50 Days of Trump: The South China Sea in the United States’ Foreign Policy

Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS William P. Lawrence (DDG-110) transits the South China Sea, January 2025. Source: USPACOM

 

 

Overall, to some degree, the Trump 2.0 Administration still maintained a consistent strategic interest in the South China Sea, with no significant departure from the United States’ approaches towards this region during the Biden era. This is true considering the United States’ diplomatic, political, and on-site activities with regards to the South China Sea in Trump 2.0’s first 50 days.

 

On the ground, the United States continued to assert its presence in the South China Sea by actively participating in joint patrols and military exercises with regional allies and partners. Bilaterally, the United States conducted a joint air patrol with the Philippines in the South China Sea on 4 February [1], a platform seizure training also with the Philippines in the South China Sea on 1 March [2]. It also organized two multilateral maritime cooperation (MCA) activities, one with the Philippines, Australia and Japan on 5 February [3], and the other involved Philippines and Canada (on 12 February [4]). From 26 December 2024 to 22 March 2025, the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier was deployed to the South China Sea to conduct joint drills with allies and partners. From 13 to 14 January, the United States Coast Guard collaborated with the Philippines Coast Guard to organize a training course on ship inspection and maintenance for Vietnamese and Indonesian officers, with Australia as an observer [5]. The United States, France and Japan also held the Exercise Pacific Steller 2025 from 8 to 19 February, which included some drills carried out in the South China Sea [6].

 

In the first 50 days of the Trump 2.0 Administration, the United States had thus organized or participated in at least six multilateral on-site operations in the South China Sea – a significant increase compared to the same period during the Trump 1.0 and Biden eras. In the early days of the Trump 1.0 and Biden administrations, the United States’ activities were limited in number primarily unilateral. Particularly, in their first 50 days, the Trump 1.0 Administration conducted one patrol in the South China Sea with the USS Carl Vinson carrier fleet, while under Biden the United States carried out a single Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and deployed an aircraft carrier fleet in the region.

 

Furthermore, the seemingly intensifying frequency and continuity of MCAs under early days of Trump 2.0 suggests that the United States might want to “formalize” MCAs as a core mechanism for maintaining its presence in the South China Sea [7]

 

With regards to diplomatic activities, although Donald Trump himself only mentioned the South China Sea once (during a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba), high-level officials explicitly raised the South China Sea issue in diplomatic engagements with their counterparts from allied and partnered countries.

 

Particularly, Secretary of State Marco Rubio was quite vocal in accusing China of undermining peace and stability in the South China Sea in various encounters with counterparts in Southeast Asia, including Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique A. Malano (on 22 January [8]), Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono (on 22 January [9]) and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son (on 24 January [10]). In a phone talk with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on January 24 [11], Rubio emphasized the United States commitment to its regional allies and expressed "deep concern" over China's "coercive behavior" in the South China Sea. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth also held a phone call with his Philippine counterpart on 5 February [12], during which the two sides discussed "re-establishing" deterrence in the South China Sea through cooperation with allies and partners.

 

Such a dynamic was taken beyond Southeast Asia. The United States-Japan Summit joint statement on Feb. 7 reiterated “strong opposition” to China's "unlawful maritime claims, militarization of reclaimed features, and threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea" and "threatening and aggressive behavior" in the South China Sea [13]. The United States-Japan-South Korea Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement on (February 19) [14] and the G7 Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement (February 15) [15] on the sidelines of the 2025 Munich Security Conference also consist strong opposition towards China's acts of restricting freedom of navigation, militarization, and coercion in the South China Sea. Additionally, the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting's joint statement on 21 January also exposes unilateral actions aimed at changing the status quo through force or coercion – seemingly an implicit reference to China's activities in the South China Sea.

 

It is worth mentioning that the United States also actively responded to notable incidents in the South China Sea. The United States Department of State condemned China on two incidents, one involved a Chinese Navy helicopter intercepting a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources’ patrol aircraft at a proximity of under 3 meters on 18 February and the other involved a Chinese J-16 fighter deploying flares against an Australian P-8A on 11 February, calling such China’s actions “reckless” and were “a threat to navigation and overflight in the South China Sea” [16].

 

Compared to the early days of the Trump 1.0 and Biden administrations, the South China Sea seemed like a more prominent issue for the United States under Trump 2.0 on the diplomatic front, at least rhetorically. Senior Trump 2.0 officials addressed it more frequently and in tougher tones. According to available public data, during the same period in Trump’s first term, the South China Sea was mentioned only in the US-Japan joint statement between President Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe [17] and in a discussion between then-United States Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and his Japanese counterpart Tomomi Inada [18]. At the time, the United States’ rhetoric largely focused on calling for restraint and avoid escalations. Likewise, the Biden Administration paid relatively low attention to the South China Sea in the similar period. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Ausin only mentioned the South China Sea as one among many other security issues in a call with his Philippine counterpart Delfin Lorenzana on 10 February 2021.

