An assessment of Cambodia-US Relations under the Trump Administrations

 

 

In general, Cambodia-US relations under Trump 1.0 were extremely complicated, with apparent political and diplomatic tensions. The sanctions imposed by the Trump 1.0 administration exacerbated the inherent conflicts between the two countries, deeply affecting strategic trust, pushing the relationship further apart and creating opportunities for China to quickly expand its influence and greater presence in Cambodia in many areas^[1].

 

In the early days of Trump 1.0, when domestic politics in Cambodia ahead of the July 2018 election were extremely complicated,  the US imposed tough measures on issues of democracy, human rights and freedom to vote. The US criticized Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen's government when Cambodia’s Supreme Court dissolved the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) in November 2017 and immediately cut off $1.8 million in funding to Cambodia^[2][3].  Prime Minister Hun Sen accused the US of interfering in internal affairs and conspiring with the opposition CNRP to overthrow the government^[4].

 

Tensions escalated after Cambodia had implemented a policy of leaning towards China to seek political and economic support in order to consolidate the CPP's rule and stabilize the domestic politics after the election^[5]. In a short time, the relationship between Cambodia and China was rapidly promoted. Cambodia received large investments and support from China to overcome the pressure of sanctions and aid cuts from the US and the West^[6]. The assistance from China was praised by Prime Minister Hun Sen as a manifestation of an "ironclad friendship" on a new level. With strengthened ties, China also expanded its military influence in Cambodia. Cambodia allowed the upgrade of the Ream Naval Base^[7], where the US military had previously deployed cooperation operations. The US accused Cambodia of allowing Chinese troops to be stationed at Ream under a secret agreement^[8] and continued to impose sanctions on senior Cambodian military figures involved in the construction of the Ream base^[9]. The tit-for-tat measures increased mistrust. Cambodia suspended joint military exercises with the US and increased military cooperation with China, marking a “cooling” period in Cambodia – US defence cooperation since the normalization of relations.

 

However, the political and diplomatic tensions did not reflect the entire picture of the relationship and foreign policy thinking of the two sides in the Trump 1.0 era. Amid diplomatic tensions, trade and economic cooperation between the two countries remained positive. The US left open the possibility of imposing new tariffs after the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) expired in December 2020. Therefore, the US remained the largest export market, making up about 40% of Cambodia's total export value^[10].

 

In the second half of Trump 1.0, the US had a more positive attitude towards Cambodia, as shown in a letter President Trump sent to Prime Minister Hun Sen on November 1, 2019, in which Trump affirmed that the US "do not seek regime change in Cambodia". This commitment not only paved the way for improving relations but also showed an adjustment in the approach to issues of difference between the two countries. This seemed to have a deeper implication for US policy, which was to reduce pressure on democracy and human rights, but increase pressure on China.

 

The paradoxes in Cambodia-US relations during this period reflect the complex and strategic nature of the relationship in the region. The implementation of foreign policies reflected the strategic priorities of the two countries’ leaders. For the Prime Minister Hun Sen administration, maintaining the CPP's leadership of the country played a pivotal role in implementing Cambodia's foreign policy. Meanwhile, President Trump 1.0 shifted the focus more towards to prevent and retain China’s influence in Southeast Asia, one of the important goals of the US’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.

 

 

Under the Trump 2.0, there may be more favorable conditions for Cambodia-US relations. Prime Minister Hun Manet is considered a “smart, flexible and realistic diplomatic strategist”^[11] with a softer and more flexible approach than his father. Hun Manet graduated with a bachelor's degree in economics from West Point, a master's degree in economics from New York University, USA and a doctorate in economics from the University of Bristol, UK.

 

Since Prime Minister Hun Manet took office, he has actively pushed dialogues to show his goodwill to improve relations and build strategic trust with the US, bringing positive results. In just one month after taking office, Hun Manet met with US acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland on the sidelines of the 78^th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The US decided to resume $18 million in assistance through USAID that had been frozen due to concerns about the fairness of Cambodia's election in July 2023^[12]. Prime Minister Hun Manet's diplomatic efforts opened up new opportunities to promote US investment in Cambodia. Many big US firms came to Cambodia soon after to seek investment opportunities^[13]. Bilateral cooperation in this  area was ​​extremely limited under former Prime Minister Hun Sen, due to concerns from US investors about Cambodia’s unsustainable business environment and strong reliance on China.

