On September 21-22, 2024, the Quad Summit took place in Wilmington, Delaware (USA) with the participation of US President Joe Biden, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. This is the 6th Quad Summit since 2021, clearly demonstrating the strong commitment of member countries to this mechanism.

Against the backdrop of the complex international strategic environment and the imminent change of leadership in the US and Japan, this year's Summit is considered a pivotal event to help the group reaffirm its role and outline its future activities.

  1. Highlights from the Joint Statement

First, although the Joint Statement does not directly mention China, there is recurring implicit reference to Beijing's actions in the South China Sea (East Sea in Vietnamese) and the East China Sea which adopts a stronger tone than that of previous versions.

Specifically, this year's Joint Statement expressed "serious concerns regarding the militarization of disputed islands and reefs as well as coercive and threatening moves in the East China Sea and the South China Sea", condemned "the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels" (while the 2023 Statement only expressed "deep concerns") and "opposed the interference and harassment of other countries' marine resource exploitation activities".

Notably, this is the first time the Quad Summit Statement has included support for the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award, emphasizing that the Award is “an important milestone and a basis for the peaceful resolution of disputes between the parties”. Previously, the Quad’s Foreign Ministers also mentioned the Award for the first time in a statement in July 2024[1].

Second, the Joint Declaration introduces and expands a series of  regional cooperation initiatives in many areas, notably maritime security cooperation initiatives and the non-traditional security cooperation with Pacific Island and Southeast Asian countries.

The Quad announced major maritime security plans including the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission between the four countries’ coast guards, which will be conducted for the first time in 2025, and the Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI), which will enable Quad partners in the region to utilize the Quad’s Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) to monitor and protect the seas, enforce laws, and deter illegal activities. These initiatives show that the Quad is increasing its security and paramilitary presence in the region, which could be a potentia direction to address the so-called “gray zone” activities[2].

The join statement announced at least seven new projects, namely providing medical equipment and pharmaceuticals to Southeast Asian countries, improving the capacity of managing submarine cable infrastructure in Nauru and Kiribati, providing humanitarian aid of more than 5 million USD to Papua New Guinea and more than 4 million USD to Vietnam to help them overcome the consequences of natural disasters, expanding the Quad’s Scholarship Program to ASEAN countries, etc.

Notably, Quad leaders increased efforts to provide essential and secure technologies, including supporting 5G coverage in Tuvalu and expanding radio access networks (RAN) to Pacific Island countries and Southeast Asia where the US - China remains heated.

Third, India, which has sometimes been deemed (mostly by US side) as a “weak link” in the Quad[3], has shown more activeness, willing to expand its areas of engagement[4].

In the joint statement, India was mentioned more than 10 times, significantly more than in previous statements of the Quad (05 times in the May 2022 Declaration and 06 times in the May 2023 declaration). New Delhi has also been more open to participating in security cooperation activities of the Quad as it will host the MAITRI initiative for the first time in 2025 and launch coastal protection activities with partners.

In addition, India has shown great responsibility in non-traditional security initiatives such as providing pharmaceutical resources for the “Quad Cancer Moonshot”, maintaining and repairing the undersea cable network of Quad partners in the Indo-Pacific region, hosting the Quad Regional Ports and Shipping Conference in 2025, and pledging to invest 2 billion USD in solar projects in the region.

  1. China’s response

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian objected to the Quad Joint Statement, viewing the Quad as “the leading mechanism in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy” and “a tool for the US to encircle China and maintain its dominant position”. China believes that the US is “trying to create a consensus against China by exaggerating the “China threat”, and that “the US has always insisted that it is not targeting any country, but the number one topic of the conference is China”.

Mr. Lin Jian also affirmed that “the situation in the East China Sea and the South China Sea is generally stable”, and stressed that “no external interference can weaken China’s determination to safeguard its territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, and regional peace and stability[5]”.

Furthermore, just a few days after the Quad Summit, China made assertive moves on the ground, including test-firing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean on September 25[6], dispatching more than 40 military aircraft around Taiwan on September 26[7], and conducting a patrol near Scarborough Shoal on September 28[8].

  1. Further comments

Some scholars have noted that the most prominent point in the Joint Statement of the Quad Summit 2024 is the expansion of maritime security cooperation initiatives. The Quad’s plan to launch joint coast guard operations and expand its maritime domain awareness program projects a strong signal, demonstrating the group’s interest in maritime security and ways to deal with China’s aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific disputed waters, highlighting the Quad’s determination to step up the implementation of specific measures instead of simply setting agendas[9].

However, some have pointed out potential limits. To effectively implement some of the initiatives put forward in this year’s Joint Statement, including the joint coast guard patrol program, Quad member states need to increase discussions to find common ground in actual implementation[10].

In general, the Summit Joint Statement shows that, in addition to displaying a clearer interest in important regional issues, the group has also proposed a series of new cooperation plans and initiatives in many areas, notably maritime security and enhanced cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and Pacific island nations. As the Quad’s agenda receives the endorsement of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the US bipartisan support[11], the imminent change of leadership in both countries wil only have limited impact on this direction of the Quad.

An original version of the article was published here.

Translated & Edited by KH.

 

[1] https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100704619.pdf

[2] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3279651/quads-maritime-partnership-signals-pledge-counter-china-expand-its-scope

[3] https://www.eurasiantimes.com/india-quads-weakest-link-silent-on-taiwa/#google_vignette

[4] https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/quad-enlarges-space-for-india-761394

[5] https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202409/t20240923_11495195.html

[6] https://tienphong.vn/dang-sau-vu-phong-ten-lua-dan-dao-lien-luc-dia-cua-trung-quoc-post1676859.tpo

[7] https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20240926-taiwan-detects-dozens-of-chinese-military-aircraft-ships-as-japanese-warship-cruises-past-island

[8] https://maritime-executive.com/article/china-and-u-s-allies-hold-competing-naval-drills-in-south-china-sea

[9] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3279651/quads-maritime-partnership-signals-pledge-counter-china-expand-its-scope

[10] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/09/22/asia-pacific/politics/quad-summit-biden-kishida-china/

[11] https://asiatimes.com/2024/09/quad-to-survive-and-thrive-after-biden-kishida/