Renewed Tensions and Continuing Maritime Security Dilemma in the South China Sea: A Philippine Perspective, by Rommel C. Banlaoi

 

INTRODUCTION

On 10 March 2009, the Philippine government signed Republic Act (RA) 9522 to comply with the requirements of the U nited Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), which stipulates that all claims to be made for sea bed or continental shelf extensions to Exclusive Economic Zones allowed under the treaty be filed by 13 May 2009. Otherwise known as the New Philippine Baselines Law, RA 9522 reaffirms the Philippines’ claims to its territorial waters, including its extended continental shelf, economic zones and an area of the contested Spratlys archipelago known as the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG).[1]

China, Taiwan and Vietnam immediately protested the passage of the New Philippine Baselines Law, which is part of a regional pattern of developments that have inevitably led to an upsurge of security tensions in the South China Sea. These developments include the China-Vietnam controversy over Sansha island in December2007,[2] the China-Philippines hullaballoo on the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in early 2008,[3]  the discovery of a major Chinese naval base on Hainan Island in mid-2008[4]  and a naval skirmish involving the US surveillance ship Impeccable and five Chinese vessels off Hainan Island in March 2009.[5]

This paper argues that security tensions over the disputed Spratly Islands have increased  over  the  past  two  years  despite  the  adoption  of  the  Declaration  on  the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002.  While tensions in the South China has no doubt de-escalated during and after the signing of the DOC,[6]  security irritants  pervaded  as  claimants  continued  to  improve  their  civilian  and  military facilities in their occupied islands, islets, reefs and shoals. Taiwan even protested the signing of the DOC as it only included Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. It  is  believed  that  the  exclusion  of  Taiwan  in  the  DOC  has  made  the declaration ineffective in managing tensions in the South China Sea.

Though the DOC temporarily calmed the waters in the South China Sea by upholding  the  principle  of  amicable  settlement  of  maritime  boundary  disputes,  its “non-binding” character made the DOC fragile and tenuous. Thus, disputes in the South China Sea continue to be major sources of maritime security dilemma in Asia. China’s growing naval power in recent years has exacerbated this regional maritime security dilemma, leading the other claimants to upgrade their naval assets and modernize their maritime  capabilities. The maritime security dilemma in the South China Sea raises the possibility of armed conflict in the Spratlys, something claimants and stakeholders alike are keen to avoid.

STRENGTHENING EFFECTIVE OCCUPATION IN THE SPRATLYS

The South China Sea is composed of two major island-chains: the Paracels and the Spratlys. The Paracels are being contested between China and Vietnam while the Spratlys are being claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam. This paper focuses only on the dispute in the Spratlys.

Based on the ten-day field research of the author in the Philippine occupied islands in the Spratlys on 6-15 May 2009.[7] All claimants involved in the disputes, with the exemption of Brunei, are strengthening their effective occupation of what they consider their territories in the Spratlys. China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have been seriously consolidating their physical presence in the South China Sea since the adoption of the DOC.

Photographic evidences indicate that claimants have been involved in various infrastructure projects that aim to intensify their military and civilian presence in their occupied islands, islets, reefs and shoals with the strategic intention to prove their effective occupation of these areas and thereby strengthen their claims for ownership. Proving their ownership of these areas has huge implications for the definition of their baselines and exclusive control and exploitation of rich maritime resources in the South China.

Figure 1 shows the already well-known overlapping claims in the South China Sea. Figure  2, on the other hand, shows the overlapping baselines of claimants. Because baselines controversies among claimants in the South China Sea have not been settled, there have also been overlapping fishing activities in the whole area as shown in Figure 3.

Fishing activities in the South China have been major sources of irritants among claimants as they accuse each other of illegal fishing and poaching in their internal waters. To justify the construction of facilities in their occupied territories, claimants even call these facilities “fishermen shelters”. Some claimants even erected some light posts and observation towers in their controlled areas in aid of navigation.  It is already known that there is an enormous navigational traffic in the South China Sea making it one of the maritime superhighways of the world. Figure 4 shows the huge number of ships and tankers passing through the South China Sea, which account for more than 50%  of the world’s annual navigational activities.

