Biden administration affirms that this region is of “vital US interests”[16] and no region will be of more significance to the world and to American prosperity than the Indo-Pacific.[17] Thus, the US can only be stable when the security of the Indo-Pacific is assured. Other regions, especially Europe and the Arctic, are considered in relation to the Indo-Pacific. To be more specific, the 2022 NSS states that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is “intertwined”, and the Indo-Pacific is the “epicenter” of 21st-century geopolitics.[18] Biden’s IPS also asserts that US allies and partners in Europe tilting toward the Indo-Pacific is necessary despite the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.[19]

Third, the content of the policy documents demonstrates that the Biden administration recognizes the importance of the Indo-Pacific not only due to competition with China or challenges from China, but the inherent value of the region itself.

China is often seen as the primary reason for the US shifting its strategic focus to the region,[20] and US initiatives are often perceived as attempts to contain China's influence.[21] However, the Trump administration's policies tend to view the region in relation to China and consider the US presence as a tool to manage the Sino-US relations, the Biden administration's policy documents demonstrate a greater respect for the region. In the 2022 NSS, the Biden administration affirms that the US does not “see the world solely through the prism of strategic competition” or seek to establish “Cold War” blocs. This implies that US policies towards the region go beyond the Sino-US competition. In the IPS, the Biden administration emphasizes that the Indo-Pacific is closely tied to US interests, particularly economic interests,[22] rather than solely focused on competition with China. In the PPS, the Biden administration does not even mention China by name but highlights the importance of the Pacific Island nations to the US instead. Officials from the Biden administration have also reiterated the statement that the US will develop regional strategies like the PPS even if the US is not competing with China[23] or such initiatives do not target China.[24] Biden’s direction of policy implementation in the region all highlight cooperation with allies and partners rather than competition with China.[25] It is possible that the Biden administration wants to convey the message that the US sees China as a part of the Indo-Pacific rather than the other way around; and that the US has its own interests in the region that are not solely tied to China.

The direction of policy implementation for the region

The foreign policy documents of the Biden administration, including the IPS, outline different directions of policy implementation. Overall, there are three main points of those directions: (i) more comprehensive; (ii) new concepts and initiatives; (iii) Sino-US competition-cooperation elevated in both scope and level.

Firstly, the Biden administration is implementing regional policy in a more comprehensive way. Regarding  the security, the concept of non-traditional security and maritime security is expanded: the US elevates global issues to a “strategic” level for the first time; the pillar of “free and open” not only emphasizes sovereignty, independence, and international law as during the Trump era, but also focuses on liberal democratic values, fiscal transparency and principles and rules in new sectors; maritime security is not limited to challenges on the surface but is connected to airspace, seabed, and outer space. The Biden administration also recognizes security threats in a more complex and diverse way. For the first time, the US documents mention “complex security threats,” “gray zone,” or “below the threshold of conflict”.[26] Regarding non-traditional security, For the first time in its history, the US integrated the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and Missile Defense Review (MDR) into the National Defense Strategy (NDS).

In terms of economy, the US fills the void left by its withdrawal from the TPP with the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). While IPEF is not a trade agreement, it is more comprehensive and flexible with four pillars covering various areas such as trade, industry-agriculture, labor, environment, digital economy, transparent governance, supply chains, infrastructure, clean energy, taxation, and corruption. These are long-term issues and fit the new trend more than the market access right. The detailed content is determined by the US and the 13 IPEF members in the region. In addition to IPEF, the US promotes numerous infrastructure initiatives in the region through mobilizing resources from various sources, not just from the US, such as the “Build Back Better” (B3W) framework with the G7 or the “Partners in the Blue Pacific” (PBP) with Australia, Japan, the UK, Canada, and New Zealand.

In terms of diplomacy, the Biden administration aims to promote more balanced relations between bilateral, mini-lateral, and multilateral mechanisms, between allies and partners, and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In the IPS, the Biden administration asserts that besides the five treaty alliances, the US will enhance relations with regional partners regardless of ideological difference; promote ASEAN centrality; continue to fortify US-led groups; supports India's regional leadership role; elevates Pacific Island nations to “top partners”; emphasizes the connection between the Indo-Pacific and Europe-Atlantic, etc.

Secondly, the Biden administration focuses on key new concepts and initiatives. Regarding security, the US promotes the concept of “integrated deterrence”. Although this concept was first mentioned by US Secretary of Defense Austin in 2021,[27] the policy documents in 2022 provide a more specific definition of this concept with a broader scope compared to Secretary Austin's statement. The initial concept involves integrating existing capabilities with new ones, integrating military and non-military tools, and integrating the deterrent military asset of the US with allies and partners. The later NSS adds three orientations: integrating regions and territories with US homeland, integrating deterrence in three phases of conflict (pre-conflict, during conflict, post-conflict), and integrating capabilities of US government departments and forces.