 

Accordingly, a key difference in the Trump 2.0’s approach is the scope of its diplomatic engagements. Unlike two preceding administrations, which primarily engaged with major powers and traditional allies in the early days of their terms, Trump 2.0 actively reached out to countries directly involved in or bordering the South China Sea, such as Indonesia and Vietnam [19].

 

 

The United States’ South China Sea policy is oftentimes closely intertwined with broader frameworks, including its China policy, Indo-Pacific strategy, and resource allocation. These factors likely came into play in Trump 2.0’s engagement in the South China Sea within the first 50 days. By maintaining the United States’ presence in the region, the Trump 2.0 Administration underscores key U.S. interests and values—particularly the principles of freedom of navigation (linked to trade interests and maintaining the United States’ influence) and the promotion of a "rules-based order" (as defined by Washington).

 

 

 

While the Trump 2.0 Administration has yet to release any formal national security-related documents, Trump and his aides alike continue to embrace the "peace through strength" concept, which identifies China as a primary strategic challenge. This doctrine could be a good indicator of how the United States will engage with China, particularly in the South China Sea.

 

Theoretically, the "peace through strength" concept implies strengthening military capabilities to ensure strategic solvency and the ability to respond to military conflict on multiple fronts [20]. Therefore, identifying China as the main adversary requires the United States to be well-prepared potential contingencies in the Pacific, including the South China Sea. Furthermore, Trump himself emphasized that "peace through strength" also lies in the ability to “avoid wars" [21]. This approach requires constant United States’ engagement in the South China Sea to communicate deterrence, discouraging Chinese expansionist ambitions while reducing the likelihood of direct confrontation.

 

Many United States’ officials during the Trump 2.0 era have endorsed this concept. For example, in a meeting between Trump and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairperson Roger Wicker, China was explicitly identified as the United States’ primary competitor in the defense technology race. The discussion also underscored the need to bolster the United States’ defense industries and deterrence capabilities against China’s growing military influence [22]. Additionally, in a letter to the United States’ army on 25 January 2025, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth named China as a threat in the Indo-Pacific, and deterring such a threat is one core objective of the "peace through strength" concept [23].

 

 

In just under 50 days, the Trump 2.0 Administration has taken serious steps to intensify pressure on China – some of which have indirect impacts on the South China Sea, signaling the United States' willingness to maintain presence in the South China Sea. 

 

For example, the administration has imposed an additional 20% tariff on Chinese imports [24] and has urged Mexico and Canada to increase tariffs on Chinese goods. Trump also issued an executive order blocking Chinese investments in high technology, energy, and other strategic U.S. sectors, including food, farmland, mining, and seaports. Moreover, the United States has proposed an additional fee of up to USD 1.5m for commercial cargo ships entering the American ports that have Chinese origins, aiming to disrupt China’s dominance in global shipbuilding [25].

 

Trump’s tough stance extends well beyond economic measures. Senator Marco Rubio’s first foreign trip was to Panama to pressure Panama’s Government to withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative and prevent Chinese firms from owning the Panama Canal. In his address to Congress on 5 March, Trump further escalated his rhetoric against China, vowing to continue tariffs on Chinese goods despite concerns over market instabilities [26]. He also pledged to reclaim Panama from Chinese influence and demanded American tech giants such as Apple to relocate their production facilities from China to the United States [27]. Trump also committed to revitalize the United States’ civil and military shipbuilding industry, signaling an intent to contain China's growing maritime influence and naval capabilities. 

 

 

Early actions and diplomatic engagements of the Trump 2.0 Administration suggest that the Indo-Pacific remains a strategic priority for in the United States’ foreign policy. This might reinforce the United States’ involvement in the South China Sea, given the region’s geopolitical significance, its connection to the "rules-based order", and the vested interests of the United States’ allies and partners.

 

The Trump 2.0 Administration’s high-level meetings, calls and other diplomatic engagement in the first 50 days were with key Indo-Pacific allies, including Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. In these encounters, top officials like Pete Hegseth and State Marco Rubio deliberately reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to bolstering alliances, protecting allies, and strengthening military cooperation – particularly in strategic locations such as Japan’s Southwest Islands. Notably, Rubio even described the United States’ alliance with the Philippines as “ironclad” [28], signaling a firm stance on regional security. President Trump himself also pledged to enhance the United States’ deterrence capabilities to protect Japan and other allies in a press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba on 8 February [29].