 

Figure 1: Overlapping claims in the South China Sea

Source: Energy Information Administration, 2009

 

Figure 2: Overlapping baselines in the South China Sea

 

Figure 3: Overlapping fishing activities in the South China Sea

Source: The Philippine Navy, 2009

 

Figure 4: Navigational activities in the South China Sea

Source: Global Ballast Water  Management Program, 2005

 

Because of strategic and economic value of the South China Sea, all claimants, except Brunei, have invested their resources in their occupied territories to maintain and consolidate their physical presence and prove their effective occupation.  Figure 5 shows the number of territories occupied by claimants and the estimated number of troops deployed by claimants.  Since 2002, claimants have been engaged in a number of construction activities that aim to improve and fortify their military and civilian presence in their occupied areas.

 

Figure 5: Presently occupied areas in the Spratlys and estimated number of troops

 

1. Vietnam

Vietnam  presently  occupies  21  islands, reefs and cay in the Spratlys. It has impressive  facilities  in  the  Spratlys.         Its  largest  occupied  island,  Lagos  (or Spratly Island), is the most heavily fortified with a solid runway, a pier, at least 35 building structures, around 20 storage tanks, at least 20 gun emplacements, at least 5 battle tanks and some parabolic disk antennas and  a spoon rest radar. In April 2009, Philippine aerial surveillance found a two newly-constructed two-storey building in the Lagos Island with 12 newly-installed light posts and 12 wind mills. Figure 6 shows the current status of Lagos Island, which looks like a small community in the middle of the vast ocean.

 

Figure 6: Lagos Island or Spratly Island (Vietnam)

Source:  Philippine Air Force, 2009

 

Aside from Lagos Island, Vietnam also maintains facilities at Pugad Island (Southwest Cay), which is just less than two nautical miles away from the Philippine occupied island of Parola (Northeast  Cay).   Pugad            Island  has   several  gun emplacements,   gun  shelters,  civilian  buildings,  military  barracks,  parabolic  disc antennas, concrete bunkers, a light house, a football field, a helipad, and many light posts. In April 2009, the Philippine Air Force sighted a supply ship in the vicinity of Pugad Island with newly installed light posts, polarized dipole array antenna, and a broadband  facility. Pugad  Island  also  has  a  well-maintained  lagoon  suitable  fortourists.  The surrounding waters of Pugad Island are also good for scuba diving and other water-based sports.  Figure 7 shows the present status of Pugad Island.

 

Figure 7: Pugad Island or Southwest Cay (Vietnam)

Source: Philippine Air Force, 2009

 

Other facilities of Vietnam in at least 14 occupied reefs seem to follow a standard pattern of construction.   South Reef, Pentley Reef, Discovery Great Reef, Collins Reef, Pearson Reef, Lendao Reef, West Reef, Ladd Reef, Central London Reef, East  Reef, Cornwallis Reef, Pigeon Reef, Allison Reef, and Barque Canada  Reef have identical structures featuring a golden-painted three-storey concrete building with built-in light house on top, gun emplacements on both sides, T-type pier, solar panels, parabolic disc antennas, and garden plots.  Figure 8 shows the Pentley Reef, which is identical with Vietnamese structures in other reefs mentioned above.

 

Figure 8: Pentley Reef (Vietnam)

Source: 570th Composite Tactical Wing, Philippine Air Force, 2009

 

2. The Philippines

The  Philippines  ranks  second  in  the  most  number  of  occupied  areas  in the Spratlys.  It is presently in control  of  nine facilities that are considered parts of the Municipality of Kalayaan.   Its largest occupied facility is the   Pag-Asa Island (Thitu Island), the closest island to the Chinese occupied Subi Reef.   Pag-Asa Island has an already deteriorating run-way maintained by the 570th Composite Tactical Wing of the Philippine Air Force.  It also has a naval detachment maintained by the Naval Forces West of the Philippine Navy.  Pag-Asa island has municipal hall called Kalayaan Hall, a village  hall  called  Barangay  Pag-Asa, a police station maintained by the Philippine National Police (PNP), sports facilities, observation tower, a commercial mobile phone station, and several civilian houses and military barracks.

