South China Sea Dispute: Implications of Recent Developments and Prospects for Coming Future, by Tran Truong Thuy

China’s South China Sea Policy before and after ARF 17 in Hanoi

As the most powerful country among the claimant states, China has set the tone for the disputes in the South China Sea. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was reached between China and ASEAN in 2002 as Beijing was adopting an accommodating stance in the South China Sea disputes. Since 2007-2008, however, as Beijing began to take on a more assertive approach, the situation has been tense again.

China’s comprehensive policy in the South China Sea

To achieve de-factor control of the South China Sea set by the U-shaped claim,  China has significantly increased its presence within the line with a comprehensive approach, expanding not only military but also paramilitary and civilian activities in the area.

Militarily, China is accelerating military build-up, especially naval modernization with the construction of a naval base in Sanya that serves as a gateway to the South China Sea. To send messages of deterrence to other claimants in the South China Sea, the Chinese navy has also increased the frequency and level of coordination in conducting naval exercises in the South China Sea. The most significant event happened in July 2010 when the PLA navy for the first time mobilized at least a dozen modern warships from three fleets (the North Fleet, the East Fleet, and the South Fleet) to conduct a large-scale joint naval exercise in the South China Sea.[1]

Paramilitarily, China has deployed patrol vessels and boats from various Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies to the South China Sea.[2] During the period of its unilaterally declared fishing ban between May and August (imposed annually since 1999), Chinese maritime security forces have repeatedly detained Vietnamese fishermen, confiscated fishing boats and demanded several fines of US $8,000 to $10,000 for the release of the fishermen. In early April 2010, Beijing even announced the dispatch of two large fishery patrol vessels to the Spratly Islands to protect Chinese fishing vessels, which were increasing in number and going further to the south.  It was the first time China had done so outside the period of its unilateral fishing ban.^[3] On June 23, 2010, the Chinese fishery administration vessel Yuzheng 311 pointed alarge-caliber machine gun to an Indonesian ship and threatened to attack the ship when a Chinese fishing boat was seized by Indonesian forces in the area within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zones in the Natuna Islands.[4]

On the diplomatic front, China’s strategy with regard to the South China Sea issues has centered on the insistence on bilateral negotiations with smaller claimant states and the prevention of any efforts to multilateralize and internationalize the issues and especially any US involvement attempts. Chinese Foreign Minister once warned that turning the South China Sea issues into international or multilateral ones will “only ma[d]e matters worse and the resolution more difficult”.^[5]

With regard to the issue of energy development in the South China Sea, beginning in the summer of 2007, China has threatened a number of foreign oil and gas companies to stop joint exploration operations in the sea with their Vietnamese partners or face unestimated consequences in their business dealings with China.^[6]

While protesting against energy development activities undertaken by other countries in the area within the U-shaped claim, China has on the other hand advocated the idea of joint energy resources development within that claim in the South China Sea. In principle, other claimants do not oppose concept of joint development; however, the question of how to define an acceptable area in the disputed waters in the South China Sea to launch joint development projects remains one of the most intractable issues in putting the idea into practice. ASEAN claimant states would certainly not accept any Chinese proposals for joint development arrangements in the areas within their claimed EEZ and continental shelves, which sometimes are five to seven hundreds  nautical miles far from Hainan Island. ASEAN claimants are ready to work with foreign—including Chinese—partners only on the condition that their sovereign rights are fully respected.^[7] As has been demonstrated in the case of the Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the South China Sea in 2005 between national petroleum corporations of China, the Philippines and Vietnam, the Philippines had to postpone the renewal of the agreement due to mounting domestic opposition, which condemned the government of compromising Philippine sovereignty by allowing the area of the joint development project to overlap with the country’s exclusive economic zone.       

Several factors contribute to explain why China has returned to an assertive approach in the South China Sea in recent years. First, China for decades of continuous remarkable economic growth has accumulated its economic and military power to a level that allows it to become increasingly assertive in conducting external behaviors, especially during and after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. Second, relative stability in China-Taiwan relations in recent years has enabled China to shift its priorities, capability and resources to other external issues, most notably to the South China Sea. Third, rising nationalism and increasing role and activities of the PLA as well as growing competition between various interest groups within Chinese domestic politics (law enforcements agencies, energy corporations, coastal provinces,…) have served to complicate the process of policy formulation and implementation with regard to the South China Sea issues in China. Fourth, other claimants’ actions in the South China Sea has also forced China to react and Beijing has overly reacted. Fifth, the lack of an effective mechanism for managing the disputes in the South China Sea, especially for regulating the conduct of the parties including China has given China much leeway to pursue its bold stance.

(continuing)