Overview of the U.S. Executive Order
The Executive Order outlines a concrete roadmap to advance deep-sea mineral extraction through five key priorities: (i) accelerating the permitting process for exploration and mining on the U.S. outer continental shelf and in international waters beyond national jurisdiction; (ii) developing a domestic supply chain for critical minerals such as nickel, cobalt, copper, manganese, titanium, and rare earth elements; (iii) boosting investment in deep-sea science, seabed mapping, and extraction technologies; (iv) fostering cooperation with allied states to explore and extract minerals within their maritime jurisdictions; and (v) countering China’s growing influence in deep-sea mineral governance and supply chains.
The domestic coordination plan is structured as follows: The U.S. Department of Commerce, through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), will facilitate licensing for exploration and extraction of deep-sea minerals in areas beyond national jurisdiction under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980. The Department of the Interior is tasked with expediting permit approvals for operations on the U.S. outer continental shelf under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The Departments of Defense and Energy will assess the feasibility of incorporating deep-sea minerals into the national defense stockpile. Notably, the order paves the way for extensive private sector participation, encouraging companies such as The Metals Company and Impossible Metals to seek mining licenses in locations like the waters off Samoa [2].
However, the Executive Order has drawn some international criticism, primarily concerning international law and potential ecological harm to the marine environment. On April 25, 2025, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun condemned the order as “a violation of international law and a threat to the common interests of the international community” [3]. As of 2024, 32 countries - including the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, Mexico, and Peru - had called for a moratorium on deep-sea mining until clear international regulations are established to safeguard the marine environment [4], hence it could be possible to predict that the U.S. order might not be universally embraced. The International Seabed Authority has (ISA) also expressed concern, warning that unilateral U.S. actions could undermine global governance mechanisms and set a precedent for unregulated deep-sea exploitation [5].
Strategic Objectives Behind the Executive Order
In addition to the five key priorities outlined above, the Executive Order may serve other purposes, particularly as the Trump 2.0 administration seeks to compete strategically with major powers while bolstering its domestic legitimacy.
First, the Executive Order may signal a new phase in great power competition, making the deep seabed an even more resolute battleground. With China, the U.S. aims to break China’s monopoly over the global critical minerals supply chain [6] by: (i) unilaterally allowing U.S. companies to apply for exploration licenses in previously untapped U.S. waters [7], thereby diversifying mineral sources and reducing dependence on China; (ii) increasing U.S. presence in the Pacific, particularly in the resource-rich Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) [8], where China has been granted exploration licenses by the ISA (the U.S. first issued deep-sea mining permits in the CCZ in 1984).
With Russia, the U.S. might seek to challenge Russia’s dominance in the Arctic [9]. The U.S. may have made several moves to pave the way for this tendency, such as the 2023 announcement of its extended continental shelf claim, which includes areas offshore from Alaska (the edge of the Arctic Ocean) [10], as well as expressing intentions to “acquire” Greenland in 2025. This approach, if proven true, aligns well with the “America First” and “peace through strength” principles of the Trump 2.0 administration.
Second, the Executive Order may serve as a tool for the U.S. to establish new norms for deep-sea mining. As the U.S. is not a member of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it cannot submit its extended continental shelf claim to the Continental Shelf Commission (CLCS) for recommendations [11] or engage in negotiations and apply for deep-sea mining exploration licenses at the International Seabed Authority (ISA). With countries such as Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand already granting deep-sea mineral exploration licenses on their extended continental shelves, the U.S. cannot remain on the sidelines and might seek to demonstrate its rules-shaping power. In addition to the recent Executive Order, the U.S. has made several moves toward establishing norms in this area, such as promoting its own 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act; rallying like-minded partners like Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK to form a “united front” at the ISA and setting standards for “responsible mining.” These efforts can indirectly legitimize the U.S. approach in deep-sea mining [12].
Third, the Executive Order may also serve as a tool for the U.S. to build and expand cooperation with allies. The U.S. led the establishment of the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP) in 2022 with 15 countries to develop a sustainable supply chain for strategic minerals [13]. Together with Canada and Australia, the U.S. launched the Earth Mineral Resource Initiative (Earth MRI) to collaborate on scientific research and mineral resource analysis [14]. Bilaterally, the U.S. has also strengthened ties with close partners such as Japan, South Korea, and South Africa by expanding the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) to diversify mineral supply sources. These multilateral and bilateral mechanisms could be further developed as specific mining activities expand into new maritime areas such as the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ).
