In his inaugural speech on May 20, the new Taipei leader Lai Ching-te mentioned China a total of seven times. Notably, Lai openly criticised China’s “grey zone” activities, stating that “China’s military actions and “grey zone” activities are considered the greatest strategic challenges to peace and stability in the world”. Throughout his speech, Lai referred to China predominantly as an existential threat to Taiwan, saying, for example, “We call on China to immediately cease We call on China to immediately cease its actions attacking Taiwan”, “China has never abandoned its intention to use force to invade Taiwan”, and “Even if we accept China’s proposals and relinquish sovereignty, China’s ambitions to invade Taiwan would never disappear”. Do Lai’s assertive remarks signal a grey future for cross-strait relations in the coming period?
China’s “grey zone” activities in the Taiwan Strait
“Grey zone” deployment is not a new concept or strategy. In recent years, China has been reported to deploy “grey zone” tactics to circumvent international laws, avoid condemnation, and achieve their objective of expanding control in areas such as the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.
In the Taiwan strait, China has adopted a gradual “gray” approach, allegedly step by step undermining the so-called “median line” in the air and at sea. The median line is an unofficial boundary in the air and on the sea that has existed between China and Taiwan for 70 years. Although China has never officially recognized this boundary, its navy and air force previously “implicitly” respected it. Since 2022, China has employed “grey zone” tactics through blockade-control exercises, frequent military aircraft crossings, and coast guard vessel intrusions to gradually erase the so-called “median line” in the Taiwan Strait.
First, to gradually eliminate the median line in the air, China took advantage of Speaker of U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, conducting large-scale military drills, long-range fire drills, missile tests, and establishing a new normal. Minutes after Pelosi landed in Taiwan on the evening of August 2, 2022, the PLA announced four days of drills in six areas surrounding the island.
This was China’s largest exercise to date due to:
- Expanded exercise areas, encircling Taiwan entirely, whereas previous drills were usually along the mainland coast.
- New tactics, including “blockade” and “control” exercises never seen before.
- Unprecedented intensity, showcasing the strongest military deterrence to date. China established a three-dimensional combat platform in the strait with aerial, maritime, and underwater operations, deploying equipment like drones previously unseen in the area.
In addition to large-scale drills, China test-fired ballistic missiles into waters around Taiwan, sent numerous warships into the Taiwan Strait, and had dozens of PLA fighter jets cross the “median line”. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence, China flew 1,727 military aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2022, about five times the number in 2020.
After the official drills ended, PLA fighter jets continued to cross the median line daily, often with more than ten aircraft. Comparatively, in July 2022, a month before Pelosi’s visit, China’s daily aircraft crossings of the median line (including unidentified-fighter planes) averaged only once per day. China’s incremental actions are creating a new status quo in the area and puts the Taiwanese government in a dilemma, forcing it to choose between accepting the new reality or escalating tensions.
Not only has China gradually crossed the median line in the air, but since its initial success in 2022, it has expanded its “grey zone” tactics at sea, venturing into restricted waters near Kinmen Island, controlled by Taiwan. On February 14, 2024, Taiwan’s CNA reported that at 1:45 PM that day, the Kinmen Coast Guard vessel CP-1051 spotted an unmarked Chinese speedboat crossing the border and entering waters 1.1 nautical miles east of Kinmen’s Beiding Island, just 0.86 nautical miles from the restricted area. The Chinese vessel refused inspection, sped off, and capsized. Four people fell into the water, with two drowning. Mainland China’s Taiwan Affairs Office claimed it was a “Fujian fishing vessel” operating in traditional Chinese fishing grounds.
While the incident remains unresolved, on the ground, China has used “grey zone tactics to shape a favourable status quo. China’s Coast Guard issued orders to strengthen law enforcement in Kinmen’s waters and maintain a regular presence in the area. Notably, on March 15, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel crossed into Kinmen’s restricted waters for the first time, advancing 3.2 nautical miles southwest of Kinmen Island, fully within Taiwan’s restricted waters. This unusual action has since been repeated, establishing a regular presence of Chinese Coast Guard and maritime surveillance vessels in waters controlled by Taiwan.