Pag-AsaIsland is the only occupied island of the Philippines with civilian residents.  At least five families reside in Pag-Asa.  This island is the main seat of the Municipality of Kalayaan established by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1596 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos on 11 June 1978. Registered voters of Kalayaan Municipality cast their votes in Pag-Asa Island during local and national elections .  The Commission  on  Elections  (COMELEC)  maintains  an  office  in  Pag-Asa  Island. The Mayor of Kalayaan Municipality has released the Kalayaan Medium Term Development Plan, 2006-2010 to civilianize the management of KIG. Figure 9 shows the current status of Pag-Asa Island.

 

Figure 9: Pag-Asa Island (Philippines)

Source: 570th Composite Tactical Wing , Philippine Air Force, 2009

 

The Philippines also maintains makeshift naval detachment facilities in five other islands, one reef and one shoal. Its facilities in the Rizal Reef (Commodore Reef) are just wooden structures  and two small single-storey hexagonal concrete buildings (Figure 10) manned by four personnel of the Philippine Navy. The Philippines also maintains a naval  detachment  in  Ayungin  Shoal  (Second  Thomas  Shoal)  established  out  of dilapidated Landing Ship Tank called LST 57 (Figure 11).  Ayungin Shoal is the closest structure of the Philippines to the controversial Mischief Reef occupied by China.

 

Figure 10: Structure in the Rizal Reef (Philippines)

Source: 570th Composite Tactical Wing, Philippine Air Force, 2009

 

Figure 11: LST 57 Docked at the Ayungin Shoal (Philippines)

Source:  Naval Forces West, Philippine Navy, 2009

 

3. China

Though China does not occupy any island in the Spratlys, it has solid facilities in seven  reefs  and  shoals  with  concrete  helipads  and  military  structures.Its  much publicized structure is in the Mischief Reef, which currently has a three-storey concrete building  and  five  octagonal  concrete  structures  in  the  vicinity.     The three-storey building has a basketball court, dipole and parabolic disc antenna, search lights, solar panels and cross-slot type radar.  In April 2009, the Philippine Air Force sighted three naval vessels in the vicinity of Mischief Reef: Fulin Class Survey Ship, Shijian Class Survey Ship and Yannan Class Survey Ship.  Three fishing vessels were also sighted in the lagoon of Mischief Reef.

 

Figure 12: Mischief Reef (China)

Source: Western Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines 2009

 

Chinamaintains a very impressive helipad facility in the Johnson Reef.  This reef has three-storey concrete building armed with high powered machine guns and naval guns.  Johnson Reef has identical structures in Chigua Reef and Gaven Reef.  In April 2009, the Philippine Air Forces sighted in Johnson Reef a Huainan Jiangwei Class Frigate with body number 560 and it was believed to be armed by surface to surface missile, surface to air missile, 100mm guns, 32mm guns, anti-submarine mortars, and Harbin Z9A Dauphin Helicopter.  Figure 13 shows Chinese structure in Johnson Reef.

 

Figure 13: Johnson Reef

Source:  Western Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2009.

 

4. Malaysia

Malaysia,  which  presently  occupies  five  areas  in  the  Spratlys,  has  well- maintained facilities in the Swallow Reef.  This reef has a diving center called “Layang- Layang”. Swallow   Reef   has   a   resort-type   hotel,   swimming   pool,   windmills, communication antennas, control communication tower, civilian houses, military barracks and a helipad (Figure 14).

Malaysiaalso has a very good facil ity in the Ardasier Reef with an excellent helipad, sepak takraw court, gun emplacements and control tower (Figure 15).       The facilities in the Ardasier Reef are almost identical with the Malaysian facilities in Erica Reef, Mariveles Reef and Erica Shoal. Malaysia also maintains a symbolic obelisk marker in the Louisa Reef.

