US-Cambodia Relations: What Drives the New Shifts?

Photo: CNA

On June 4, US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin visited Cambodia, marking a significant milestone in bilateral relations, and raising hopes for a warmer period in US-Cambodia relations. During a meeting with Senate President Hun Sen, Washington reaffirmed its commitment to cooperating with Phnom Penh to address existing challenges in bilateral ties. Both sides agreed to overcome misunderstandings, work towards improving their relationship, and capitalise on the potential for collaboration, particularly in military and economic sectors. Thus, what drives the efforts to improve US-Cambodia relations?

Washington: the Weakness of the "Stick"

Under former Prime Minister Hun Sen, the US made numerous efforts to promote democracy and human rights, imposing sanctions on Cambodian officials and economic activities. However, these measures were limited in advancing democracy and human rights in Cambodia or curbing China’s influence, often pushing Cambodia closer to Beijing.

From 1998 to 2007, the US Congress banned government-to-government aid to Cambodia to pressure former Prime Minister Hun Sen to establish a a full democracy. Relations improved under President Obama but took a downturn in 2018 when the US suspended the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in response to Phnom Penh’s crackdown on political opposition. In 2021, the US Department of Commerce and State Department imposed export controls on certain goods and arms to Cambodia.

These approaches had little effect on Hun Sen’s administration. As a seasoned leader tempered by years of political turbulence, Hun Sen was vocal in his criticism of Washington’s sanctions. In 2017, following the US’ cessation of electoral funding and threats of “more specific actions” after the Supreme Court dissolved the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), Hun Sen dismissed the aid cuts as damaging only to those serving US policies, stating that Cambodia welcomed the cessation of US assistance[1]. Similarly, in 2021, during a press conference in Phnom Penh, Hun Sen downplayed concerns about US sanctions on senior Cambodian officials, while the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Kuy Koung criticised the US measures as interference in Cambodia’s internal affairs[2].

The relationship with Cambodia has long been a contentious issue in US policymaking. Washington has oscillated between two options: continuing to wield the “stick” against democratic backsliding and China’s growing influence or offering “carrots” to secure US interests in the region. Past experience shows that sanctions and criticism have only alienated Cambodian leaders, strained bilateral relations, and pushed Cambodia further towards Beijing.

US Concerns over China

Hun Sen’s government has consistently shown strong support for China’s priorities over the decades. Cambodia’s actions, influenced by Beijing, have often alarmed the US, particularly concerning Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Uyghur issue.

In 1997, Cambodia ordered the closure of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Phnom Penh. In 2009, the country deported 20 Uyghurs to China. In 2012, as the Chair of ASEAN Summit, Cambodia failed to produce a joint statement for the first time in 45 years due to criticisms of China’s activities on the South China Sea. A similar incident occurred in 2016 when Cambodia blocked a strong ASEAN statement condemning China’s actions in the South China Sea. In line with the “One China Policy”, Cambodia refused to allow Taiwanese flags to be displayed anywhere in the country in early 2017. By mid-2019, Cambodia became the first Southeast Asian country to officially support Beijing’s stance on the political crisis in Hong Kong, expressing an unwavering attitude towards the “One China Policy”[3].

While China’s influence was growing rapidly, US-Cambodia relations remained strained. Militarily, Cambodia cancelled the joint Angkor Sentinel Exercises with the US in 2017 and 2018. Politically, Phnom Penh accused Washington of colluding with the CNRP to discreetly organise a “colour revolution.” Economically, the US imposed stricter trade and investment standards, citing corruption, political instability, and inadequate infrastructure in Cambodia under Hun Sen as major obstacles, stated in “Investment Climate Statements: Cambodia” annual editions[4]. In contrast, China refrained from criticism and generously provided aid, therefore for Cambodia, making closer ties with Beijing was a safer political and economic option.

Another obstacle for US-Cambodia relations is China’s construction at the Ream Naval Base in the Gulf of Thailand. In 2021, the US Embassy in Cambodia Chad Roedemeier criticised Phnom Penh’s lack of transparency over the project, raising concerns about China’s military involvement at the base. Chad Roedemeier stated “The Cambodian government has not been fully transparent on the aims, the nature, and the scope of this project, as well as the role of the [Chinese] military. These raise concerns on the intended use of this naval base”[5]. The Cambodian government has repeatedly denied these claims, emphasizing that hosting foreign military bases is unconstitutional.

As Beijing’s influence continues to expand in economic, military, and diplomatic spheres and Cambodia maintains a tough stance regarding its relations with China as well as the Ream base issue, the US risks losing a key regional partner unless it adjusts its approach. Hun Sen’s famous remark, “If I do not rely on China, who else will I rely on?” reflects this reality[6]. Washington seems to understand that continuing with the “stick” approach offers little hope of shifting Cambodia towards democracy or distancing it from China, and may instead drive deeper Sino-Cambodian cooperation. Thus, the previous US approach not only failed to yield results, but also created additional obstacles for the US itself in maintaining and managing relations with Cambodia.