Additionally, the US Department of Defense also introduces a new concept of military presence called “campaigning”. This concept entails strategically deploying all military activities to weaken the enemy's will and capabilities from within, making it unable to employ gray zone tactics.

Furthermore, the US, along with the Quad, has put forth the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative,[28] which aims to share real-time information at sea with regional partners through emerging technologies to address natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and vessels that do not transmit signals (dark shipping).[29] This could be an indication that the US is targeting China's gray zone activities.

Moreover, the US has introduced a series of new initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century, and the Partners in the Blue Pacific, emphasizing “transformative cooperation”. Although not clearly defined, “transformative cooperation” can be understood as a form of minilateral cooperation with more limited membership and scope of operation but more flexible operational mechanisms, such as AUKUS, Quad, CHIP 4, PBP, and even IPEF (despite having 14 members, IPEF has a relatively “open” mechanism as each country can negotiate and decide the details of the initiative and mode of participation).

Thirdly, the Biden administration is determined to enhance competition with China in terms of both scope and level. This direction is reflected in the way US policy documents identify the rival, scope, and methods of competition. Regarding identifying the rival, the US no longer considers Russia and China at the same level as before, but affirms that China poses a greater threat because it is the only country with the intent and power to reshape the international system.[30] In terms of geographic scope, the US expands competition from the Pacific to a global scale, prioritizing regions where China is seeking to increase its influence, particularly the Pacific Island nations.[31] The NSS, for the first time, includes an exclusive section on the Arctic and the domains where China is increasing its presence, such as the sea surface, airspace, and outer space, while at the same time focusing on developing new principles and regulations in these domains. In terms of methods, in the economic field, instead of focusing solely on trade wars or tariffs like Trump did, the Biden administration expands competition to emerging technology, especially in semiconductors. In the security field, the US states that the goal of “integrated deterrence” is to deter China in all domains.[32]

Implications for Vietnam

The content and implementation activities of Indo-Pacific policies demonstrate that the US highly values Vietnam. Some policy documents that directly mention Vietnam, such as the IPS or the Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), consider Vietnam as one of the “leading” regional countries. Although the NSS and NDS do not directly mention Vietnam, this country is still one of the few ASEAN members (besides Singapore) referenced in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG). Traditionally, the NSS and NDS do not mention ASEAN members by name, even when some of them are US allies.

Issues such as the Mekong or the South China Sea are not or rarely mentioned in US Indo-Pacific policy documents. However, there are many other issues consistent with Vietnam’s direction. Specifically, the important role of the Indo-Pacific region is prioritized; the US asserts its pursuit of multilateralism and promotes ASEAN’s central role; China’s grey zone challenges are noticed; climate change, cyber security, inequality in development... are issues of special concern to Vietnam, especially when this country has just been elected as a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council and set a net zero emissions target by 2050.

During the policy implementation process, Vietnam is the US' interest partner. Vietnam potentially receives the third US Coast Guard ship through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program[33], and was early invited to join the IPEF or IPMDA. Vietnam is also one of the countries chosen to promote the Biden administration’s Limits in the Seas No. 150 (LITS 150[34]) and its first IPMDA. US officials also said that some documents (such as the NSS or LITS 150) are proposed to be translated into Vietnamese, demonstrating the extent to which it has been a “reader” that the US is looking for. During the IPS promotion at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, US Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Kritenbrink also affirmed that Vietnam is the US’ critical partner in all IPS’ five pillars (free and open region, connections, economy – prosperity, security and resilience against transnational threats). The US internally also highly values Vietnam’s position in the US regional vision and appreciates the positive and active spirit of Vietnam diplomacy.


The analysis above shows that Vietnam has an important position in the US Indo-Pacific policy documents, bringing many opportunities for this country. In terms of strategy, Vietnam has the potential to enhance its position as one of the few US-valued ASEAN members. US allies may therefore also have a similar respect for Vietnam. In addition, in the context of expanding great power competition and strengthening links with the region, the US needs greater support from “like-minded” partners and more members to join its new initiatives, therefore, Vietnam will certainly have more importance to the US.

In terms of security, the rules-based order that the US promotes is beneficial to Vietnam's security. The 13th National Party Congress determines that protecting independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity is a national interest and international law is the sharpest weapon for small countries to achieve it; if all parties comply with international law, Vietnam will also maintain peace and stability, especially in cyberspace, outer space, seabed or airspace, which are areas that Vietnam does not have many technical strengths.

