Functional Cooperation and Pan-Beibu Gulf: Potential For Peace in the South China Sea

Given the complexity of the South China Sea issue, it may be unrealistic to hope for a final solution to the dispute any time soon. It is, however, reasonable to expect continued stabilization in the security situation in the area in the near future. I argue in this paper that this sense of cautious optimism is based on three factors or trends that are still taking place in the South China Sea region. First of all, the relations among various claimants have improved significantly over the past decade. The political, economic, and security ties between China and other states involved in the dispute have reached such a positive level that no party would be willing to take actions in the South China Sea to dramatically disrupt the largely tranquil (although still contentious) situation in the area. Second, all parties involved in the contention are more or less developmental states, which means that leaders in these countries, in the foreseeable future, would still adopt a head-in-the-sand approach to focus on their domestic economic growth. A stable and peaceful environment will continue to be the priority for national leaders in the region. And, to facilitate domestic development, cooperation with other parties in the neighbourhood will continue to be essential. Third, we have witnessed quite positive developments in the South China Sea in the past decade or so. It seems that these factors that brought about these positive developments are still functioning.

On the ground of cautious optimism, I argue that there is a good opportunity for parties concerned to consider and push for a functional cooperation approach in the South China Sea. Enhancing functional cooperation in the South China Sea will contribute significantly to the stability in the region and conform to the common interests of all disputant countries in the area. I believe that a few factors are likely to contribute to the emergence of a functional cooperation approach to the dispute. First of all, all other major proposals to the solution of the dispute either failed or have been proven to be not feasible. Second, China-Southeast Asian relations have been significantly enhanced and continue to move towards the positive direction. Third, non-traditional security cooperation has been identified as one of the priorities in China-ASEAN relations. Fourth, in recent years, China has demonstrated growing activism in regional maritime cooperation. Fifth, the growing China-ASEAN economic integration, such as the Pan-Beibu regional economic zone, and the imperatives in the South China Sea (including environmental protection, biodiversity, marine economy, anti-piracy, safety of the sea lanes of communication, etc) call for joint efforts in pushing for functional cooperation in the South China Sea.

In the rest of the paper, I will briefly discuss the strategic significance of the South China Sea for parties involved, the new Beibu regional economic zone proposal, and China’s improving relations with ASEAN countries. We will then examine the recent developments in the South China Sea and put functional cooperation and the Beibu plan in this context for analysis.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The South China Sea is the maritime heart of Southeast Asia. Connecting the Malacca Strait to the Southwest and Balintang Channel, Bashi Channel, and Taiwan Strait to the Northeast, it is a strategic navigation corridor between the North Pacific and the Indian Ocean, where one fourth of the global maritime exchanges transit each year. It is also rich in fishing resources and potentially rich in oil and gas.

The South China Sea is strategically significant for all parties involved in the contention: quest for energy resources, fishing and other maritime interests, and overall national security. The South China Sea, often dubbed the “second Persian Gulf,” has been regarded as one of the most important strategic oil and gas sources for various contenders.  According to one estimate, the energy deposit in the South China Sea is somewhere between 23 billion to 30 billion tons of oil.[1] Another estimate predicts that oil reserve in the Spratlys would be 34.9 billion tons and natural gas about 6 trillion cubic meters.[2]

In light of this, it is not a surprise that many countries have scrambled to exploit the energy resources in the South China Sea. As a matter of fact, exploitation of oil and gas resources in the South China Sea has been a constant source of irritation in the relationships among these claimant states. Marine economy is also an important factor in the considerations of various parties. Fishing industry has been an important part of the economic life of almost all parties adjacent to the SCS. Various states have begun to pay more attention to the sea and marine economic growth.

Another important consideration for all parties is strategic. Each party believes that the SCS is uniquely important to its national security. Having a strong foothold in the SCS would provide a strategic defence hinterland, the security implication of which would be profound, particularly given the fact that the South China Sea has been traditionally a transit area for the navies of major powers. Similar to all other competing states and external powers, the SCS is also important because it contains very important flight routes and sea lanes of communication. Its importance as a transportation outlet is related to the Malacca Strait, which is a crucial channel for the energy security of all parties.

