08/12/2011
It is true that the current regional power balance is greatly in favour of China and its economic power swamps many Asia Pacific countries including Japan, India and South Korea. China is capitalizing on its power potential and the grammar and language of recent Chinese announcements, articulations and actions relating to sovereignty contestations and territorial disputes and its penchant for intimidating its neighbours has sent discomforting signals among the Asia Pacific region. Ironically, China’s advocacy to generate peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region has touched a nadir; instead it has added to uncertainties that can potentially undermine regional stability.
In recent times, South China Sea has been at the centre stage of Asia Pacific regional security debate and discourse. China has claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea. It has exhibited assertiveness at sea, objected to offshore exploration activities in the EEZ of claimant states, has challenged the internationally accepted freedom of navigation in international waters, and on occasions shown proclivity for saber rattling. Significantly, China has rejected and warned external powers such as the US, Japan, South Korea and India to stay away from the South China Sea disputes. The prevalent view among Asia Pacific countries about China is of suspicion, distrust and anxiety due to Chinese behaviour and intentions in conduct of its international relations clearly raising the ‘China threat’ to new levels.
The reverberations of developments in South China Sea have been felt in India too. Although not a claimants to any territory in South China Sea, the region gains salience for India on account of its maritime trade which transits through the region. These sea-lanes are critical for India’s economic vitality. India also has stakes in the oil and gas exploration in the region and has been engaged in commercial energy transactions with Vietnam since the late 1980s. New Delhi’s concerns also arise from the Chinese articulation of its ‘core interests’ which Beijing may expand to include the disputed areas in India’s northern borders.
This paper attempts to highlight the significance of South China Sea in India’s political, economic and strategic calculus. It begins by showcasing that South China Sea had been an integral part of India’s socio-cultural, economic and politico interactions with the ancient kingdoms adjoining South China Sea. The paper then examines India’s operational and commercial interests in South China Sea and argues that India is an important stakeholder in then evolving economic and politico-security dynamics in South China Sea. The paper also presents India’s transactions with China with regard to its boundary disputes in the Himalayas particularly in the context of the ongoing military infrastructure build up which impacts on Indian security and adds to its uneasiness.
Politico-strategic Developments in South China Sea
The tone and tenor of the statements and actions by the South China Sea claimants with regard to their assertion over the sovereignty over the South China Sea has brought the issue to the forefront in the Asia Pacific security discourse. The harsh reality is that the tranquil waters of South China Sea appear to churn with insecurity. A non-binding multilateral agreement ‘2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ (DoC) with focus on the Spratly Islands has been in place since 2002 wherein China and ASEAN countries agreed to work together to build trust and confidence, exercise restraint for creating a positive atmosphere for the eventual resolution of disputes, and to maintain peace and stability in the region.
Although the DoC was a concrete step to institutionalize regional dialogue among the claimants and served for the de-escalation of military tensions in South China Sea, it appears that it was unable to dispel ‘China Threat’ among the claimant states. China has always been keen to deal with the claimants on a one-to-one basis unlike the ASEAN countries who seek ‘a more formal and legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea’ to bring about stability in the region. The region, therefore, remains a fertile ground for conflict in the light of territorial claims, ambitions and flashpoints.
The claimants have been engaged in building infrastructure on several islands in South China Sea to support military operations. What is noteworthy is that the buildup resulted in a number of airstrips turning these islands into unsinkable aircraft carriers. It is possible to stage smaller military aircraft of the VSTOL (vertical short takeoff and landing) variety. According to the Taiwanese Air Force Chief, Liu Kui-li ‘Because of the strong likelihood that landing strips at air bases will come under intensive missile attack and be destroyed during a war with China, the air force considers fighters with VSTOL capabilities to be most suitable for Taiwan’s defense.’[1]
Currently, there are four known airstrips of various sizes on the Spratly Islands. Rancudo Airfield (1300 meters) on the Pagasa, occupied by the Philippines, is the longest and C130 transport aircraft land on a regular basis. Islets occupied by Malaysia (Swallow Reef or Layang Layang), Vietnam (Truong Sa Lon) and Taiwan (Taipingdao) are home to 600 meter air strips while Brunei has not invested in any such facility. The forward deployed aircraft on these islands can serve as deterrent and also be put into combat at short notice till reinforcements come from mainland. As far as China is concerned, the Woody Island is bristling with a range of military related infrastructure including a well developed runway for military use, a mobile missile battery, naval facilities for ships and a network of intelligence and communication infrastructure. The Sanya Naval base has sophisticated infrastructure to host both nuclear and conventional submarine and is a perfect launching point for nuclear submarines into the South China Sea.
The claimants have so far attempted to keep military activity in the defensive mode; however, as sovereignty issues gain primacy, energy exploration activity intensifies in disputed areas, there will be tensions in the region.
The current naval inventory and the ongoing acquisition plans among the South China Sea claimants is worrisome. They continue to build their military / naval capability to deter and in some cases consolidate through bilateral military engagements with extra regional powers.The thrust of naval acquisitions is on submarines equipped with anti-ship and land-attack missiles, modern torpedoes, electronic support measures and above all the AIP that makes these vessels a formidable platform. The regional navies see several benefits in acquiring these platforms that could serve as force multipliers and also as anti-access platforms centred on credible conventional deterrence. Likewise, shore based fighter jets to attack targets at sea are fast gaining primacy. These could be deployed, in the future, through extended runways on the unsinkable aircraft carriers.
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Read full text of this paper here
[1]Rich Chang, “Air Force Plans to Buy Jets That Need Shorter Runway”, Taipei Times, January 23, 2006.
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