In response to reporters' questions on the afternoon of May 25, 2023, Deputy Spokeswoman of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Pham Thu Hang said that Chinese survey vessel Xiang Yang Hong 10 (XYH-10), Coast Guard vessels, and fishing ships had violated Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) established in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982).[1] According to Reuters, the ship XYH-10 and its escorts have appeared in Vietnam's EEZ since May 8.[2] Data from open vessel-tracking sources such as Marine Traffic or Sea Vision also show this occurrence. Looking back from the beginning of 2023 until now, China has deployed many so-called “survey and research vessels” to operate in Vietnam's EEZ, such as the case of the Haiyang Dizhi 4 in early March 2023, but it is noteworthy that the XYH-10 this time is approaching the coast of Vietnam and blatantly conducting activities that China calls “normal”. Against the backdrop of China's efforts to build the image of a “responsible major power”, this move of China has obviously infringed on the UNCLOS and seriously violated Vietnam's sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its EEZ and continental shelf established in accordance with UNCLOS.

The panorama of the incident

According to Reuters, from May 8, China has deployed the scientific research vessel XYH-10 with a number of escorts including Coast Guard, militia and some unknown ships[3] to Vietnamese EEZ.[4] Reuters supposed that these Chinese ships showed up in the context of the ongoing ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (AIME 2023) which is participated by naval ships and aircraft from India, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei from May 8, 2023.[5]

Then on May 10, Reuters continued to report that the ship XYH-10 and its escorts entered Block 04-03 of Vietsovpetro, a venture between Russia's Zarubezhneft and PetroVietnam; and concurrently moved closer to Blocks 05-1B and 05-1C, operated by Japan’s Oil & Gas company Idemitsu Kosan.[6]

Additionally, according to data from open vessel-tracking sources such as Marine Traffic and Sea Vision, XYH-10 and its escorting ships have not yet been withdrawn from the area (as of the date of this article), further complicating the situation in the South China Sea.

Vessel-tracking illustration of the route and activities of the Chinese group show the following characteristics:

First, regarding operating location, at 14:00 on May 8, 2023, this ship appeared at about 182 nautical miles from the Vietnamese baselines; but by the time of May 13, this ship had entered very close to only about 47 nautical miles from the Vietnamese baselines; and until 13:00 on May 18, monitoring data showed that this ship was about 82 nautical miles from the Vietnamese baselines. Up to now, XYH-10 is sending signal that it is still within Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf.

Figure 1: Operation of the XYH-10 in Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone from May 8
Chinese Survey Vessel Xiang Yang Hong 10’s Encroachment on Vietnam s Waters: Intention and Consequences

Source: The author's team tracked it from Sea Vision's ship monitoring software (Note: the map with the nine-dash line and the extent of the 9 oil and gas blocks that China invited for bids in 2012 all lack legal basis and were rejected by the 2016 South China Sea Award)

Second, escorting the XYH-10 are a large number of Coast Guard vessels, militia fishing boats and unknown ships flying the Chinese flag. The route map of these ships shows that they are escorting, following and protecting the operation of the XYH-10 within Vietnam's EEZ and continenal shelf, creating a very complicated situation in the South China Sea.

Figure 2: Route map of some Coast Guard vessels, militia fishing boats and unknown ships “escorting” the XYH-10
Chinese Survey Vessel Xiang Yang Hong 10’s Encroachment on Vietnam s Waters: Intention and Consequences

Source: The author's team tracked from Sea Vision's ship monitoring platform

Third, regarding the activities of the group of Chinese ships, XYH-10 is said to have moved at full speed before entering Vietnam's EEZ, then began to slow down and move at a speed of 4-5 nautical miles/hour.[7] Additionally, some said China’s vessel has been deploying clusters of buoys and dragging subsea cables, which could be used for high-resolution seismic surveys. Regarding the activities of the escorting vessels, Ray Powell - Director of the Myoushu Project, an initiative launched by Stanford University to study China's strategy in the South China Sea - shared on his Twitter account that China Coast Guard vessel 4303 cut across the bow about 200m in front of Vietnam Coast Guard vessel CSB 7011 at 1.51 p.m, May 15.[8]