All these considerations give rise to the rigid and non-yielding positions of all parties concerned in the South China Sea disputes and perhaps explain why all the major policy proposals or initiatives have either failed or proven to be unfeasible.

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONTENTION

The South China Sea might be one of the most controversial areas on the planet, as six parties (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei) are involved in disputes over jurisdiction of the territory and maritime space. Attitudes of the other countries involved in the Beibu Gulf Cooperation toward China are quite diverse.[3] Cambodia is not involved in any dispute, has only indirect interests in the South China Sea, and cultivates very good bilateral relations with China.[4] Singapore and Thailand are not involved in any dispute, and both enjoy cautious but friendly relations with China, while being probably the strongest advocates of continued US military presence in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has been neutral in the disputes until China emitted a claim over a gas-rich zone near the Natuna Island. Since 1990, Jakarta has been playing a leading role in trying to manage the potential conflicts in the South China Sea disputes, while remaining suspicious about China’s moves toward Southeast Asia in general.[5] Malaysia too has been very active in the Sino-Southeast Asian informal dialogue on the South China Sea that began in 1990, also favouring a continued US presence, while at the same time trying to engage and accommodate China, especially through bilateral negotiations.[6] Brunei is involved only in maritime boundary disputes in the South China Sea and occupies no territory. It maintains a low profile position, keeping friendly but limited relations with both China and the US.

Given their past experiences with China in the South China Sea, the Philippines and Vietnam are certainly the ASEAN states most concerned about China’s intentions in the region. The Philippines considers China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1995 and repeated Chinese incursions into Scarborough Reef since 1997 offensive moves against its national territory. As a result, Manila tries hard to balance the Chinese increased regional power by keeping close ties with the US, and favours a continued US military presence in Southeast Asia. As for Vietnam, it has twice confronted China militarily over islets, in 1974 in the Paracels and in 1988 in the Spratlys, both conflicts resulting in China’s victory. Vietnam’s relations with the US have been lukewarm at most, and with the fall of the Soviet Union, Hanoi felt more isolated than ever, nurturing fears that China would build a hegemonic rule at its expense. It is also important to note that significant disputes exist among the disputant countries in Southeast Asia, making cooperation among themselves and a united approach to China very difficult.

The Philippines and Vietnam have traditionally been the least keen on negotiating with China about the South China Sea issue. In 1992, Vietnam refused the Chinese proposal to shelve the sovereignty issue and to jointly explore disputed maritime areas, stating that it would never allow Chinese companies to enter areas considered to be under its national jurisdiction. The Philippines too turned down China’s offer of joint use of its facilities on Mischief Reef, in 1998.[7] But both countries’ concerns about China have recently been minimized and gave way to what seems to be a more cooperative approach. In 2000, China and Vietnam signed a joint statement showing their willingness to seek a durable solution acceptable to both sides and agreeing to cooperate on issues of maritime environmental protection, meteorology, and disaster prevention. In September 2004, the Philippines agreed with China, and then with Vietnam in March 2005, to jointly explore ocean territory around the Spratly Islands in connection with a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU). The tripartite agreement calls for joint seismic research but also for exploration into oil and gas deposits in the area which would be undertaken by the state-owned oil companies, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), the China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC), and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corp. (PETROVIETNAM).

CHINA’S NEW APPROACH TOWARD THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

China is understandably the most important player in the South China Sea dispute. Throughout the 1990s, China has made a great effort to normalize its relations with the Southeast Asian states. Departing from its initial approach that favoured bilateral relations, China got more involved in multilateral and regional institutions,[8] especially in frameworks that allowed Beijing to enhance its dialogue with ASEAN. When President Jiang Zemin and all the ASEAN leaders organised the first ASEAN+1 Summit in December 1997, they issued a joint statement of establishing partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust oriented towards the twenty-first century, thus mapping the development of their future relations. As a consequence, economic and political relations between China and the ASEAN countries developed rapidly.[9] But security relations were tarnished by territorial disputes in the South China Sea, especially with the Philippines over the Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal, and with Vietnam over their sea and land borders. At the turn of the century, however, the tensions began to reduce, thanks to a series of agreements: China and Vietnam signed a Treaty on the Land Border in December 1999, followed by an agreement demarcating maritime territory in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000,[10] and in November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, at the ASEAN-China summit in November 2001, ASEAN leaders accepted China’s proposal to create a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) that would include China, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand by the year 2010, followed by Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam by the year 2015.[11]