Fourth, the Executive Order may serve as a solution for the Trump 2.0 administration to meet its domestic economic and political objectives. The deep-sea mining industry could generate over $300 billion and create 100,000 jobs for the U.S. in the next decade [15], helping Trump fulfill his promises to voters. He may also use the Executive Order to demonstrate his efforts in pushing administrative reforms and attracting business investment, providing an alternative to Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) or the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL). Additionally, some sources suggest that the order may have resulted from lobbying by the Canadian company The Metals Co [16]. The company, which already has a branch in the U.S., is likely to receive approval for deep-sea mining (particularly in the CCZ) from the U.S. government, with support from the Executive Order. Moreover, the U.S. has also advanced partnerships with Lockheed Martin, focusing on the exploration and extraction of metal nodules in the CCZ through domestic licenses [17].
International Implications of the Executive Order
The Executive Order could lead to numerous international repercussions, impacting the interests of third-party stakeholders
Strategically, the Executive Order expands the scope and areas of great power competition. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) will become the next “hotspot” between the U.S. and China. The U.S.-Russia-China competition in the Arctic, especially as climate change causes ice to melt, will become more pronounced. Unilateral U.S. deep-sea mining activities could prompt China, Russia, and other countries to follow suit, negatively affecting international law and the legitimate interests of small island nations in the Pacific [18].
On the legal front, the Executive Order could set a troubling precedent in an area where international law is not yet clearly defined. The order mentions deep-sea mining in the Area, a matter currently under negotiation by the International Seabed Authority (ISA). U.S. unilateral actions could encourage other countries to bypass ISA mechanisms, undermining global governance and multilateralism and leading to the risk of unregulated mining, exploitation without profit-sharing as mandated by UNCLOS, or disputes over the ownership of newly discovered marine resources.
In terms of non-traditional security, the Executive Order could present significant environmental challenges. Environmental organizations within the U.S. itself have raised concerns about the order, as deep-sea industrial activities could cause irreparable damage to deep-sea biodiversity, an area that remains largely unexplored [19]. This concern is also shared by many international environmental organizations and experts. For example, groups such as Fauna & Flora International and the Deep Sea Conservation Coalition (DSCC) have called for a halt to deep-sea mining, emphasizing that such activities could result in “irreversible” harm to deep-sea ecosystems and exacerbate the climate crisis by disrupting the ocean's carbon storage capacity [20]. However, since its first term, the Trump administration has shown a tendency to prioritize the economy and energy over environmental concerns [21]. This only amplifies the challenge, especially for countries that are particularly vulnerable to marine environmental risks.
Conclusion
The Executive Order on deep-sea mineral extraction issued on April 24, 2025, is a clear manifestation of the new domestic and foreign policy of the U.S. under Trump 2.0: reinforcing U.S’s power and dominance; preventing the rise of geopolitical adversaries; and shaping a new set of rules beneficial to U.S. security and economy. However, its unilateral , lacking international consultation, places the U.S. at risk of increased criticism from the global community. As international waters increasingly become a space for strategic competition, U.S. deep-sea mining policy will serve as an important gauge of how a superpower views its power and responsibility in the 21st century.
Ngoc Mai - Hop Chau - Do Hoang*
South China Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
The views expressed in this article are solely of the authors
Endnote:
[6] “U.S. Interest in Seabed Mining in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Brief Background and Recent Developments.” Congressional Research Service, April 25, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12608.
[7] Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz, “Trump’s Deep-Sea Mining Executive Order: The Race for Critical Minerals Enters Uncharted Waters,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 25, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-deep-sea-mining-executive-order-race-critical-minerals-enters-uncharted-waters.
[8] The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) is a vast area located between Hawaii and Mexico, known for its abundant reserves of polymetallic nodules containing valuable metals such as nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese.
[9] Russia currently possesses the largest number of military bases, warships, and icebreakers in the Arctic, and has issued its 2022 Maritime Doctrine affirming its ambition to become a maritime power and to assert control over the Northern Sea Route.
[14] McCormick, Rhys, Samantha Cohen, Andrew P. Hunter, Gregory Sanders, Samuel Mooney, and Daniel Herschlag. “Introduction.” National Technology and Industrial Base Integration: How to Overcome Barriers and Capitalize on Cooperation. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2018. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22430.3.