It is of great importance to pay attention to the location, scope and level of the XYH-10’s operation and China's “unprecedented” moves. In terms of location, XYH-10 and its escorts operate in the position closest to the coast of Vietnam so far. In the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig incident in 2014, China placed the rig in the waters about 17 nautical miles South of Tri Ton Island (of the Paracel Islands of Vietnam), 120 nautical miles East of Vietnam’s Ly Son island, 119 nautical miles from Vietnam’s baselines.[9] In 2019, China deployed Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey vessel to conduct illegal activities in Vietnam’s EEZ; at one point, the vessel was only about 73 nautical miles [10] from the coast of Ninh Thuan province. Currently, XYH-10 has gone one step further and operating deeper into Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf; at one point, it was only 47 nautical miles from Vietnam’s baselines (as the map above shows).[11] In terms of quantity, it also shows an “unusual” behavior because escorting XYH-10 this time are a large number of Coast Guard vessels, militia fishing boats, state-sponsored fishing boats and even unknown ships. The Chinese vessels are possibly deployed in multi-layer formations, using Fiery Cross Reef as their commanding center. For each trip to-and-from the “center”, the tactic has shown flexibility in terms of types and number of escorting vessels for each layer and even unknown ships. Previously, according to information from Sea Vision, from the beginning of 2023, there were 30 - 40 Chinese militia fishing boats continuously swarming for a long time along the central coast of Vietnam.

Response of the Parties

Responding to Reuters' information about the unusual activity of a group of Chinese ships in Vietnam's EEZ from May 8, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that “Chinese fishing and scientific research vessels carry out normal production and work activities in maritime areas under China's jurisdiction”.[12]

On May 26, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning persisted at a regular press conference that: “China has sovereignty over Nansha Islands and its adjacent waters and sovereign rights and jurisdiction over relevant waters. It is legitimate and lawful for relevant Chinese vessels to carry out normal activities in waters under China’s jurisdiction. There is no such a thing as entering in other countries’ exclusive economic zones.” [13] This statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson is deliberately confusing and claiming an exessive maritime zone in contrary to UNCLOS and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award which China is a party of.

Previously, on the afternoon of May 25, Deputy Spokesperson of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pham Thu Hang affirmed “As reported recently, China's research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 10, along with a number of Chinese Coast Guard and fishing vessels have breached Vietnam's EEZ as established in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam and competent authorities have been in contact with their Chinese counterparts on numerous occasions and are implementing appropriate measures in accordance with Vietnamese and international law to ensure Viet Nam's lawful and legitimate rights and interests.”

The Deputy Spokesperson of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized: “Vietnam requests that Chinese relevant authorities observe the consensus between the two countries' high-level leaders, to cease immediately any acts of violation, withdraw the Xiang Yang Hong 10 and other vessels from Vietnamese waters, respect Vietnam's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction, to strictly abide by the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), to maintain peace, cooperation and development in the South China Sea, and contribute to strengthening the two countries' bilateral ties.

In addition, XYH-10 activities have also attracted Chinese public opinion in recent days. Major Chinese newspapers such as Sohu, NetEase, and Sina all reported on the event and acknowledged that a large number of Chinese ships of all kinds are present in the South China Sea, the current situation also shows a force difference when the number of Chinese ships is 10 times higher than that of Vietnam. [14] The Chinese press also acknowledged that this was not the first incident in 2023. Previously in March, Chinese ships were present in Vietnam's EEZ and confronted in the “Wan’an Bei”. [15] At the same time, the Chinese press also said that China's purpose this time is to “completely break the so-called exclusive economic zone of  Vietnam” [16] by protesting against Vietnam's oil and gas activities. [17]

China’s intentions

XYH-10 is a multi-purpose vessel that can carry out both survey and research. It is also equipped with icebreaking capability as it is a ship with high collision ability and difficult to be damaged.

Therefore, XYH-10 is a “dangerous” vessel which can easily conceal China’s true intentions in the South China Sea. However, the operation of XYH-10 can be explained from the following aspects:

First, economically, by using XYH-10, China may be conducting survey operations as it is promoting its “maritime power” strategy. The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022 was the first time developing “maritime economy” had appeared in the report. Accordingly, China under President Xi Jinping’s third term is making efforts to exploit and develop maritime economy, in which oil and gas are the field with the potential to create a “breakthrough”.

Being China first integrated distant-water research vessel [18], XYH-10 is capable of conducting integrated marine environmental monitoring, exploring, sampling and field analyzing of petroleum resources, physical oceanography, marine geology, geophysics, marine biology, marine chemistry, marine meteorology in the waters both near and far from the shore. The ship is one of China's deep-sea ocean basic research vessels, researching new advanced technologies. [19] All areas rich in oil reserves in the southern part of the South China Sea are deep-water areas, requiring high technology in exploration and exploitation. Meanwhile, XYH-10 is considered an integrated scientific survey vessel, integrating many functions and technologies, reaching the international standards in engineering and surveying capabilities. [20] Therefore, XYH-10 will be an effective tool for China for oil and gas exploration and exploitation as well as gathering oceanic intelligent information in the southern part of the South China Sea.

