China determined to project forces in the South China Sea

China expansion in the South China Sea: From small steps to a giant leap

On January2,2016, a Chinese Cessna Citation Sovereign 680 landed on the airfield on Fiery Cross Reef[1], the military headquarters[2]of the 7 features occupied by China in Spratly Islands. On January 6, China carried out test flights of two large commercial airliners at this newly built airfield[3]^,[4]. From January 1 to 8, the Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam recorded 46 flights from China into the Flight Information Region of Ho Chi Minh City which "have ignored all the rules and norms of the ICAO by not providing any flight plans or maintaining any radio contact with Vietnam's air traffic control center[5]". Vietnam[6]and Philippines[7]officially protested these Chinese flights. Japan foreign minister considered the flights were "a unilateral change of the status quo" and "Japan "cannot accept (the act) which is escalating tensions (in the region) and is a concern shared by the international community[8]". The State Department Spokesman John Kirby said China's landing of the plane "raises tensions and threatens regional stability[9]".

Fiery Cross Reef, August 14, 2014. © CSIS

Fiery Cross Reef, September 3, 2015. © CSIS

People cannot help but wonder how that could happen on a submerged feature by nature. Indeed, the airfield was not built in one day; eventually the work already began in 1987.

According to IHS Jane's report and CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative[10], agreed to build 5 weather monitoring stations, including one in the South China Sea, for an UNESCO project. China used this to justify its occupation of features in Spratly Islands. The Chinese occupation of features led to confrontations with Vietnam. The most serious incident was the March 1988 Johnson Reef skirmish where Chinese navy attacked, killed 64 Vietnamese, sunk 3 Vietnamese ships and finally occupied Johnson South Reef.[11]

Aftermath, China moved quickly to consolidate its presence. By the end of 1988, China had occupied six reefs and atolls in the Spratly Islands. In 1990, China built a two-story concrete structure on Fiery Cross Reef, believed to be an observation post, and then added a helipad as well as a pier shortly. Within 14 years, China had added to the facility a soldier's garrison, a helipad, a wharf, a greenhouse, communication equipment and coastal artillery.

It was the turning point in summer 2014 when China started land reclamation in all of 7 occupied features, and then accelerated with the completion of airstrips and ports. However, this went unnoticed as the world was distracted by the Hysy-981 standoff[12], which happened at the same time as China started to speed up work in Fiery Cross Reef as well as in other 6 features. One year later, from small military outposts, China had built bases that can be used for both civilian and military forces. The backbone of the bases is a complete system of airstrips, ports, fresh water[13](e.g. the desalinator on Woody Island of Paracel islands can process 1000m³ per day), fuel service stations (e.g. the service station on Woody Island, an island in the Paracel islands, will has a 2000m³ fuel tank[14]) and supply ships (e.g. the 7800-ton displacement supply ship Sansha 1[15]). In the near future, once all the facilities are installed, the artificial islands would become strategic bases for China to control and project forces to the South China Sea.

Sansha I, the 7800-ton deplacement supply ship and Woody Island (Phu Lam) in Paracel islands, where the ship can reach between 10h. The rollon-rolloff vessel can transport 546 people and 20 standard contener trailers

Strategic values of the artificial islands: securing China's core interests, including sovereign claim; trade and energy transport protection; national defense and force projection.

With all Paracel islands and the 7 artificial islands in Spratly islands, which are much larger than all the natural ones in Spratly islands, China now holds a strategic position in the South China Sea. The airstrips and ports can serve as logistics and frontier command posts for intelligence, patrol and force projection. Before the construction of airstrips and large ports, China was unable to control the South China Sea where China claims for almost all the waters despite the protest of ASEAN countries (Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei). Lacking of efficient air, navy tankers or long range systems, China People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and Air force cannot operate thousand kilometers far from its farthest southern bases in Hainan with the current combat systems. The 3110m length, 200-300m width airstrips meet the requirements to support all kinds of aircrafts, from UAVs, fighters, early warning aircrafts to medium and heavy transport aircrafts.