 

Despite such rhetorics, Trump recently criticized the United States-Japan Security Treaty “un-reciprocal” [30] even after previously vowing to protect Japan [31]. Similarly, his nominee for Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby suggested that Taiwan should increase its military budget to 10% of GDP [32] – a highly implausible prospect, and Trump himself often insinuates about Taiwan not paying adequately. These signals further complicate the United States’ support for Taiwan, especially considering Trump previous emphasis on peace in the Taiwan Strait or endorsement for the island’s role in international organizations.

 

However, as in the Trump 1.0 era, the United States’ allies have proved to be quite skillful in encouraging the United States to maintain its engagement in the region. Even if the Trump 2.0 Administration is about to scale back security commitments, it would still have strong incentives to maintain a unilateral presence in the South China Sea – both to prevent a strategic vacuum that China could exploit and to preserve relationships with key alliances and geopolitical advantages. 

 

 

Following the United States’ large-scale strike against Houthi rebels in Yemen, concerns have emerged that Trump's aggressive foreign policy approach could strain the United States’ resources [33]. While this concern is valid to some extent [34], early indicators suggest that the United States’ resource allocation to the Indo-Pacific – including the South China Sea – has not diminished and may even increase in the future. 

 

First, multiple U.S. officials have underscored the Indo-Pacific’s importance to the Trump 2.0 Administration. Trump 2.0 officials even went so far as to urge Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security, thus allowing the United States to concentrate its resources on the Indo-Pacific theater. On February 12, in Brussels, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called on Europe to shoulder more of its security burden so the United States could "prevent a war with China" in the Indo-Pacific. On April 3, during a Congressional hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense nominee Elbridge Colby advocated for a major resource shift away from other regions to prioritize competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, the Heritage Foundation recommended increasing defense spending to sustain the United States’ involvement in the South China Sea, even when there might be other urgent security demands [35]. Similarly, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) published a policy proposal in 2022 which identified containing China in the South China Sea as a key component of "American Strength” [37]. These figures and institutions are known for their close ties to Trump and might have considerable influence over his decisions. Meanwhile, traditional Republicans who favor continued United States’ presence and resource allocation to other regions (namely in the Middle East and Europe) appear to be losing influence in the Trump 2.0 era [39].

 

Second, although detailed spendings for the United States’ annual operations in the South China Sea remain publicly unavailable, existing data suggests that resource allocation is relatively modest compared to other security commitments. The Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative (IPDI) for 2024 estimated over $10bln [40], but only $1.1bln was earmarked for capacity-building programs for allies and partners – a key approach of the United States in the South China Sea. And while the United States in 2024 provided USD 2bln in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Indo-Pacific nations in 2024[41], it is only a small fraction if compared to nearly $200bln of aid to Ukraine during the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war, or the $4bln of aid committed to Israel alone – to name just a few [42]. Much of IPDI funding is for maintenance of bases, infrastructure, and procurement of equipment – expenditures that could be adjusted without necessarily reducing deterrence in the South China Sea. For these reasons, the United States’ financial allocation – thus its engagement – in the South China Sea remains sustainable even as the country looks towards other security demands.

 

Third and empirically, despite common concerns over resource allocation, early signs show that the Trump 2.0 Administration has continued to prioritize the United States’ involvement in the Indo-Pacific. On January 21, the first high-profile diplomatic event after Trump’s inauguration was the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Washington, where members reaffirmed security cooperation and joint investment in regional security initiatives. On February 7, during a meeting with Australian counterpart, the United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to joint defense technology cooperation under AUKUS and recognized the mechanism’s role in strengthening regional security [43]. On 16 March, Reuters reported that the United States had deployed the USS Minnesota submarine to Australia as part of AUKUS. This move came despite concerns from Elbridge Colby over the United States’ underperformed shipbuilding industry, thus further signaling the United States’ continued commitment to AUKUS even amid domestic constraints. It is also important to note that while most foreign aids were temporarily frozen under Trump 2.0 for reviews, the Department of States decided to exempt security programme to the Philippines [44]. This decision highlights that Indo-Pacific engagement – including in the South China Sea – remains a priority and has not been sacrificed for other interests.

 

 

During its first 50 days, the Trump 2.0 Administration exhibited several indications that could influence the United States' approach to initial engagement in the South China Sea, though in a negative fashion. While some of these factors may seem unlikely to materialize, they still deserve careful consideration.

 

First, regarding leadership style, Trump appears to adopt a more transactional approach, therefore his foreign policy will likely focus on his narrow interpretation of national interests over the traditional (or is often assumed) role of the United Sates as a provider of global “public goods”. Considering Trump’s recent decisions – withdrawing the United States from some prominent multilateral agreement, protectionist policies, and populist rhetorics, one might argue that the United States now wants to strip off its internationalist burden of safeguarding international orders. If this is the case, Trump 2.0 might adopt a more pragmatic, case-by-case approach towards promoting freedom of the seas, freedom of navigation, and security in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or Taiwan. While there could be some principles that Trump still has interests in protecting like freedom of navigation, as he cited this to amplify the attack against Houthi rebels, but whether such protection will be applied universally or selectively remains unclear.