 

The deadlocked defense relations also saw positive developments, marked by the important visit of former US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Cambodia in June 2024, to strengthen defense relations and discuss the resumption of defense cooperation programs, including the joint exercise Angkor Sentitel that had been suspended due to tensions in relations since 2017^[14]. The visit warmed up bilateral defense relations after many years of estrangement under former Prime Minister Hun Sen. The commitment was immediately translated into concrete actions with the first port call of the USS Savannah after 8 years^[15]. Cambodia welcomed the US Navy back to Ream Naval Base^[16].

 

High-ranking leaders’ exchanges and engagement to promote security-defense cooperation continued to be implemented after US President Trump took office. To be specific, Commander of the US Army Pacific (USARPAC), General Ronald P. Clark on February 24, 2025 and Major General Scott A. Winter, Deputy Commanding General - Strategy and Plans for the USARPAC paid visits to Cambodia on February 24 and 25, 2025, respectively^[17].

 

The rapid shifts in security-defense relations between the two countries have attracted the attention of scholars. Many prestigious Cambodian scholars believed that Trump’s return to power would have more positive policies towards Cambodia, especially in reducing pressure on democracy and human rights issues^[18]. Meanwhile, Hun Manet is currently said to be seizing the opportunity and priorities from US policies in the region to untie the knots in the relationship. The Cambodian leader is ready to discuss cooperation in Trump’s "transactional" style, including in “sensitive” issues such as the Ream Naval base^[19]. This is an important message that the Hun Manet government wants to send to the Trump 2.0’s policymakers, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has been a strong critic of China’s military activities in Cambodia^[20].

 

Cambodia’s moves show the Minister Hun Manet government’s desire to build trust and improve relations with the US. Instead of continuing the tough and confrontational approach of the previous term, the Hun Manet government has shown more flexibility and actively promoted dialogue, in good faith. Furthermore, the Hun Manet government has also proactively bolstered relations with major US allies and partners, including Japan, South Korea, India and Australia, not only in the economic and diplomatic fields but also in defense cooperation. This can be shown by port visits by naval ships from these countries to Cambodia. The Cambodian military also confirmed that naval ships of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force would visit Ream port in the near future^[21].

 

Cambodia’s move to improve relations with the US and promote multilateralization of relations under Hun Manet is being highly appreciated by scholars, with the view that it can bring many benefits, serving as a basis for the country’s development^[22]. This approach helps Cambodia minimize the risks from over-reliance on China^[23], especially against the backdrop of recent decline in Chinese investment in Cambodia^[24]. The multilateralization of relations will facilitate Cambodian leaders in expanding its room for maneuver and enhancing autonomy in planning national development strategies in the new situation. These efforts will also help Cambodia strengthen its image and position its strategic importance with partners in and outside the region.

 

However, certain obstacles in the relationship between Cambodia and the US are expectable. On the one hand, China is likely to view the development of the Cambodia-US relationship as a threat to its interests and the foundations established in Cambodia for many years. On the other hand, the US remains skeptical about the “close” relationship between Cambodia and China despite  Cambodia’s current goodwill in the relationship with the US.

 

This challenge requires the Hun Manet government to persevere with its current approach, as well as to take tactful steps in balancing between the US and China. It is necessary for Cambodia to demonstrate its independence and consistency in its foreign policy, maintain neutrality, positivity and transparency, especially in the current hot issues, as well as in the fierce major powers rivalry in the region.

 

Nguyen Tien Thinh
Research Officer, South China Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
Translated by TNDH
*The views expressed in this article are solely of the author

 