Furthermore, the bases provide China facilities and the real ability to control a vast area next to its border, which is vital for its economy. China, the world second largest economy, imports more and more fossil fuel and natural resources from Africa and Middle East. The lion share of China's import and export pass through the South China Sea, Malacca strait and Indian Ocean. Without supports from coastal military bases, these sea lanes are vulnerable. Hence, China would need to secure these lanes with its navy. Analysts believe that the sea ports in Malaysia (Klang), Myanmar (Sittwe and Kyaukpyu), Bangladesh (Chittagong), Sri Lanka (Hambantota and Colombo), and Pakistan (Gwadar) could play a bigger role rather than commercial ports, especially in crisis. Those who do not believe in the "spring of pearls" strategy[16]develop a theory saying that China is not able to build military bases in South and Southeast Asian countries, at least in short or mid-term, due to the "swing" policy of these countries. Also, as the matter of fact, China does not have sufficient experience and technology in that area. They might be right but in reality China still continues building ports wherever they can for potential military purpose. To date, China has established bases in Paracel and Spratly islands and continues to negotiate with Djibouti to set up a military base[17].

Other than territorial claim and maritime transport security, China might want to keep away threats coming from other global and regional powers such as the US and India far from its border. The bases in Paracel and Spratly islands allow China to access to the deep blue waters. 30 years on, China has been building its navy from a near shore, purely defensive force to a blue sea navy. The announcement of building indigenously a new aircraft carrier[18]is merely the emerging part of an iceberg. China has reorganized and modernized not only the PLA structure but also its defense technology and industrial base. Without a comprehensive organization, the PLA in general and the PLA Navy in particular, does not have any chance to neither challenge the US in the Pacific and Indian oceans nor dominate the regional powers' navies.

In the South China Sea, the 7 artificial islands occupied by China is the real game changer. Before the land reclamation in 2014, these outposts were small, isolated and ill-supplied. They could be accessed by helicopters and maritime supply ships only. Upon the completion of airfield, ports and necessary military equipment, it fully unleashes the potential of those artificial islands. In war time, especially short and local scale war, military aircrafts and warships from Fiery Cross Reef and Cuarteron Reef could deny access between the southern part and the central part of Spratly islands. And in a very short time, the bases in Subi, Hughes, Gaven, Johnson South and Mischief Reefs could effectively overwhelm the much less powerful Vietnamese or Philippines outposts in the center of Spratly islands. In such scenario, if China succeeded to isolate and overwhelm parts of Spratly islands, they could rapidly take over a large number of features in Spratly islands in a considerable short time, before any agreement of ceasefire. There is a chance for such scenario given what happened in Paracel islands in 1956 and 1974, Spratly islands in 1988 and 1995, and in Scarborough Shoal in 2012, where China all gained control and access.

China's commitment: DOC and the future of COC?

In 2002, China and ASEAN members signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). In the DOC[19], China and ASEAN member states declared to "reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations" and " are committed to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual respect". China and ASEAN also committed to "undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability". However, in reality, since 2002, China law reinforcement force and China fishing boats have rammed, harassed and sunk Vietnamese fishing boats[20]^,[21]^,[22], fired at fishermen[23], cut the cable of Vietnamese survey boat[24], etc. In 2014, China anchored the Hysy-981 in the EEZ of Vietnam. And the most aggressive move is the land reclamation in summer 2014 in all 7 features occupied by China. The deployment of a large number of ships, from corvette (e.g. type 056), missile destroyer (type 052D) to large supply ship (e.g. Sansha 1, 7800-ton displacement, transport 546 people and 20 contener trailers, 1 round trip every week[25]) is unprecedented and at a scale that no other country around the South China Sea can match.

In the declaration, ASEAN and China reaffirmed that "the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability". Given the actual situation in the South China Sea, the future of the COC is still unknown.

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