Generally speaking, China’s new approach to the South China Sea reflects its flexibility in seeking some balance in pursuing sovereign, economic, and strategic interests. Given the political, economic, and strategic importance of the SCS for China, many people in China may have wished to use assertive means to push for China’s interests in the area. However, in the past decade, there has been no major military conflict between China and other disputants over the SCS.[12] Prediction that in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN states would be unable to pressurize China into accepting multilateral negotiations turned out to be incorrect.[13] China, on one hand, held a strong position on its claim of sovereignty at all diplomatic occasions, took peace-meal actions to consolidate its presence in the SCS, and responded with stern warnings when other disputants acted against Chinese interests. But on the other hand, Beijing felt that it had to address other more important goals in its foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, entailing quite a few significant changes in the Chinese actual behaviour.

For instance, it has changed its previous adamant insistence on bilateral talks to now gradually accepting multilateralism as an approach. It has signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC), which is not a treaty in the legal sense but does serve as a moral restraint on the parties concerned. This demonstrated to some extent China’s acceptance of norms to regulate issues concerning the SCS, no matter how primitive and informal the norms are. Together with the traditional “joint exploitation” proposal, the DOC indicated further compromise of the Chinese sovereignty claim. Also, by joining the TAC, China has legally committed itself not to use force against members of the ASEAN. Another change in Chinese policy is Beijing’s increasing intensity of pushing for concrete programs of joint development, whereas in the past Beijing has been criticized of advocating “shelving disputes, joint development” without any practical proposals.

Why China would adopt these relatively more moderate policies? It is an important question, not only to understand the history in the past decade, but also to have some clue for future development. One factor that most observers can agree upon is insufficient capability of the PLA Navy,[14] but this factor alone does not give us a satisfactory explanation: after all, China did take forceful actions in 1974, 1988, and 1995 when its navy was even far inferior. In reality, three major factors concurrently played a crucial role in shaping China’s new approach: the need of a peaceful neighbourhood for domestic economic development, the importance of ASEAN, and the strategic pressures from other external powers.

On top of these concerns, Beijing seems keener than ever to appear as a responsible major power, in order to water down the “China threat theory” and ready to favour dialogue, confidence building measures, and cooperative relations instead of aggressiveness and sabre-rattling, which could prove more damaging for its own interests. This new approach does not mean that China and the other claimant states can easily overcome their historical quarrels, but it means that China is willing to pay more attention to the political interests and long-term strategic interests in Southeast Asia, and to work out a win-win solution. Chinese analysts believe that solving the SCS dispute within the framework of a strategic partnership is beneficial to China’s core interests, including Chinese efforts to prevent Taiwan independence.[15]

As the popular saying goes, it takes two to tangle. Without the positive response and reciprocity from other claimant states, the South China Sea would not have seen the current stable situation. Similar to the Chinese concerns, other regional states were also willing to adopt a more conciliatory stance because all of them needed a peaceful and stable external environment for their domestic economic programs. Many of them realized that confronting China in the South China Sea would be detrimental to a stable China-ASEAN relationship. Other external powers, such as the United States and Japan, also would not favour conflicts in the South China Sea for fear of disrupting the maritime transportation and regional peace.

CHINA’S GROWING ACTIVISM IN MARITIME COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA[16]

In the past decade or so, China has exhibited growing activism in maritime affairs in East Asia. This is first and foremost demonstrated by the notable progress that the PLA has made in engaging the militaries of many other countries. This growing military openness and international communications, especially between the PLA Navy and the naval forces of other countries, have had a positive impact on China’s maritime cooperation.

