From 10 to 16 September, Russia and China conducted their largest military exercise in 30 years, named "Ocean-2024". Both sides mobilized a total number of over 400 warships, submarines, and support vessels, more than 120 aircrafts and helicopters, as well as over 90,000 troops[1].

In addition to its sheer size, other features of the "Ocean-2024" exercise is worth noticing, which makes Chinese naval expert Zhang Junshe described it as a “rare” occasion[2]:

  • It is part of a multi-force exercise-patrol phase that extends throughout September.

It runs concurrently with the first phase of the "Beibu/Interaction-2024" exercise. Following "Ocean-2024", the coast guards of both nations conducted joint exercises near Peter the Great Bay (16 to 20 September) and patrolled the North Pacific Ocean's international waters (starting on 21 September), alongside the second phase of the "Beibu/Interaction-2024".

  • Regarding geographical range, these joint exercises cover a vast area from northeastern Russia to the Sea of Japan.

Compared to the 2023 Russia-China exercise, "Ocean-2024" is larger in both scale and scope, reflecting an increasing trend in the frequency, scale, and operational area of these activities, particularly post-2022[3].

An indication of strengthened Russia - China relations?

Elizabeth Wishnick and James Char comment in an analysis on CNN that the expanded scale of the exercise does not indicate an impending alliance between the two nations but aims to send a message to the US and its allies. Theoretically, this exercise does not suggest a unification of both sides’ actions or policies. Empirically, despite their common interests, Russia and China lack trust due to historical tensions. Their relationship is characterized by conditional diplomacy, with actions reciprocated based on the other side's moves. Besides, both countries have stated that they are not forming an alliance and are not targeting any third party[4].

In addition to the above comments, it could be seen that there remain substantial frictions between Russia and China stemming from an unequal partnership and territorial disputes, which might limit their bilateral military cooperation.

On the other hand, an alliance is not essential for mutual support in a conflict scenario. The exercise might not indicate a possibility for an alliance, but can still increase their interopability in times of needs. If necessary, Russia can provide limited assistance to China in case of a crisis in the Pacific, similar to China’s approach during the Russo-Ukraine conflict.

An original version of the article was published here.

Translated & Edited by KNH.

[1]https://apnews.com/article/russia-naval-air-drills-china-f941584643d6503df2b42dae7abe7f15

[2] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202409/1319659.shtml

[3] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/24/japan-to-alaska-whats-behind-russia-china-joint-military-drills

[4] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/17/china/china-russia-military-drills-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html

More info:

https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-relationship-weaknesses-mistrust/

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-china%E2%80%99s-10-dash-line-map-clear-threat-207302

https://ordi.vn/trung-quoc-va-cuoc-chien-nga-ukraine.html