Second, on political-diplomacy field, XYH-10’s activities can send an “intimidating” message to other claimants in the South China Sea. XYH-10 is deployed when India, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei conducted the first joint exercise in the South China Sea in 2023. Some assessments from China linked the current activities of XYH-10 with the India-ASEAN cooperation, saying that the claimants want to continue to involve extra-regional countries in dispute. [21] In this case, it is India - which is one of the four members of the QUAD and also a country that is having a tense territorial dispute with China on the land border. As a result, India could become the subject of enticement by the claimants against China. [22] Some other Chinese opinions draw the connection between XYH-10 activities to the possibility of strengthening US-Vietnam relations in the future, after US Secretary of State Blinken visited Vietnam last April. At the same time, the US has also enhanced cooperation with the Philippines to open 4 more military bases to the US, which directly aims at China. [23] This geopolitical context triggers more assertive activities of China in the South China Sea.

Third, on the ground, China may be trying to make its increased presence (via surveying and patrolling) a “new normal” to enhance its influence in the South China Sea. On April 1, 2023, the National Natural Science Foundation of China announced the map of 33 reference sections for regular research ship visits, in both the far and near seas. This is the first time China has publicly announced its plan to send a scientific research vessel to conduct marine scientific surveys in the South China Sea.

These 33 reference sections stretch from the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea to the Western Pacific Ocean and the Eastern Indian Ocean. These sections cover the South China Sea from North to South, from East to West in all disputed areas in the South China Sea. Some pass through sensitive areas such as near US and allies’ military bases or cut through vital areas to submarines between the Philippines and Taiwan. By announcing this plan and taking the first steps in the deployment of XYH-10 in the southern part of the South China Sea, China shows the possibility of turning marine scientific research and survey into the “new normal” in the South China Sea in the future.

Although XYH-10 is operating with many different intentions as China may want “kill two birds with one stone”, the main purpose of XYH-10, as stated in China’s state media, is to directly deny Vietnam’s EEZ. China believes that with the “Four Shas” (Nanhai Zhudao) claim, China will have exclusive jurisdiction in the South China Sea and the so-called normal operation area of XYH-10 is completely within the 9 oil and gas blocks that China opened for international bidding in 2012.

Consequences in the future

With the intention imposing the ill-found claim of “Nanhai Zhudao”, China has infringed Vietnam's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction legitimately estblished in accordance with UNCLOS in the EEZ and continental shelf, defied the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award and violated the spirit of the DOC/COC and the Charter of the United Nations.

First, the area where the research vessel XYH-10 operates lies entirely within the EEZ and continental shelf of Vietnam, which is determined on the basis of Articles 57 and 76 of the 1982 UNCLOS. Under the provisions of UNCLOS, Vietnam has issued legal documents establishing the scope and legal regime in its EEZ and continental shelf. Accordingly, Vietnam is allowed to exercise the coastal state's sovereign rights over the exploration and exploitation of marine resources. The operation of XYH-10 seriously violated the relevant provisions of UNCLOS and Vietnamese laws; at the same time, China's coast guard and maritime militia ship’s maneuver of obstructing law enforcement activities in dangerous movements are creating unsafe navigation and affect the freedom of navigation of all ships and vesssels sailing through this area.

Second, China has claimed the so-called “sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao” and since then claimed the EZZ and continental shelf around the features in the South China Sea. Based on that, XYH-10 is said to be operating “normally” in “the waters under China's jurisdiction” by the Chinese. The Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning on May 26 further replicated China’s sovereignty over the Spratlys and rejected that “[t]here is no such a thing as entering in other countries’ exclusive economic zones”.

It is true that the Spratly Islands are still under soveignty disputes where more than one party claim sovereignty over. However, regardless the existence of the sovereignty disputes, the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award clearly clasified the emerged geographical features of the Spratsly as rocks, thereby, having no EEZ and continental shelf of their own. The statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, therefore, reflects the irresponsible practice of China in arbitraly intepreting UNCLOS for its own interests, defies the 2016 Aribtral Award and ignores the legitimate maritime entitlement of coastal states in generating EEZ and continenal shelf.