China has made notable progress in participating in joint search and rescue exercises on the seas with a wide range of countries in recent years. China and India held their first naval joint search and rescue operation in 2003 in East China Sea. The military exchanges between the two powers have been gradually increasing ever since, leading to the second joint search and rescue exercise in the Indian Ocean in December 2005.[17] In July 2005, China, South Korea, and Japan held a joint search and rescue exercise in China’s offshore area. In September and November 2006, Chinese and American navies conducted two search and rescue exercise in the U.S. West coast and in the South China Sea respectively.[18] This was the result of 8 years of maritime security consultations between the two countries and a major breakthrough in the past 20 years.[19] China participated in the first ARF maritime-security shore exercise hosted by Singapore in January 2007. In March 2007, two Chinese missile frigates, together with the naval forces from Bangladesh, France, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States participated in the four-day sea phase of “Peace-07” exercises in the Arabian Sea. In May 2007, a PLAN missile frigate took part in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) exercise that also involves Australia and the United States. Although China joined this forum over twenty years ago as one of its founding members, this was the first time it got involved in a live exercise.[20] Joint search and rescue operations were also conducted with Australia and New Zealand in October 2007.

These joint search and rescue operations offered experience to the PLAN, and gradually changed the Chinese military decision makers’ mindset that contributed to the political and military confidence shown in the decision of the Gulf of Aden mission. Moreover, the naval exchanges with external powers and regional states have been quite significant in facilitating China’s participation in various programs of maritime cooperation in East Asia.

China is no longer an outsider in East Asian maritime cooperation, particularly in some of the concrete projects, such as joint oceanic research, environmental protection, and many sea-based non-traditional security issues. In Northeast Asia, China helped North Korea train personnel and provided various equipments to North Korea. The two countries also engaged in a few research projects in the Yellow Sea.[21] China and South Korea signed a MOU on joint oceanic research in 1994 and set up a joint research centre on marine science the next year. The two sides have been collaborating quite closely on a wide range of issues ever since, e.g. management of offshore areas, marine environmental protection, and information exchange. China and Japan, in the past years, also cooperated in studies of oceanic currents. Japan provided equipment and trained Chinese personnel.[22] At the trilateral level among China, Japan, and South Korea, starting from 1999, the three countries launched a ministerial level meeting on environment and various concrete proposals on sandstorms and marine environmental protection have been carried out. In 2004, the authorities monitoring earthquake in the three countries agreed to share seismic information and technology. The immigration authorities of the three countries have also held workshops on countering terrorism, drug trafficking, and human trafficking in Northeast Asia.

In Southeast Asia, China has agreed to various legal frameworks that would facilitate closer maritime cooperation with its neighboring states in the region, either bilaterally or multilaterally. These documents include the 2000 China-ASEAN action plan on countering drug trafficking, the 2002 China-ASEAN joint declaration on cooperation in non-traditional security issues, and the 2004 China-ASEAN MOU on non-traditional security cooperation. Bilaterally, China has attempted to strengthen maritime cooperation with Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. With Vietnam, discussion and cooperation were conducted through the joint marine experts group. Major areas of cooperation included forecast of waves in the South China Sea, offshore environmental protection, exchange of information, and coastal area management capacity building. China and Thailand are negotiating a formal agreement to further institutionalize and deepen their cooperation in maritime affairs.[23] During a visit to Southeast Asia by the former director of China’s State Oceanic Administration Wang Shuguang in 2004, China and reached agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia on cooperation in a variety of maritime issues (e.g. marine environmental protection, oceanic resources management, and oceanic science and surveys). Various concrete projects have been or are being carried out. During Wang’s visit, he even proposed that maritime ministers of countries surrounding the South China Sea meet regularly.[24] China claims that it intends to further engage ASEAN countries in disaster reduction and relief, seminars on oceanic studies, and eco-monitoring training programs in the South China Sea area.[25] All these proposals are essentially areas of functional cooperation.

