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On 12 November 2025, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced that the two countries had completed negotiations on a Treaty on Common Security and were preparing to sign it in 2026, signaling a “new era” in bilateral relations.
Under the treaty, the two sides will: (i) hold regular consultations at leader and ministerial levels on shared security issues; (ii) hold consultations when the security of either country, or their common security, is threatened in order to consider individual or joint responses; and (iii) promote mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security fields.
Recent efforts by Australia and Indonesia to strengthen defence and security ties feature several notable points.
First, the treaty reflects Australia’s efforts to expand its defence and security (DnS) network in Southeast Asia, rather than focusing solely on its traditional partners. In recent years, Australia has enhanced DnS cooperation with Southeast Asian countries through initiatives such as the Malaysia-Australia Joint Defence Program; the Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement (MLSA) with the Philippines (2021); the Australia-Indonesia Defence Cooperation Agreement (2024); the Peacekeeping Partnership Agreement with Vietnam (2024); and a memorandum of understanding with Singapore (2025).
The new treaty with Indonesia may be seen as a step forward in DnS cooperation between Australia and Southeast Asia. It enables Australia to play a more proactive role in regional security by jointly addressing challenges within Indonesia’s security environment. Through this, Australia continues to promote its role as an active partner of Southeast Asia while enhancing its influence in the region’s DnS affairs.
Second, the treaty indicates that Indonesia is adopting a more flexible approach to defence cooperation, while still remaining within the framework of its traditional non-aligned foreign policy. Beyond Australia, Indonesia has also promoted DnS cooperation with countries such as Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and China; however, most of these relationships have not resulted in a treaty on common security. The treaty with Australia is considered Indonesia’s first to include obligations to act when the other party is threatened. This partly reflects Indonesia’s prioritisation for Australia as a neighbouring partner in the DnS domain.
Nevertheless, the treaty constitutes a “soft” mechanism, allowing parties to choose whether to “act” or “not act” depending on their policies and priorities. In other words, Indonesia has the discretion to calibrate cooperation in a way that does not undermine the interests of its other partners. This enables Indonesia to safeguard its traditional non-alignment principle while maintaining its flexibility in policy-making.
Some argue that the treaty reflects increasing cooperation among Asia–Pacific countries to collectively counter China. Such an interpretation, however, may be premature. Indonesia has established a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China and has strengthened DnS cooperation with Beijing through the “2+2” dialogue mechanism and other frameworks. For Australia, following high-level engagements, Canberra has also expressed its willingness to improve bilateral relations with China. It is evident that both countries seek to maintain amicable relations with China. Therefore, concluding that the treaty is aimed at China lacks sufficient grounds.
Translated and edited by VKN