[1] “Cambodia Says It Would Welcome US Navy at Port Expanded with China’s Help.” 2024. Reuters. 1 October 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cambodia-says-it-would-welcome-us-navy-port-expanded-with-chinas-help-2024-10-01/.
[2] “Cambodia’s Diplomatic Playbook for Trump’s Second Term.” 2025. Press Xpress. 7 February 2025. https://pressxpress.org/2025/02/07/cambodias-diplomatic-playbook-for-trumps-second-term/.
[3] “Cambodian Canal Megaproject in Trouble.” 2024. Https://Www.bangkokpost.com. The Bangkok Post. 21 November 2024. https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2906181/cambodian-canal-megaproject-in-trouble.
[4] Cheang, Sopheng. 2024. “US Navy Warship Will Make Its First Port Call in 8 Years in Cambodia.” Navy Times. 14 December 2024. https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2024/12/14/us-navy-warship-will-make-its-first-port-call-in-8-years-in-cambodia/.
[5] Chheng, Niem. 2024. “Analysts Warn Trump-China Contest May Create Regional Pressures.” The Phnom Penh Post. 8 November 2024. https://www.phnompenhpost.com/politics/analysts-warn-trump-china-contest-may-create-regional-pressures.
[6] Chheng, Niem. 2025. “Ream Naval Base Open next Month; Japan Scheduled as First Guests.” The Phnom Penh Post. 18 March 2025. https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/ream-naval-base-open-next-month-japan-scheduled-as-first-guests.
[7] Garrett, Shanae. 2025. “USARPAC General Travels to Cambodia.” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Ngày 26 tháng 2 năm 2025. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/NEWS/News-Article-View/Article/4081134/usarpac-general-travels-to-cambodia/.
[8] Horng, Pengly. 2024. “17 Mega US Firms Keen to Explore Investment Opportunities in Cambodia.” Khmer Times. 28 February 2024. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501447882/17-mega-us-firms-keen-to-explore-investment-opportunities-in-cambodia/.
[9] Hutt, David. 2019. “China Throws Hun Sen an Economic Lifeline - Asia Times.” Asia Times. 1 May 2019. https://asiatimes.com/2019/05/china-throws-hun-sen-an-economic-lifeline/.
[10] Lim, Chhay. 2025. “No Room for Missteps: Cambodia’s Strategic Wishlist for Trump 2.0.” 9DASHLINE. 6 February 2025. https://www.9dashline.com/article/no-rooms-for-missteps-cambodias-strategic-wishlist-for-trump-20.
[11] Lim, Chhay, and Nory Ly. 2024. “Cambodia Makes New Friends on the International Stage.” East Asia Forum. 11 April 2024. https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/04/11/cambodia-makes-new-friends-on-the-international-stage/.
[12] “Outcomes of the Meeting between Samdech Thipadei HUN Manet and Her Excellency Victoria Nuland, United States Acting Deputy Secretary of State.” 2023. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 23 September 2023. https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/files/uploads/ICUJ970L7NCC/[Stamped]230923-With_Letterhead_PR_ENG_SPM%20with%20US%20(2).pdf.
[13] Page, Jeremy, Gordon Lubold, and Rob Taylor. 2019. “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network.” Wall Street Journal. 21 July 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-deal-for-chinese-naval-outpost-in-cambodia-raises-u-s-fears-of-beijings-ambitions-11563732482.
[14] “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin Ill’s Meetings with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Senior Cambodian Officials.” 2024. U.S. Department of Defense. 4 June 2024. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3795409/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-ills-meetings-with-cambodian-pri/.
[15] Rim, Sokvy. 2022. “Why Cambodia Is Leaning towards China and Not the US.” Think China. Think China. 9 May 2022. https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/why-cambodia-leaning-towards-china-and-not-us.
[16] “Senators Markey, Rubio, and Durbin Applaud Unanimous Committee Passage of Cambodia Democracy and Human Rights Act, Urge Swift Senate Passage.” 2022. Senate.gov. Edward Markey. 19 July 2022. https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-markey-rubio-and-durbin-applaud-unanimous-committee-passage-of-cambodia-democracy-and-human-rights-act-urge-swift-senate-passage.
[17] Sochan, Ry. 2024. “Pundits on Shift in US-Cambodia Relations.” The Phnom Penh Post. 2024. https://asianews.network/pundits-on-shift-in-us-cambodia-relations/.
[18] Sophirom, Khan. 2017. “Samdech Techo Hun Sen Calls for Clarification from U.S. On Its Political Interference in Cambodia’s Internal Affairs.” Press and Quick Reaction Unit Cambodia. 3 September 2017. https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/11951.
[19] “Statement by Spokesperson Clayton M. McCleskey on the Dissolution of the Principal Opposition Party in the Kingdom of Cambodia.” 2017. U.S.AID. 17 November 2017. https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/ar/news-information/press-releases/nov-17-2017-statement-spokesperson-dissolution-principal-opposition-party-cambodia.
[20] U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2020. “Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity in Cambodia under Global Magnitsky Authority.” U.S. Department of the Treasury. 15 September 2020. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1121.
[21] “US Pulls Cambodia’s Election Funding; Hun Sen Says Cut It All.” 2017. Voice of America. Voice of America (VOA News). 19 November 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-cambodia-election-funding-hun-sen/4125151.html.
[22] Vanyuth, Chea. 2021. “US Remains the Biggest Market for Exporters.” Khmer Times. 14 October 2021. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50952218/us-remains-the-biggest-market-for-exporters/.