At the broader international level, China has been participating in the UNEP’s Global Meeting of Regional Seas, the Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, the East Asian Seas Action Plan, and the Northwest Pacific Action Plan. In the Northwest Pacific Action Plan, for instance, in December 2007, China joined the relief work of an oil spilling incident off South Korea coastal area under the emergency response mechanism of the plan and, in September 2008, China and South Korea held a joint emergency exercise in dealing with search and rescue and oil spilling in the sea.[26] China joined the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF) in 2004, four years after its inception. The forum attempts to provide a platform for international coast guard leaders to interact regularly and also initiated at-sea combined exercises that began in 2005. China now actively participates in its six areas of cooperation: anti-drug trafficking, joint actions, counter-illegal immigration, maritime security, information exchange, and law enforcement on the sea. In 2006, China even hosted the seventh experts’ meeting of the NPCGF.[27] China’s participation in the NPCGF is particularly significant since it provides a valuable forum for China and the US to communicate and exchange views on various maritime issues.[28] Two Chinese ports-Shanghai and Shenzhen-are now officially part of the US Container Security Initiative (CSI).[29]

All these new policy moves and behaviors reflect a slightly changed mindset among Chinese decision makers. Some Chinese analysts believe that cooperation with other militaries, including the U.S. military, on various non-traditional security issues is an inevitable trend as China further integrates itself into the international society. Military exchanges with other countries are also important as the Chinese military may have to be more frequently involved in protecting China’s overseas interests and evacuating Chinese nationals in emergent foreign conflict areas. Exchanges with foreign militaries, especially the US military now would lay a good foundation for cooperation and avoidance of misunderstanding when such cases arise.[30] These are evidence that China is prepared to engage other disputant countries in the South China Sea to formally launch functional cooperation in the South China Sea.

THE PAN-BEIBU GULF PROPOSAL: POTENTIAL TO STABILISE THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The origin of the Pan-Beibu Gulf proposal is the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) framework in which Guangxi, together with Vietnam, proposed a Beibu Gulf regional economic cooperation zone. Apart from Vietnam, this scheme would include China’s Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hainan provinces. Starting from early 2006, Guangxi began to push for a wider Pan-Beibu Gulf economic cooperation scheme to also include Hong Kong, Macao, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei. The expansion of the original sub-regional economic zone is an effort on the part of Guangxi to construct its coastal area as a new economic growth centre in China.

Guangxi proposed that the Beibu Gulf scheme be part of what is called a physically M-shaped structure in China-ASEAN cooperation: the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS); the Nanning to Singapore corridor (Mainland economic cooperation); and the Pan-Beibu Gulf zone (Maritime economic cooperation). Guangxi does not have advantages in the GMS, but the Pan-Beibu Gulf zone and the M-shaped strategy will allow it to play a leading role in China-ASEAN economic cooperation.

The initiative has been approved by the central government in Beijing. China’s State Development and Reform Commission issued a formal planning document recently on the proposal. The regional economic zone has received strong support from top Chinese leaders. The Chinese government has also started campaigning the proposal at the international level. Premier Wen Jiabao, for instance, gave encouraging comments on the proposal both at the memorial summit of China-ASEAN summit in November 2006 and at the tenth China-ASEAN summit in January 2007. Both the local government in Guangxi and the central government in Beijing are expected to further promote the Beibu Gulf proposal in the framework of ASEAN + China.

There are a few reasons why leaders in Beijing think favourably of this initiative. It is perceived as useful in rapidly developing the economy in Guangxi, still a relatively poor province, and the economic development in China’s vast under-developed mid-western regions. Also, it is believed to contribute positively to the China-ASEAN FTA because those Southeast Asian countries involved in the cooperation are relatively developed.

The main overall objective is to take advantage of the geographical situation of the Beibu Gulf in order to create a regional hub and transform the area into a dynamic economic pole. Nine key-sectors of development have been identified, ranging from transports, trade, investments, energy, tourism, agriculture and fisheries, services and environment. First among them, the construction of a “tri-dimensional” (sea, air, land) transport network is seen as essential to allow the trade exchanges and human flows. If fully implemented, the Pan Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation project will lead to a deep economic integration between the nine coastal states and five Chinese territories involved, putting the South China Sea in the position of an “internal lake” in the middle of the M-shaped regional economic cooperation scheme.