 

Figure 14: Swallow Reef (Malaysia)

Source: Western Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines 2009.

 

5. Taiwan

Taiwanonly occupies one island called Itu-Aba, officially named by Taiwan government as Taiping Island.  It is the largest and the most heavily fortified among the occupied islands in the Spratlys.   It has more than 50 buildings used for military and civilian purposes.  Itu-Aba has excellent helipad and a very long run-way inaugurated by then President Chen Shuibian in March 2008.  The whole island is protected by at least 500 troops armed with at least 20 coastal guns, 20 gun emplacements and communication towers. Like other occupied islands in the Spratlys, Itu-Aba has several parabolic disc antennas, radars, solar panels and concrete bunkers. The island also has firing range and sports facilities.  Aerial surveillance of the Philippine Air force in April 2009 indicated that Itu-Aba has newly-constructed three-storey building, new access ramp, and a new firing range.   Figure 14 shows the current status of Taiwan’s facilities in Itu-Aba.

 

Figure 14: Itu-Aba (Taiwan)

 

Figure 14: Ardasier Reef (Malaysia)

Source: Western Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines 2009

 

From the foregoing, China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam have invested their resources to erect solid and more stable structures in their occupied areas.  Philippine structures in its nine occupied territories remain modest and in the dismal stage of rapid deterioration. However, the  Philippines  occupy  the  most  number  of  Islands (Kota, Lawak, Likas, Pag-Asa, Parola and Pugad) that are vegetated and suitable for human habitation if properly developed.  China’s occupied areas are all reefs but with solid and highly cemented structures.  Majority of the areas occupied by Vietnam are also reefs. But like China, these reefs have solid three-storey buildings. Though Taiwan only occupies one island, it is, however, the largest island in the Spratlys.  Malaysia does not occupy any island like China. But all Malaysian occupied reefs are located in an area of huge oil and natural gas deposits (Figure 15).  Moreover, its Swallow Reef called Layang-Layang is the most developed reef in the Spratlys for tourism purposes.

 

Figure 15: Oil and Natural Gas Fields in the South China Sea

Source:“Oil and Gas Resources in the South China Sea” at  http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/maps/EEZ%20Claims,%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Resources.jpg

 

CONCLUSION

Based on photographic evidences gathered by the author from various official and non-official open sources, all claimants, with the exemption of Brunei, have been consolidating their civilian and military presence in the Spratlys to assert their territorial claims. Though there seems to be a de -escalation of conflict in the South China Sea with the adoption of DOC in 2002, renewed security tensions have occurred in the late 2007 indicating the limitations of DOC in managing territorial disputes and perpetuati ng the maritime security dilemma in one of the contested waters in the Asia Pacific. Beyond  doubt,  the territorial disputes in the South China continue to play a destabilizing role in the security of the Asia Pacific region.[8]   There is therefore a great need to increase transparency and to enhance confidence-building among claimants and other stakeholders in the disputes to effectively overcome the security dilemma in the South China Sea and decisively create a cooperative management regime necessary for regional peace and stability.[9]

Prof. Rommel C. Banlaoi

Executive director, philippine institute for peace, violence and terrorism research (PIPVTR)

Head of center for intelligence and national security studies (CINSS)

Lecturer, Command and General Staff College (CGSC) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

Senior Fellow, Yuchengco Center, De La Salle University

 

Author’s Biography

Rommel C. Banlaoi

Rommel C. Banlaoi is the Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), a non-government academic research organization in the Philippines engaged in policy development.  He also heads the PIPVTR Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies.  He was a professor of political science at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), assistant professor of international studies at De La Salle University (DLSU) Manila, instructor in political science at the University of the Philippines (Los Banos) and university research associate at the University of the Philippines (Diliman).  He is currently a senior fellow at the Yuchengco Center of De La Salle University while lecturing international relations and regional security at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).  He has authored several books,  journal articles and book chapters on international terrorism, South China Sea Disputes, regional security and Philippine foreign and defence policies.