24/03/2011
China Sea workshop process: Some backgrounds 1. There were already armed conflicts between China and Vietnam before 1990. 2. There were a number of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral territorial disputes. 3. There was rush to seek resources, either living or non-living/minerals. 4. Some historical confrontation and conflicts between the countries in the area, including between China and Southeast Asia. 5. The interest of outside powers on South China Sea, particularly in terms of navigation and over flight
Indonesian position
1. Indonesia borders on the South China Sea but not a participant in the multiple disputes over Spratly Islands group.
2. In the 1980’sIndonesia was worried that the South China Sea may become new flash points of conflicts in the area that may affect peace and stability in Southeast Asia.
3. At that time ASEAN did not have any perspective on the South China Sea. In fact, there are a lot of disputes between the ASEAN countries themselves.
4. At that time ASEAN did not yet include Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam).
Indonesian informal initiatives
In view of difficulties in taking formal initiative, I traveled across the other 5 ASEAN countries at that time to discuss what could be done. I found out that:
1. Practically everybody thought that we should do something.
2. There was apprehension that territorial disputes could pose major difficulties in developing cooperative efforts.
3. It would be better if the approach was informal, at least at the initial stage.
4. There was some opinion that ASEAN members should coordinate their views first before engaging non-ASEAN states in the process. (I did not share this opinion).
In attempting to manage the potential conflicts in the South China Sea, I developed 3 objectives:
1. To device cooperative programs in which everyone could participate, no matter how small or insignificant it may appear in the beginning.
2. Promote confidence building process.
3. Encourage dialogue between the parties to seek solutions to their problems.
Seeking cooperative programs
1. The first meeting of the workshop in 1990 (in Bali) was attended only by the Six ASEAN Countries.
2. I devised six topics for discussion, on which each ASEAN country was requested to take the lead:
· Territorial and sovereignty issues: Malaysia
· Political and security issues: Singapore
· MSR and environmental protection: Indonesia
· Safety of navigation:-Philippines
· Resources management: ThailanD
· Institutional mechanism for cooperation: Brunei Darussalam
In the subsequent meetings of the workshop, we were able to bring in China, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, particularly after the achievement of peace in Cambodia, and the entry of the Indochinese countries into ASEAN.
It was not easy to bring in China into the workshop process, perhaps because of:
1. its dislike to “regionalize” or “internationalize” the South China Sea problems;
2. the inclusion of Chinese Taipei in the process;
3. China regarded that whatever problems it had with the other countries, China would solve it directly and bilaterally.
The workshop process has continued annually in Indonesia since 1990 and the 19th workshop is now being planned in November 2009. In addition, the workshop process also worked through various Technical Working Groups (TWG’s) and Group of Expert Meeting (GMS) and Study Groups (SG) in various places around the South China Sea Area, hosted by their respective countries.
There are five TWG’s, namely on (1) Marine Scientific Research, (2) Resource Assessment, (3) marine environmental protection, (4) safety of navigation, shipping and communication, and (5) on legal matters.
The cooperation on MSR is perhaps the most advance, particularly after the bio- diversity expedition around Anambas Islands. Now we are actively preparing and developing cooperation on how to deal with sea level rise as the result of global climatic change.
During the last meeting (18th Workshop in Menado in November 2008), China and Chinese Taipei agreed for the first time to submit a joint proposal before the next meeting (November 2009) combining the Chinese concept on Education, Training Course and Exchange of Marine Science and Technology in the South China Sea, and the Chinese Taipei proposal on “Southeast Asia Network for Education (SEA – ONE)”. Hopefully the Joint proposal would soon be approved and implemented, thus becomes another milestone in building up peace and cooperation in the South China Sea.
Confidence building process
1. After several meetings, discussion on territorial and sovereignty issues as well as on political and security issues have stalled, mainly because of the reluctant of the parties to go on. Yet, the discussions have brought better understanding of the problems involved.
2. Discussion on confidence building had brought some results:
· No major expansion of military presence in the disputed area recently
· No major occupation of the reefs and the banks
· It appears that more contact and transparency have developed between the authorities concerned.
3. More Codes of Conducts between the parties have developed, such as:
· The China-Philippines Code of Conduct (1995)
· Vietnam-Philippines Code of Conduct
· ASEAN-China Code of Conduct (2002)
· China-Vietnam Delimitation Agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin (2002)
· Some joint development/cooperation, such as between Malaysia with Thailand, and Malaysia with Vietnam; and China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin on fisheries
Some lessons for 2nd track diplomacy/informal process
1. Some conditions for successful efforts:
· Realization by the parties that the outbreak of conflicts will not settle the disputes and therefore will not be in their interests
· The existence of political will to seek and solve the problems peacefully
· Not galvanizing public opinions, because it may solidify positions rather than enabling compromise or solution to take place
· Need for transparencies in national policy and legislation
· Need to take into account the interest of the non parties that maybe interested in the peaceful solution of the issues
2. Some basic principles:
· Use an all inclusive approach
· Start with less sensitive issues
· Involve senior government officials as much as possible
· The process should be flexible and do not necessarily being institutionalized.
· Do not magnify differences but emphasize similarities
· Follow step by step approach, perhaps begins with technical issues
· Lack of immediate results should not be cause for despair
· Keep the objective simple
· The roles of initiator or conveners are important.
The South China Sea Workshop process was supported by CIDA through the University of British Columbia in Vancouver for 10 years. Now the workshop process continues on its own, supported by all the participants. Certain participants who financially can not attend meetings, are supported by Special Fund which was established by voluntary contributions from the participants.
In conclusion, after many years of managing potential conflicts in the SCS, now the spirit of cooperation has emerged in the area. There has been no eruption of conflicts or armed conflicts since 1988. In fact, the friendly relations between China and the Southeast Asian Countries have developed considerably. Yet, the prospects for conflicts in the SCS continue to exist in the future if the countries concerned do not persist in managing them carefully. Therefore, the informal efforts to manage potential conflicts in the South China Sea should continue, while the formal efforts by the countries concerned to settle bilateral issues should also be encouraged. It is expected that counties concerned should not take action that may complicate the issues.
Director, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, Indonesia
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