Indeed, in the proposed Chinese plan, there are a few functional areas that directly deal with the South China Sea. The proposed short-term objectives (5 years) include the building of a “tri-dimensional hub” (sea, land, air) between China and ASEAN countries, the creation of a platform for information sharing and the implementation of a highly informatized network for ports management, the development of major coastal cities into dynamic economic growth poles, the promotion of marine-based tourism, the protection and sustainable development of the fishing resources and of their biological environment.

The first key sector that needs to be developed has been identified as the transports, especially the ports. The project calls for an increased cooperation in cargo, containers and people transport, the opening of new tourist maritime routes, the protection of the marine environment, the establishment of a “Pan Beibu International Port Shipping Group”, the implementation of a negotiation and cooperation mechanism for maritime and port affairs, and the coordination of regional efforts in marine salvage.[31]

Substantive cooperation in any of these functional areas (which, intentionally or not, do not include the contentious issue of joint exploitation of oil and gas) would mean a major breakthrough in the South China Sea dispute. Chinese analysts and top leaders have commented that the emergence of the Pan-Beibu Gulf Zone will help initiate China-ASEAN dialogue and cooperation in maritime affairs. It will also serve as a platform for communication and coordination among various parties on the SCS and it will give the member states more motivation to act responsibly when facing crucial issues such as the protection of the environment and the sustainable development of the coastal and maritime zones. At this point, it looks like a way to a peaceful and pragmatic response, if not yet a complete resolution, to the conflicts in the SCS. The Pan-Beibu Gulf regional cooperation, now strongly pushed by China, is likely to give further impetus for Beijing to engage other claimant states on the SCS dispute. If the relevant ASEAN countries eventually agree to join hands in the new sub-regional cooperation scheme, the time will soon come when all parties in the SCS dispute earnestly tackle this maritime issue. They will find it helpful to revisit many of those policy recommendations that were proposed at the Indonesia-initiated workshops in the 1990s and various joint development schemes or schemes of sharing resources that had been suggested by the scholarly community.

Many experts have already shown how much the SCS is under serious stress and how the disputes over sovereignty have so far inhibited a coordinated plan to tackle the significant issue of environmental degradation.[32] The United Nations Environment Program funded by the Global Environment Facility (UNEP/GEF) project entitled “Reversing Environmental Degradation Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand” and the South China Sea Workshops are tentative coordinated responses to this issue.[33] However, the Pan Beibu Gulf Cooperation presents a more comprehensive approach that would encompass the two sides of a same coin, namely sustainable economic development together with the preservation of biodiversity and marine environment.

Various institutional arrangements have already been created in order to address maritime and ocean issues in the region. Most countries have a Ministry of Environment. Indonesia created a Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in 2001, Thailand and Vietnam have a Ministry of Natural Resources, China established a State Oceanic Administration, Singapore’s management of coastal and marine waters are under the responsibility of the Maritime Port Authority. Most of these institutions work in parallel on the same issues, without any collaborative planning or connections with each other. The Pan Beibu Gulf Cooperation might be able to provide those institutions with a way to combine and harmonize their efforts, thus reducing costs and allowing for more knowledge and information sharing that will ultimately be beneficial for the entire community. The same can be achieved with a wider synergy between the regional marine affairs institutes which address such issues as pollution, marine piracy and boundaries (China Institute for Marine Affaires, Indonesian Center for the Law of the Sea, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Philippine Center for Marine Affairs, Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological Research, Vietnam Continental Shelf Committee, to name a few).

If the proposals concerning the development of a tri-dimensional transport hub are to be realized, this will mean that a greater coordination of efforts will be needed and supervisory mechanisms will have to be put in place. Standardized procedures, mutual consultations, sets of rules to govern the air and ocean spaces will also be needed, which at the end of the day will tremendously reduce the risks of encroachments in the sky and at sea. Moreover, in order to protect the bulk carriers and shipping containers whose increased number will match the development of the inter-regional commercial exchanges, joint patrols for anti-piracy and joint search and rescue teams will also be required. It will then be necessary to establish cross-jurisdictional arrangements. With time, these necessary arrangements might pave the way for the different claimant states to be less reactive about who owns what, and to look at the SCS more like an internal regional lake source of shared benefits gains rather than a bone of contention among neighbours.