Vietnam can strengthen its defense capability. For example, Vietnam can receive more assistance for its maritime capacity, especially law enforcement through the US’s deployment of “integrated deterrence” in the South China Sea, which is to promote partners’ maritime capacity in parallel with the US’ capacity (President Biden has committed 60 million USD to support initiatives led by the US Coast Guard in the Indo-Pacific region).[35] The NDS’s creation of a new tactical concept called “campaigning” aiming for “grey zone” challenges may also bring benefits to Vietnam, as Vietnam needs to address new challenges in the South China Sea rising from militia vessels, survey vessels, or foreign floating drilling rigs. The increasing presence of the US Coast Guard in the region according to the direction of the documents also has a deterrent effect on illegal fishing ships (IUU), piracy, or smuggling.[36] In terms of “soft” capacity, many soft capacity supporting programs for Vietnamese forces in the previous year came from the PDI initiative, such as foreign language training, comprehensive security or SeaVision programs for Vietnamese officials. The IPMDA initiative led by Quad can provide more comprehensive information about the operations of ships on the ground, including ships turning off AIS signals. Therefore, it helps Vietnam notice incidents at sea sooner, and manage fishing vessels more effectively, which can contribute to removing the EU’s “yellow card” soon (especially when EU inspectors come to Vietnam to check on the progress in handling illegal fishing in 2023). IPMDA also creates a new cooperation forum for countries with a shared interest in maritime security and expands the gathering of Vietnamese forces in sea and island issues.

In addition, Vietnam can attract more resources from the US to address global issues directly affecting its security and development. The 13th National Party Congress identifies “climate change, natural disasters, diseases, and other non-traditional security issues” as challenges of particular concern to Vietnam. Biden administration’s documents also show similar concerns and the US is seeking to mobilize resources and increase international cooperation to solve these issues.

Regarding the economic benefits, the initiatives set out in the US documents, especially the IPEF, may help Vietnam realize economic development orientations, including post-pandemic economic recovery, sustainable economic development, market and supply sources diversification, digital economy, and tariff reduction, etc. Vietnam can also contribute to shaping the contents of the IPEF instead of passively participating – which is consistent with its desire to shape multilateral political-economic institutions provided in the 13th National Party Congress. Besides the IPEF, US infrastructure initiatives and investment in ASEAN infrastructure also promise to provide investment capital transparently and meet high standards of environment, labor, and quality. The US promotion of new supply chains also brings the potential for Vietnam to become an important production base, thereby gaining technology to take to higher levels in the production chain.

Regarding diplomacy, the US promotion of the ASEAN centrality, sending an Ambassador to ASEAN, expanding its delegation, and more active engagement with ASEAN is consistent with Vietnam’s interest and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The US’ high appreciation of ASEAN also helps other US groups to be more accepted, opening up opportunities for cooperation between Vietnam and these cooperation mechanisms, including the Quad.


However, Vietnam may have to deal with many challenges. In terms of strategy, these documents pay attention to Vietnam, but its position can still be undermined. As the scope of the Sino-US competition is increasingly expanding, the US will have to focus on other partners and regions, which makes the Sino-US competition in areas adjacent to Vietnam such as the South China Sea receive less consideration. The US also set higher expectations for Vietnam’s voice in the international community, meanwhile, the two sides still have different stances on concerns regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, trade, currency, Russian arms procurement, etc.

In terms of security, the Sino-US competition may pose an impact on traditional and non-traditional security, and Vietnam’s rights of self-determination. First, Vietnam is potentially caught between a rock and a hard place, especially in the context that China is promoting many new initiatives and reacting more aggressively to the US presence in the region. Second, the risk of on-the-ground collisions is increasing, as all parties are strengthening their activities at sea, underwater, and in the air. Some US internal officials having “hawkish” views want to escalate tensions to have an “excuse” to promote competition with China, which would be an extremely dangerous scenario as it could spark a clash. Third, the region is encountering the risk of a nuclear race. The new NDS shows that the Biden administration is not pursuing the “no first use” principle as promised, and could seek to increase the number of warheads. The NDS said that the US will develop the W76-2 warhead launched from submarines and is committed to increasing its underwater presence, causing more collision risks in the South China Sea, especially when there is information saying that the US used to have submarine incidents here due to its outdated seabed maps.[37]

Vietnam may also bear other pressures when the US implements its documents: the NSS mentions ideological competition (democracy – non-democracy), whereas Vietnam and the US still have many differences in which; the direct mentioning of Vietnam in some important documents may also put pressure on this country to promote military cooperation beyond its “four Nos” defense policy; security initiatives like the IPMDA are not yet transparent, especially in terms of technology and member responsibilities, which may give rise to technical concerns (whether technologies integrated into the IPMDA is suitable for Vietnam’s existing technologies or pose impacts on national security?).

