Misconceptions about the post-World War II international order
The assertion that the post-World War II international order “clearly affirmed” China’s sovereignty over the “Nanhai Zhudao” (Nam Hải Chư Đảo) is a misinterpretation of the Cairo Declaration (1943), the Potsdam Declaration (1945), and the Treaty of San Francisco (1951). In reality, no international legal document explicitly states that the Spratly (Trường Sa) or Paracel (Hoàng Sa) Islands, referred to by China as the Nansha Qundao and Xisha Qundao, are inherently China’s territory. The Cairo and Potsdam Declarations only stipulated that Japan must return “the territories it had taken from China,” including Taiwan, Manchuria, and the Pescadores Islands, with no mention or implication regarding the Paracel or the Spratly Islands.
China’s interpretation of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations as evidence of territorial sovereignty constitutes a sophistry about their scope of legal effect. It is because these declarations are not legally binding, as compared to a multilateral treaty (they were neither accepted nor ratified by later claimant states), and they cannot substitute the established procedures of determining sovereignty under contemporary international law. If anything, the fact that the declarations specified the return of Taiwan, Manchuria, and the Pescadores without mentioning the Paracel or the Spratly Islands suggests that the latter were not considered Chinese territory.
Furthermore, China was not invited to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference, where the formal postwar territorial arrangements were negotiated and signed. The San Francisco Treaty required Japan to give up its claims to the Paracel and the Spratly Islands, but did not affirm the sovereignty over these islands to any state. This legal gap allowed multiple parties to put forward their own claims, which must therefore be examined based on accepted principles of international law rather than unilateral interpretations. At the conference, the Vietnamese delegation asserted sovereignty over the Paracel and the Spratly Islands, and no delegation objected.
Along similar reasoning, China’s argument for “international recognition” based on foreign maps labeling the islands as Chinese, or on U.S. naval personnel assisting Chinese vessels in surveying certain features, does not establish legal title. Under international law, territorial sovereignty cannot be inferred from incidental or pragmatic actions; it requires clear, continuous, and uncontested acts, which have never existed in the South China Sea since the 1950s, as states such as Vietnam, and later the Philippines and Malaysia, have consistently protested China’s claims and undertaken their own acts of occupation on the ground.
Twisting the facts
In Chapter 2 of the report, Xinhua accuses several countries of “escalating disputes in the South China Sea,” “illegally occupying islands and reefs,” and “illegally exploiting resources” in waters that it claims fall under China’s “historic rights.” However, this line of argument neglects both the legal nature of the disputes in the region and the historical and international legal realities, especially Vietnam’s continuous and lawful occupation and administration of the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
Contrary to the report’s description, Vietnam established and maintained administrative, military, and civil presence in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, continuously and peacefully from the 17th century, under the Nguyen Lords, the Tay Son dynasty, and the Nguyen dynasty, which was later continued by modern governments. During the French protectorate period, the Indochinese administration (representing Vietnam) continued governance activities such as erecting sovereignty markers, constructing lighthouses, and maintaining permanent forces. These acts were recorded in administrative documents, maps, and international sources.
After World War II, the French, on behalf of the Indochinese administration, dispatched personnel to take over the islands upon Japan’s withdrawal. After 1954, Vietnamese people continued to administer the Paracel and Spratly Islands, organized elections there, built infrastructure, and maintained garrisons. Notably, the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands against Chinese forces clearly demonstrated Vietnam’s position on defending its territorial sovereignty at the time. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam both declared continuity and reaffirmed Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and consider these inseparable parts of Vietnam’s territory.
Moreover, Vietnam’s marine exploration and resource extraction activities take place within its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, established in accordance with the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which both Vietnam and China are parties. Therefore, China’s use of its unlawful “nine-dash line” claim to oppose these activities constitutes a violation of international law. Similar actions were rejected by the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award.
Accusations that Vietnam is “provocative,” “violating” the law, or colluding with “external actors to cause trouble” are not only baseless but also display “irresponsibility” amid an already complex dispute. In reality, it must be objectively recognized that it is China’s expansion of military presence and its large-scale island-building activities that have caused serious instability in the South China Sea, not Vietnam’s lawful actions to defend its sovereignty within the boundaries permitted by international law.
Legal sophistry and historical distortion
In Chapters 3 and 4 of the Xinhua report, China asserts its sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands based on “early discovery,” “naming,” “administrative management,” and “historic rights” dating back to “ancient times.” However, these arguments fail to meet current international legal standards for territorial acquisition and are riddled with historical misinterpretation and legal sophistry.