Previously, in Note Verbal No.22/HC-2020 to the United Nations, Vietnam expressed its consistent stance against China's claims, and affirmed that the maritime zones of non-submerged features in the Spratly Islands must be identified in accordance with Article 121(3) of UNCLOS; island groups in the South China Sea, including the Spratlys, have no baselines drawn by connecting the outermost points of the most distant features. It can be affirmed that there is absolutely no so-called “normal activity in the waters under China's jurisdiction” in the “Nansha”.

Meanwhile, according to data from open vessel-tracking sources like Marine Traffic and Sea Vision, XYH-10’s activities continuously take place in Vietnam's EEZ and continental shelf, which is established in accordance with the UNCLOS. The Chinese ship group's activities are seriously infringing on the Convention, seriously violating Vietnam's sovereign rights and jurisdiction under UNCLOS; and against the spirit of the DOC and the COC consultations.

Third, Vietnam and China are both parties to UNCLOS, therefore any interpretation or application contrary to the provisions of the Convention is invalid. This was also confirmed by the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal. China's claim of “historic rights” to the waters within the “nine-dash line” is contrary to UNCLOS; China has no “historical status” over the waters in the South China Sea and has no legal basis to make claims of “historic rights” to the resources within the “nine-dash line”. According to the Court of Arbitration, not a single structure in the Spratlys confers China's right to an EEZ.

Therefore, it can be seen that China is seriously violating Vietnam's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the EEZ and continental shelf generated in accordance with UNCLOS. At the same time, China's maritime actions are also going against the agreements between the two countries' senior leaders reached during their high-level visit in November 2022, negatively affecting the relations between the two countries.

Internationally, this dangerous activity of the Chinese ship group is blatantly challenging international public opinion; seriously threatening freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, increasing the risk of unintended collisions and clashes. In the context that China and ASEAN countries are promoting the implementation of the DOC and the COC negotiation process, China's current violations of international law will make the negotiation process more difficult and deadlocked.

Hoang Lan, Researcher, East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.

Illustration: Nhat Linh, Researcher, East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam monitored the open application Sea Vision.

The original Vietnamese version was published here. The article represents the author's own views and does not represent the affiliated institutions.


 

REFERENCES

[1] https://nld.com.vn/chinh-tri/yeu-cau-trung-quoc-rut-tau-huong-duong-hong-10-khoi-vung-bien-viet-nam-20230525162456931.htm

[2] Laurie Chen, Krishn Kaushilk, Chinese militia boats cross Indian, ASEAN warships exercising in South China Sea; accessed by https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-militia-boats-cross-indian-asean-warships-exercising-south-china-sea-2023-05-08/

[3]  “Unknown” ships on the Sea Vision platform, May 9

[4] Laurie Chen, Krishn Kaushilk, Chinese militia boats cross Indian, ASEAN warships exercising in South China Sea; accessed by https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-militia-boats-cross-indian-asean-warships-exercising-south-china-sea-2023-05-08/

[5] Ibid.

[6] Francesco Guarascio (additional reporting by Laurie Chen in Beijing and Khanh Vu in Hanoi, quoting SCSCI’s Van Pham), Cluster of Chinese vessels spotted near Russian rig off Vietnam - ship monitors; accessed by https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cluster-chinese-vessels-spotted-near-russian-rig-off-vietnam-ship-monitors-2023-05-10/

[7] Ibid.

[8] https://twitter.com/GordianKnotRay/status/1656546683269050368/photo/2

[9] https://dangcongsan.vn/thoi-su/trung-quoc-dua-gian-khoan-dau-khi-hai-duong-981-vao-bien-dong--vi-pham-nghiem-trong-luat-phap-quoc-te-251152.html

[10] Data from Marine Traffic

[11] Data from Sea Vision

[12] Reuters, ibid.

[13] https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20230526-1398474

[14] https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20230511A02ZCZ00

[15] https://www.163.com/dy/article/I5440LA10511JTAO.html

[16] https://k.sina.com.cn/article_6614114351_18a3b602f0010160fx.html

[17] https://www.znzfws.com/d/41229

[18] Tạp chí Điện tử Giáo dục Việt Nam, Tàu Khảo sát Hướng dương Hồng 10 Trung Quốc sẽ hoạt động ở cả Biển Đông, accessed by https://giaoduc.net.vn/tau-khao-sat-moi-huong-duong-hong-10-tq-se-hoat-dong-ca-o-bien-dong-post142229.gd

[19] https://upimg.baike.so.com/doc/5217813-25023051.html

[20] https://www.163.com/dy/article/I4DA2BTE0511JTAO.html

[21] https://c.m.163.com/news/a/I4HLS3O205562WZT.html

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.