The Pan Beibu Gulf Cooperation project is a great opportunity to enhance the synergistic relationships among regional governments and intergovernmental bodies, and across sectors. Strengthening regional partnership around core projects like the ones proposed by the Pan Beibu Gulf scheme will enable members to implement cost-effective actions that will ultimately lead to alleviate the pressure on the marine environment, to improve the living conditions of the local populations, and to increase the fluidity of regional exchanges. There are lots to be done around the SCS in the areas of ecological preservation, natural resource management, coastal and ocean policies, tourism, trade, shipping and ports. A shared vision of the achievements that can be gained through cooperation will enable the members to concentrate on concrete and pragmatic measures that have to be taken for the good of the overall community rather than focusing on self-interests. By putting aside the deadlock question of sovereignty rights and working on functional and technical areas, the members of the Pan Beibu Gulf project may well promote a stable and peaceful South China Sea for years to come.

CONCLUSION

Any solution to a prominent international dispute needs the political wisdom and will on the part of state leaders. This is particularly the case with regard to the South China Sea simply because this issue is perhaps more complicated than most other international disputes. Political wisdom and judgment are of course closely related to state leaders’ shrewd calculation of national interests as well as responses in their domestic politics.

The road toward peace and cooperation in the SCS may still be long, but the last decade has given reasons to be more optimistic, as the situation has been evolving from confrontation to a more cooperative trend.[34] Although the different claimant states are not yet prepared to give up their sovereignty claims, at least they have been able to move beyond the fixation of the sovereignty issue, and they have shown their ability to focus on dialogue and the preservation of regional stability.[35] Indeed, the recent developments show that, when provided with grounds for cooperation on non-traditional security issues without focusing on jurisdictional and sovereignty issues, claimant states were able to talk about the dispute in a non-confrontational basis.[36] The informal meetings organised since 1990 within the framework of the “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea” project have successfully been focusing on cooperation in sectors such as marine scientific research, marine environmental protection, safety of navigation and communication, resource assessment and means of development, and legal matters.[37]

The Chinese proposal of the Beibu economic zone, which extends to neighbouring states surrounding the South China Sea, provides such an opportunity for decision makers in relevant parties to make the political judgement and weigh in their national interests. There are reasons to believe that some cooperative mechanisms among various parties serve the common interests of all. China, the most important player in the South China Sea dispute, has long been proposing “shelving disputes and joint development.” The Pan-Beibu Gulf cooperation proposal, which explicitly mentions areas of international cooperation in the South China Sea, presents an opportunity for various parties to further engage and discuss concrete measures to help maintain long-term peace and stability in the sea. The Pan-Beibu Gulf cooperation proposal, if eventually adopted by China and ASEAN, has the potential to further de-securitise the South China Sea and could lead to breakthroughs in multilateral cooperation in such functional areas as maritime transportation, environmental protection, and joint exploitation of resources. The proposed Pan Beibu Cooperation scheme, if implemented, would constitute a step forward a greater integration and cooperation on non-traditional issues in a more formal framework.

According to the social constructivist theory of international relations, “community enhances security”--the more the idea of community takes hold in Asia, the more stable and secure the region will become.[38] The Beibu Gulf economic zone is likely to further push forward a sense of economic community that may well pave the way for the development of a peaceful South China Sea. Also, economic interdependence, now gradually taking shape in this part of the world, is likely to restrain parties involved from adopting assertive moves in the South China Sea. Moreover, the new regional economic cooperation proposal may provide further incentive for the various parties to move beyond the status quo to enhance their engagements in various areas of functional cooperation.

Assistant Professor, S.  Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

[1] Chen Shangjun, “Ruhe renshi haiyang zai guojia nengyuan anquan zhanlue zhong de diwei” (How to understand the role of the sea in China’s energy security strategy), China Oceans Newspaper, 30 August 2005; Li Zengtang and Tian Yudong, “Er ling yi ling nian qian wo guo haiyang shiyou canliang jiang fan bei” (China’s oil production in the sea to double before 2010), Zhongguo haiyang bao (China Oceans Newspaper), 23 September 2005.