On December 18, Carnegie published a report by Elina Noor discussing undersea cables in Southeast Asia. The report highlights several challenges related to the cable systems in the South China Sea, including:
  1. Waning South China Sea Attention – The potential for conflict in the South China Sea has led investors (e.g., Apricot and Echo) to avoid routing cables through the area, opting for costlier but safer alternatives.
  2. Chinese Claims and Bureaucratic Delays – China’s claims in the South China Sea impact licensing timelines and procedures for routes such as SJC2. Additionally, some littoral states impose strict licensing requirements, further complicating deployment.
  3. Risk of Physical Damage – The region sees tens of thousands of fishing vessels, cargo ships, naval vessels, and other maritime traffic annually. Many existing cables are aging, making them vulnerable to accidental damage from anchors or trawling activities.
  4. Geopolitical Fragmentation – U.S.-China competition has led to market fragmentation, making it more difficult for Southeast Asian countries to select partners, thereby increasing pressure to “take sides.”
  5. Risk Escalation – In the event of an incident, hasty responsibility attribution could escalate tensions.
The first four points are not entirely new and have been extensively analyzed in its Thematic Report on undersea cables (available here). However, Carnegie’s report does not address the risk of deliberate sabotage—a growing trend in asymmetric warfare scenarios. Recent examples include:
  • The Houthi “attack” on cables in the Red Sea.
  • The Finland and Germany cable damage, with indications of Chinese vessel involvement.
Additionally, undersea cables may become targets for undersea surveillance and intelligence-gathering, as well as potential attacks from armed groups or maritime militias.
 
Translated and edited by NNHD
A full text of the Article could be found here