 

With this approach, Trump might seek compromises with China in the South China Sea, leveraging territorial disputes as bargaining chips in broader negotiations with Xi Jinping. His leadership style suggests a willingness to trade long-term strategic security interests and alliance commitments for short-term economic benefits. A clear example of this tendency is his direct call with Vladimir Putin without consulting Ukraine or NATO allies beforehand, as well as Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s statement that Ukraine should “abandon hope of winning all territory back from Russia” [45]. Such instances signal an imminent possibility that Trump 2.0 may engage in great power dealmaking at the expense of smaller nations. Additionally, while Trump’s settlements in the Middle East and Ukraine could free up the United States’ resources for a more aggressive stance against China, they may also serve as mere bargaining tactics to seek concessions from China, thus facilitating potential global division into spheres of influence.

 

This perspective is echoed by many analysts who warn of a possible “G2” arrangement, in which the United States might weaken its security commitments in the Indo-Pacific in exchange for economic or trade concessions from China [46]. Others argue that Trump’s personal rhetoric on China, inter alia, makes him more likely to pursue a “grand bargain” that could undermine American interests in the South China Sea [47]. For China, such a scenario would be highly favorable, providing incentives for China to escalate pressure on the United States, pushing the latter toward a position where compromise becomes inevitable [48].

 

Second, regarding compliance with international law, Trump himself has repeatedly demonstrated a disregard for principles of borders and territorial sovereignty – provocative ideas such as the suggestion to "annex" Canada as the 51st state of the United States, "buy" Greenland (from Denmark), rename the Gulf of Mexico, or turn Gaza into a resort...[49] Such rhetoric not only undermines the rule of law [50] but also risks setting a dangerous precedent, providing justification and motivation for other major powers to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of smaller nations. This, in turn, could have indirect but significant consequences for the South China Sea. In addition, small and medium-sized allies and partners may be concerned about the possibility of being "abandoned" in the future, facing pressure to "reconcile" with China.

 

In addition, if the Russia-Ukraine situation unfolds according to Trump's proposed arrangements, in the aftermath Russia will have the territories it forcefully seizes from Ukraine. This precedent could encourage China to push forward its territorial ambitions aggressively and forcefully, creating a "fait accompli" under the assumption that any backlash from such "reckless" behaviors would be short-lived and eventually inconsequential vis-à-vis potential gains – permanent territorial control. From a legal standpoint, this precedent could mark a return to the principle of "acquisition by conquest" [51] which contradicts the United Nations Charter.

 

Third, regarding the Cabinet, the extent and degree of influence that different factions within the Republican Party and Trump 2.0’s apparatus have on foreign affairs is still unclear to external observers. So far, Trump's strategic objectives through these key figures remain vague [52], and significant disagreements persist between his policy team and the broader Republican Party [53]. On 11 March, Trump authorized Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to investigate corrupt politicians [54], signaling the likelihood of sweeping personnel adjustments in the near future. Meanwhile, Andrew Byers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, has proposed withdrawing American troops or weapons systems from the Philippines in hopes of reducing Chinese Coast Guard’s patrols in the area. Additionally, complicated internal political dynamics of the United States – marked by deep partisanship and potential budget cuts – could significantly alter foreign policy priorities.

 

Finally, recent developments may only be early indicators rather than an intentional, long-term policy under Trump 2.0. Some of the United States’ activities in the South China Sea, especially military ones, could be the result of pre-existing plans, simply continuing like an “inertia” from the previous administration. For instance, military operational planning cycle of the United States’ is typically 18 months, meaning that current exercises, joint patrols, or capacity-building programs in the South China Sea region may have been all set during the Biden era. Moreover, Trump’s leadership style often prioritizes short-term, transactional gains, egoism, and disruptions through provocative statements, making it difficult for his administration to establish consistent and sustained strategic approaches [55]. 

 

 

The first 50 days of the Trump 2.0 Administration show that the United States’ early approach to the South China Sea was more of a continuation rather than a major shift. Trump 2.0 continued to mention the South China Sea in its foreign policy discourse, actively strengthened military cooperation with regional countries, and swiftly responded to incidents involving allies and partners. This tendency could be a result of Trump 2.0’s vision of a strategic competition with China, its desire to engage with the Indo-Pacific region, and a committed resource for these policies. Nevertheless, these are still early indicators, and numerous factors might alter or even reverse such a tendency.

 

Nguyen Khanh Nam - Do Thi Thu Ngan - Do Manh Hoang
South China Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
*The views expressed in this article are solely of the authors

 

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35. Ibid
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