Cambodia: A new government, new opportunities

Based on statements from the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) during the 2023 general election and the “Pentagonal Strategy – Phase I” introduced under Prime Minister Hun Manet, Cambodia is clearly aware of the risks posed by great power competition and leans toward a more neutral foreign policy.

The “Pentagonal Strategy – Phase I” highlights:

1. Global geopolitics are increasingly fragile and tense, with superpower rivalries, and the division and struggle between multipolar-globalisation and unipolar-protectionism complicating the future global order and making it more difficult to assess.
2. International institutions, especially the UN, are facing a loss of confidence in their ability to address challenges and maintain peace.
3. Great power rivalries have undermined the international order and the existing multilateral mechanisms, pressuring neutral and non-aligned foreign policy efforts.
4. Developing countries face challenges from unilateral coercion, economic sanctions, and interference in the internal affairs under the guise and pretext of democratic values and human rights.

Compared to The Four-Phase Rectangular Strategy only asserting “The world is moving towards a new multipolar framework due to the changing balance of global power. This development will lead to changes in the structure of global rules and institutions, both politically and economically.”, the “Pentagonal Strategy – Phase I” emphasized the “fragility”, “tension” and “weakening of the international order” as well as multilateralism, reflecting Cambodia’s heightened awareness of the international challenges faced by developing nations and its intent to pursue a more flexible and neutral foreign policy to reduce dependence on China amid global political instability.

Early signs of this shift were evident during the July 23, 2023 general election when the CPP proposed a balanced foreign policy, highly adaptable to international dynamics. Cambodian Foreign Minister Kung Phoak stated that the new policy prioritises respecting international order under the UN and ASEAN, with national interest and peace as top priorities. In an interview with the National Election Committee (NEC) on July 18, 2023, Phoak asserted the CPP’s stance in building peaceful and effective relations with neighbouring countries and promoting multilateralism. Economically, Cambodia aims to attract investment, seek international markets for domestic products, and promote tourism and cultural exchanges to achieve economic growth.

This evolving perspective on international relations has contributed to a more open stance toward the US. In April 2024, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sun Chanthol met with US Ambassador Patrick Murphy, expressing goodwill and discussing plans for future cooperation which included a potential visit to the US by the Deputy Prime Minister himself[7]. Warmer US-Cambodia ties could help mitigate the negative effects of sanctions while opening new opportunities for economic and military collaboration, thereby supporting Cambodia’s goal to graduate from the list of least-developed countries by 2027.

Looking Ahead

The recent warming of US-Cambodia relations reflects mutual efforts to find common ground between Washington’s regional influence and strategic competition goals and Phnom Penh’s new foreign policy orientations. However, this does not imply Cambodia will distance itself from China. Since Prime Minister Hun Manet took office, Cambodia has repeatedly praised its “ironclad” relationship with China and expanded cooperation in areas such as public diplomacy, tourism, and poverty reduction. Moreover, China remains crucial for Cambodia’s infrastructure development and economic growth.

Looking ahead, Cambodia is likely to strengthen ties with the US while maintaining and expanding its relationship with China. Balancing these relationships will require an adept use of diplomatic measures to maximize national interests and maintain equilibrium in its relations with the two major powers.

Do Thi Thu Hien*
East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
*The views expressed are her own and do not represent the stance of her organisation
Translated and editied by PDT, NN, DH

APPENDIX

2017 Investment Climate Statements: Cambodia 
2018 Investment Climate Statements: Cambodia
2019 Investment Climate Statements: Cambodia
2020 Investment Climate Statements: Cambodia
2021 Investment Climate Statements: Cambodia
2022 Investment Climate Statements: Cambodia

REFERENCE

[1] “Defiant Cambodia PM Dares US to Cut All Aid to His Country”, ABC News, 19 November 2017, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-19/cambodia-tells-us-to-cut-all-aid/9166672. 

[2] “Cambodia’s Hun Sen Dismisses US Sanctions on Military, Elites”, Radio Free Asia, Accessed 6 June 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/sanctions-12092021164549.html. 

[3] Sovinda Po and Christopher B. Primiano, “An ‘Ironclad Friend’: Explaining Cambodia’s Bandwagoning Policy towards China”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39, Volume 3 (December 2020): 444–64, https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420901879. 

[4] Refers to Appendix I

[5] “US raises concerns over Chinese construction at Cambodian naval base,”South China Morning Post”, Accessed 6 June 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3152371/us-raises-concerns-over-chinese-construction-cambodian-naval. 

[6] “Cambodia’s Hun Sen: ‘If I Don’t Rely on China, Who Will I Rely On?’”, Nikkei Asia, Accessed 8 June 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Future-of-Asia/The-Future-of-Asia-2021/Cambodia-s-Hun-Sen-If-I-don-t-rely-on-China-who-will-I-rely-on. 

[7] “Cambodia Keen on Continued US Support, Khmer Times, 25 April 2024, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501478388/cambodia-keen-on-continued-us-support/.