25/11/2011
This paper looks at developments affecting security in the South China Sea prior to and after the adoption of the Guidelines to Implement the Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea on July 20, 2011. The first part of the paper provides a comparative assessment of China’s aggressive assertiveness in relations with the Philippines and Vietnam and their responses prior to the adoption of the Guidelines. The second part of the paper assesses the significance of the Guidelines to Implement the DOC on security in the South China Sea. Part three reviews developments after the Guidelines were adopted with a focus on China’s bilateral relations with the Philippines and Vietnam and Sino-Indian relations. The paper concludes by arguing that bilateral arrangements between China and other claimant states is a necessary but not sufficient condition for maintaining security in the South China Sea as long as China continues to assert “indisputable sovereignty” over the maritime area.
Introduction
This paper reviews developments affecting the security of the South China Sea during 2011. The paper first discusses Chinese assertiveness in the first half of the year and contrasts this with developments in the second half of the year after China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reached agreement on Guidelines to implement the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (hereafter DOC Guidelines).
During the first half of 2011 China embarked on pattern of aggressively asserting its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea by targeting the commercial operations of oil exploration ships in waters claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. China’s actions not only raised regional tensions but also provoked the Philippines into making repeated diplomatic protests, increasing its defence budget, lobbying regional states for political support, and aligning more closely with the United States. Vietnam responded by calculated displays of resolve to defend national sovereignty, further its program of force modernisation, and stepped up its defence cooperation with the US, India, Japan, the Philippines and other ASEAN states.
During the second half of the year, after the adoption of the DOC Guidelines, tensions over the South China Sea began to subside and diplomacy took centre stage. China also initiated a round of high-level diplomacy by hosting official visits by Philippines’ President Benigno Aquino III and Nguyen Phu Trong, Secretary General of the Vietnam Communist Party. China and Vietnam reached a separate bilateral agreement on guidelines to settle maritime disputes during Secretary General Trong’s visit.
This paper is organised into five parts. Part one discusses Chinese assertiveness directed at the Philippines and Vietnam in the first half of the year. Part two reviews the responses by the Philippines and Vietnam to Chinese assertiveness. Part three discusses the adoption of Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC (Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea). Part four analyses diplomatic developments involving South China Sea claimant states after the adoption of the DOC Guidelines. Part five discusses the impact of security trends on the prospects for a resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
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* Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia. His research focuses on Southeast Asian regional security and foreign policy issues with a particular interest in Vietnam, ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Many of the author’s current research papers may be located at >www.scribed.com<. E-mail: c.thayer@adfa.edu.au.
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