Regarding non-traditional security, the US cooperation mechanisms may be not entirely substantive. Vietnam-US cooperation on global issues in particular and the progress in repelling global challenges in general can be used as a “card” in the Sino-US play. For example, China stopped the bilateral climate change dialogue in response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The US domestic politics also does not completely agree on promoting the green economy. Many opposing opinions believe that the “green transition” will make the US more dependent on China as it has to import a lot of electronic battery materials[38] or damage the US economy.[39]

Regarding to economy, the IPEF still has many limitations. With the trade pillar, the US expects participating countries to commit to meeting all labor requirements (independent unions) and digital standards (especially freedom and security of information). With the supply chain pillar, the US intends to prevent dual-use technology transfer to China, require countries to tighten exports and technology transfers, and even give up control of the supply chain. Meanwhile, Vietnam is encouraging core technology imports and massive electronics exports to China (the largest among exported products).[40] Regarding infrastructure, clean energy, and decarbonization, initial costs to produce renewable energy are higher compared to fossil energy and Vietnam’s existing infrastructure (Vietnam is still using more than 50% of its energy from coal). The ability to mobilize capital for initiatives such as the B3W and the Blue Dot Network remains unclear. In terms of anti-corruption, this is a sensitive field as Vietnam is assessed by US Trading Economics as having a high corruption index (the highest record in 2021)[41].

In terms of diplomacy, the Indo-Pacific policy documents may pose impacts on the ASEAN central role. First, the IPS has many differences from the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Second, the “ASEAN central role” may just be a slogan. The US honors ASEAN but at the same time also promotes Quad as the leading grouping in the region. Third, within ASEAN, the US also tends to focus on some key bilateral partners including Vietnam and its former allies, while somewhat “neglecting” some remaining countries (the IPEF does not have the participation of Laos or Cambodia; the US Summit for Democracy excluded Singapore). This could intensify the rift between ASEAN.


In 2022, the Biden administration released a series of policy documents and statements related to the Indo-Pacific region, including the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the new Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Pacific Partnership Strategy, and the Administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China, demonstrating a change in its way to shape the region. Accordingly, the Indo-Pacific is the US’ top priority in the new landscape, which is to determine its vital interests and not merely tied to Sino-US competition. Many other regions in the world, especially Europe, are assessed concerning the Indo-Pacific. The documents also show the US’ adjustments in strengthening its presence in the region, including covering fields more comprehensively, focusing on “key” initiatives such as the IPEF and IPMDA, or new tactics such as “integrated deterrence” and “campaign”, and enhancing great power competition both in terms of scope and level.  

The important role of Vietnam is also reflected in the US’ new policy documents. Even without mentioning the Mekong or not focusing too much on the South China Sea, US policy documents still have many contents consistent with Vietnam’s direction. To take full opportunities from the policy implementation, increase Vietnam’s value in the international community, and limit the negative impacts of Sino-US competition on Vietnam and ASEAN, Vietnam can actively participate in new US initiatives within its capacity and in accordance with its interests; flexibly promote soft capacity building, and direct the US’ security resources to address South China Sea’ grey zone issues, even lobbying the Biden administration to issue separate documents on Southeast Asia or the South China Sea as the way the US has done with the Pacific Islands. Simultaneously, Vietnam also needs to support other parties’ Indo-Pacific policies, as this is a general trend welcomed by ASEAN. During this process, Vietnam needs to assess the “pieces of the policy puzzle” following its national interests and thoroughly seek to reduce the pressure of “choosing sides” from great power competition./.


* M.A. East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. The author would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nguyễn Thị Lan Anh, Dr. Lại Thái Bình, Mr. Lưu Việt Hà and Ms. Đỗ Ngân for their support during the process of writing this paper.

