Recently, The Cradle published a commentary by Aidan J. Simardone (former Stimson Center scholar), arguing that India and China are competing to circle the vacuum in Madagascar. https://thecradle.co/.../madagascar-erupts-indian-ocean...
According to the article, India is "quietly" consolidating its presence in Madagascar through: establishing a listening post in 2007 and a chain of military installations in the surrounding region (Mauritius, Maldives, Oman, and the Seychelles), signing a defense cooperation agreement in 2018... Presence in Madagascar would allow India to promote trade with Africa, protect trade routes, exploit mineral resources, and create an early warning system for hostile vessels entering the Indian Ocean... Meanwhile, China has had a military base near Madagascar since 2017 and is expanding ports in the region around Madagascar. Beijing already invested in the Tamatave Port, and could seek access to Diego Suarez - a former French naval base in Madagascar. Madagascar is also the maritime spine of the BRI, and China is Madagascar's top trading partner.
The US also seeks to expand its presence here due to concerns about China monopolizing the Indian Ocean, similar to France's historical fears about British presence. However, U.S. engagement is far more limited than China's and India's because: i) the U.S. is too far from Madagascar; ii) the U.S. is distracted by other regions, focusing only on West Asia in the Indian Ocean, and an overly thin military presence in the Western Indian Ocean; iii) the U.S. is pursuing tariff wars with India; iv) the U.S. has a history of troubled relations with Madagascar (cutting aid after the 2009 coup), while new Malagasy government has strong anti-imperialist tendencies (as seen in recent anti-France sentiment)...
The article highlights the trend of increased great power presence in/around Madagascar and the potential for Madagascar to become a new arena for strategic competition. However, the article leaves several points unexplored:
1/ Beyond commercial and strategic interests, major powers like India and China may have many other interests in Madagascar. For example: Madagascar has abundant nickel reserves, which is critical for defense equipment production, but extraction is limited by poor infrastructure; Madagascar's anti-imperialism aligns with China's push for "Global South" solidarity and India's "non-alignment"; Madagascar has large populations of Indian and Chinese descent due to historical migration...
2/ Beyond India and China, Russia and Japan are also pursuing this trend. Russia previously "took sides" in Madagascar's 2018 election, has a base in the Red Sea, and is increasing naval exercises around the Indian Ocean... Japan views Madagascar a key partner in its vision of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," an active participation in the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), a focal destination for Japanese infrastructure investment - most notably the expansion project of Madagascar's main port, scheduled for completion in 2026 - and a site of resource exploitation, exemplified by the Ambatovy Project, which is the largest foreign investment ever made in Madagascar.
3/ Increased great power presence does not necessarily lead to competition; it could create opportunities for international cooperation for Madagascar and the major powers themselves. For example, China has established the China-Indian Ocean Forum, which includes both India and Madagascar as participants.