Although China has not yet invaded or annexed Taiwan, its “grey zone” activities have allowed it to maintain a presence in the core area, undermine the status quo in the strait, and avoid triggering military reactions from other parties.
A “greyer” future for cross-strait relations?
Against this backdrop, Taiwan’s new leader, Lai Ching-te, emphasised Taiwan’s resolve to protect its territory in his inaugural speech, pledging to enhance national security awareness, improve legal frameworks, and, importantly, bolster defence capabilities. Taiwan’s defence budget has risen for seven consecutive years. In 2017, defence spending accounted for 1.82% of GDP. In 2022, defence spending reached $16.8 billion, or 2% of GDP. This trend continued, with Taiwan’s 2024 defence budget increasing to approximately $19 billion, or 2.5% of GDP.
In addition to higher defence spending, Taiwan, under Tsai Ing-wen, shifted from balancing relations between major powers to aligning more closely with the U.S. to counter China. Taiwan provides leverage for the U.S. to use Taiwan as a “playing card” in major powers competition. Tsai Ing-wen established the Department of Indo-Pacific Affairs under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declaring Taiwan an indispensable link in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Taiwan even ambiguously hinted at the possibility of considering U.S. access to Itu Aba Island (referred to by Taiwan as “Taiping Island”) in Vietnam’s Spratly Archipelago. Taiwan also regards the passage of U.S. and allied warships through the Taiwan Strait as a positive demonstration of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.
Meanwhile, the U.S., though lacking formal ties with Taiwan, has increasingly used “the Taiwan card” amid rising U.S.-China competition since Trump Presidency. The U.S. has consistently promoted Taiwan’s role in its Indo-Pacific strategy, known as the “free and open Indo-Pacific”.
At Lai Ching-te’s May 20 inauguration, the Biden administration reaffirmed U.S. policy consistency toward Taiwan. A delegation led by U.S. National Economic Council Director Brian Deese and former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage attended. Earlier, after Lai’s election victory on January 15, 2024, the U.S. sent former National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley and former Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg to meet Lai and Vice President Tsai Mei-chin. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also congratulated Lai after the inauguration, reiterating U.S. cooperation with Taiwan to promote shared values and maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
For China, under President Xi Jinping, its policies toward Taiwan have grown increasingly hard-line, not only in terms of actions – increased “grey zone” tactics – but also in its rhetorics. The Third Historical Resolution of November 2021 revealed China’s strategic shift toward a more assertive stance. At the Sixth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, China proposed its “Comprehensive Plan for Resolving the Taiwan Problem”. The strategy emphasised “unification” (mentioned 81 times) and “peace” (25 times). While focusing on countering “Taiwan independence,” external interference, and promoting unification and integration were considered the focal work of China on the Taiwan issue.
This shift marked a transition from passive defence to proactive advantage-seeking, from “strategic defence” to “readiness to fight”, and from “waiting for Taiwan to change its actions” to actively presenting Taiwan with a choice between “peaceful unification” and “military unification”, gradually exploring and narrowing the scope of the U.S. “strategic ambiguity”.
Following the 20th CPC Congress, Liu Jieyi, Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, reiterated the “Taiwan strategy” message, asserting China’s determination to unify Taiwan. Xi appears to have begun implementing a “unification plan,” placing it on China’s agenda with deliberate and thorough consideration.
In short, with its geostrategic significance, Taiwan remains a flashpoint in great power competition. In recent years, China has adopted a harder line regarding the reunification of Taiwan, accompanied by increased “grey zone” activities aiming to undermine the so-called “median line” and “restricted waters” in the Taiwan Straits. In response, Taiwan has been focusing intensively on strengthening its defensive capabilities, and leaning closer to the US. The assertive statement made by Taiwan’s new President Lai Ching-te further hints at potential heightened tensions across the strait. However, the risk of military conflict remains low, as both Beijing and Taipei are aware of the devastating consequences for both sides. Moreover, mechanisms to manage and control crises remain in place. Above all, maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity is a shared aspiration of all nations and territories in the region, as Lai’s speech also underscored.
Hoang Lan
East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
*This article solely represents the author's personal views
Translated and edit by DT, NN, DH
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