[1] “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Archived Trump White House, 18/12/2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 

[2] “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report ,” U.S. Department of Defense, 1/7/2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF

[3] “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific - Advancing a Shared Vision,” U.S. Department of State, 4/11/2019,   https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf

[4] Jeff Smith, Unpacking the Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, War on the Rocks, 14/3/2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/unpacking-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific/

[5] Peter Beinart, “Trump Doesn't Seem to Buy His Own National Security Strategy”, The Atlantic, 19/12/2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/nss-trump-principled-realism/548741/

[6] “Indo- Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, 11/2/2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

[7] Antony J. Blinken, “The Administration's Approach to the People's Republic of China - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State, 26/5/2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

[8] “Pacific Partnership Strategy of The United States,” The White House, 29/9/2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Pacific-Partnership-Strategy.pdf 

[9] “Biden-Harris Administration's National Security Strategy,” The White House, 12/10/2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

[10] “2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States,” U.S. Department of Defense, 27/10/2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF

[11] Footnote 9, page 11

[12] Footnote 6, page 6.

[13] Footnote 9, page 38.

[14] Footnote 6, page 5.

[15] “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report ,” U.S. Department of Defense, 1/7/2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF

[16] “2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States,” U.S. Department of Defense, 27/10/2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF

[17] Footnote 9, page 38.

[18] ibid, page 17 & 37.

[19] Footnote 14.

[20] Premesha Saha, “From ‘Pivot to Asia’ to Trump’s ARIA: What Drives the US’ Current Asia Policy?,” ORF Occasional Paper no.236 (2/2020), https://www.orfonline.org/research/from-pivot-to-asia-to-trumps-aria-what-drives-the-us-current-asia-policy-61556/

[21] Ted Carpenter, “Washington’s Three‐​pronged Strategy to Contain China’s Military Power”, CATO, 8/10/2020, https://www.cato.org/commentary/washingtons-three-pronged-strategy-contain-chinas-military-power

[22] The documents state that the Indo-Pacific is where the US has the most military bases; supports more than 3 million American jobs; is the source of nearly 900 billion USD in foreign direct investment in the United States, and is a large market with more than 1.5 billion people will join the global middle class in this decade.

[23] Phelim Kine, “U.S. looks to claim victory in Pacific Islands influence battle with China”, Politico, 21/9/2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/21/pacific-islands-influence-china-us-00057911

[24] “The Veracity of Indo-U.S. Defence Ties”, Kashmir Observer, 14/2/2023, https://kashmirobserver.net/2023/02/14/the-veracity-of-indo-u-s-defence-ties/

[25] For example, the NDS list of directions of policy implemtation prioritizes modernizing the alliance with Japan and Australia; promoting cooperation with AUKUS and QUAD, and partnerships with India - Korea – Taiwan; supporting the role of ASEAN; etc and then dealing with China's "gray zone" activities. The US also prioritizes maintain communication with the Chinese military and managing competition responsibly.

[26] The 2022 NDS affirms that the US is committed to supporting allies and partners in responding to China's gray zone activities, including in the South China Sea, while previous NDS versions did not mention this challenge.

[27] “Austin Discusses Need for Indo-Pacific Partnerships in the Future,” U.S. Department of Defense, 27/7/2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2708315/austin-discusses-need-for-indo-pacific-partnerships-in-the-future/

[28] “Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders' Tokyo Summit 2022,” The White House, 23/5/2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022/

[29] Vessels that do turn off AIS to avoid being tracked.

[30] “Biden-Harris Administration's National Security Strategy,” The White House, 12/10/2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

[31] China recently has reached a security agreement with Solomon, sought to sign security and economic agreements with Pacific island nations, and persuaded many Pacific island nations to abandon diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.

[32] Previously, US officials, when promoting the concept, did not clearly state the object of deterrence and only explained the "integrated" aspect of capabilities, fields and partners.

[33] https://vnexpress.net/dai-su-knapper-my-san-sang-chuyen-tau-tuan-tra-thu-ba-cho-viet-nam-4453767.html

[34] The report rejects some of China’ claims in the South China Sea based on historical rights or customary international law.

[35] See note 3.

[36] Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, “Joe Biden's New Indo-Pacific Strategy: A View from Southeast Asia,” The Lowy Institute, February 16, 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/joe-biden-s-new-indo-pacific-strategy-view-southeast-asia

[37] Liu Xuanzun, “US Spy Ship Conducts Extensive Activities in S.china Sea, 'Aims to Collect Data to Support Submarine Warfare against China',” Global Times, October 11, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1235992.shtml; Tucker Reals, “U.S. Nuclear Submarine USS Connecticut Damaged in Underwater Collision with Unknown ‘Object’ in South China Sea,” CBS News, October 8, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nuclear-submarine-uss-connecticut-south-china-sea-collision-unknown-object/

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[39] Lisa Friedman, “G.O.P. Coronavirus Message: Economic Crisis Is a Green New Deal Preview,” The New York Times, May 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/climate/coronavirus-republicans-climate-change.html

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