Is the Trump Administration Taking Freedom of Navigation Less Seriously?

Recently, SCMP has published a commentary by Dr. Bao Yinan (Huayang Institute), arguing that the Trump Administration is reducing its priority on freedom of navigation, reducing its promotion of a "rules-based maritime order" and its involvement in that regard in the South China Sea.

 

The indicators provided by the author include: 1) the Trump 2.0 administration had yet to issue U.S. Annual Report on Freedom of Navigation (FON) for 2024 by the time of the article’s publication, a departure from U.S. decades-long tradition; 2) as of early August 2025, the Trump 2.0 administration has yet to publicly conduct FONOPs in the South China Sea, a stark contrast to Trump 1.0's routine of about more than 7 per year; 3) The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) does not extend the provision requiring reporting on freedom of navigation operations.

 

The author gives three reasons for this change: 1) The Trump administration might be focusing too much on global hotspots, ignoring long-term maritime strategy; 2) Trump 2.0 has cut the budget and reorganizeed the State Department, disrupting the decision-making process on FONOPs in the South China Sea; 3) The Trump 2.0 administration does not want to publicize freedom of navigation operations that challenge the claims of allies and partners, especially when it needs to rally support in maritime hotspots and has been negotiating about military base arrangements or tariff issues with many allies and partners.

 

According to the author, if this trend continues, the U.S. will weaken its symbolic leadership role, break its own maritime standards, reduce the transparency of its own policies, etc.

 

The article has indeed summarized some signs of Trump 2.0's approach on the issue of FONOPs in particular and freedom of navigation in general. However, the author's assessment may be a bit hasty for a few reasons:

 

- The fact that the U.S. has not yet released the 2024 FON Report may be due to technical factors. Although not as late as this year, the FON Reports in recent years (public versions) were also released in different time periods (the 2019 version was in July 2020, the 2020 version in March 2021, the 2021 version in April 2022, and the 2023 version in May 2024, etc.). The fact that the U.S. had a new Administration and had been conducting administrative reforms might have slowed down this process. The FON Report for 2024 was in fact released right after the article’s publication, in late August 2025.

 

- The U.S.' reduction of publicity about its FONOPs is not an unusual sign. Historically, the U.S. used to not publicly announce FONOPs to avoid "politicizing" this U.S. activity, which the U.S. officially consideres not political but legal.

 

- In the South China Sea, FONOPs are not the only indicator of U.S. commitment or engagement. FONOPs after the Trump 1.0 administration have tended to decrease in frequency, but some other activities, typically Maritime Cooperation Activities (MCA), have increased in frequency.