First, modern international law does not recognize mere “discovery” as an independent basis for establishing sovereignty, unless it is accompanied by actual, continuous, peaceful occupation with clear elements of state administration. The Chinese sources cited, such as ancient maps, voyage journals, or local toponyms, do not demonstrate tangible administrative control, and they certainly do not satisfy the “effectivités” standard applied by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in cases such as Minquiers and Ecrehos (1953) and Pedra Branca (2008).
In particular, the concept of “historic rights” that China uses to justify its expansive claims over the South China Sea was rejected by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal. The ruling explicitly stated that China has no lawful historic rights over waters beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial seas established under UNCLOS, and that the “nine-dash line” is inconsistent with any legal regime recognized by UNCLOS. China’s continued invocation of this concept not only violates principles of maritime delimitation under international law but also destabilizes the global legal order at sea.
By contrast, Vietnam possesses a solid legal basis and credible historical evidence to assert sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Historical records show that since the 17th century, the Nguyen Lords organized the Hoang Sa and Bac Hai fleets to operate regularly in the area. This administrative practice was maintained through successive dynasties, the French colonial period, the South Vietnamese government, and, after 1975, by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Administrative records, maps published by the Indochinese administration, and modern Vietnamese government decrees and sovereignty declarations all demonstrate continuous, peaceful, and public occupation recognized internationally in each historical period.
While China lacks evidence of actual control before the 1970s, its use of force to occupy the entire Paracel Islands in 1974 and certain features in the Spratlys in 1988 further contradicts its “historic rights” claims, which are incompatible with the prohibition on the use of force in international relations (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter). The “historic rights” as interpreted by China cannot replace a lawful legal basis for sovereignty and do not satisfy the criteria for valid territorial acquisition. Sovereignty is not derived from national memory or traditional names; it must be demonstrated through actual administration in accordance with current international law, a standard that Vietnam has consistently and transparently fulfilled.
Flawed approach and methodology
Although presented under the banner of a “historical-legal study,” the Xinhua Institute’s report fails to meet even the minimum standards of rigorous academic work. First, its approach does not follow any recognized method of historical or legal research in the international scholarly community. The report lacks a clear theoretical framework or conceptual structure and provides no basis for critical evaluation or independent verification of the sources and arguments it cites.
The selection of historical evidence is arbitrary, relying primarily on documents published by China or official statements of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflecting bias and self-reference, with no engagement with international scholarship or critique from independent academics. For example, the report cites ancient maps, voyage journals, and Ming-Qing local gazetteers, but without systematic verification regarding their legal validity, purpose, or the continuity of territorial administration.
Moreover, the report selectively quotes and distorts international documents such as the Cairo Declaration (1943), Potsdam Declaration (1945), and the UN Charter, while entirely ignoring foundational instruments of modern international maritime law with binding legal force, such as UNCLOS 1982 and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award. Omitting or disregarding these essential legal bases constitutes academic dishonesty, which would be unacceptable under international research standards.
Importantly, the report, though framed as research, is heavily politicized, employing propagandistic language, from phrases such as “Western media distortion” and “anti-China alliances” to treating Chinese sovereignty as a premise that requires no evidence. This demonstrates that the report is not a scientific study but a political product designed to justify domestic narratives and shape foreign media discourse.
Even technically, the report is poorly organized, lacks coherent reasoning, repeats itself, and is written in a disjointed style with no scholarly peer review, indicating it is not the work of an independent research institute but a political statement masquerading as academic analysis. Its “pseudo-scientific” and “pseudo-historical” nature reflects not only a non-academic approach but also a model of using history as a tool of power rather than as a subject of truthful inquiry.
Respecting standards and upholding historical facts as a path to peace
The Xinhua Institute report on South China Sea sovereignty does not meet international legal standards and lacks the academic rigor required for serious research. Its claims on history and “historic rights” are incompatible with the modern international legal system and have been rejected by independent judicial bodies. Most legal references cited in the document lack reliability and legitimacy.
Sovereignty cannot be established through distorted interpretations of history or by imposing power on the ground. Legitimacy arises only from compliance with international law, honesty in historical interpretation, and objectivity in scholarly research. Achieving a peaceful, fair, and sustainable solution for the South China Sea requires first respecting the law, historical facts, and academic standards.
Translated by KNHT
