Collision between China and the Philippines in Second Thomas Shoal: Developments and Consequences

 

 

Following China's occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995, the Philippines has strengthened its grip over Second Thomas Shoal - located 105 nautical miles off Palawan Island - by stranding the old warship BRP Sierra Madre there in 1999 and casually deployed marines to resupply it. The Philippines further reinforced its control over the spot in 2012 as a response to China's increased presence at Scarborough Shoal. In 2016, the Philippines took China to the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS, resulting in a judgment that invalidated China's claims and its so-called “historical rights” in the South China Sea.

 

In recent years, confrontations between China and the Philippines have exacerbated. China has demanded the Philippines to remove the Sierra Madre from Second Thomas Shoal, using coast guard vessels and militia fishing boats to block Philippine supply ships. In 2023 and 2024, this "cat-and-mouse" game further intensified after President Marcos assumed office. He withdrew the Philippines from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and strengthened ties with the U.S. and Japan. China responded with increased gray zone tactics to assert its claims in disputed areas, including Second Thomas Shoal.

 

Tensions escalated in March 2024 when Chinese Coast Guard ships began using water cannons to attack Philippine vessels supplying the BRP Sierra Madre. Accordingly, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos condemned China's actions as “illegal, coercive, aggressive and dangerous” [1], while the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs accused China of violating the Philippines' sovereign rights and jurisdiction [2]. In response, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong accused the Philippines of violating previous agreements and commitments by illegally using coast guard ships to resupply the Sierra Madre [3]. China’s Ministry of National Defense also pledged to take necessary measures to protect China’s territorial integrity as well as its maritime right and interests against “provocative” acts from the Philippines [4].

 

In April 2024, China announced that it had reached temporary agreements with the Philippines under President Duterte to restrict certain activities around the disputed areas, including fishing and approaching military vessels. Furthermore, in early 2024, both sides agreed on a “new model” of dispute management related to Second Thomas Shoal. China also criticized the Philippines for pursing own agenda at the expense of mutually-respected agreements in the last 7 years, thus forcing China to act in response. However, both Philippine Defense Minister Gilbert Teodoro and President Marcos denied that such agreements ever existed.

 

On May 8, when the Chinese Coast Guard blocked a Philippine supply ship at Second Thomas Shoal, Manila summoned Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian to protest the "aggressive actions" of using water cannons to harass the supply ship, violating UNCLOS and the 2016 Tribunal Award. On June 15, the Philippines filed a petition with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), requesting “the establishment of the outer limits of the Philippine continental shelf” 648 km off west coast of Palawan Island [5]. The Philippines also encouraged fishing in the South China Sea and deployed a new Indian-transferred Brahmos missile battery at Leovigildo base on Luzon Island.

 

The June 17 incident at Second Thomas Shoal marked the peak of the Sino-Philippine tension. The Philippines used special forces and civilian rescue forces to resupply their post at Second Thomas Shoal, while the Chinese Coast Guard obstructed, rammed, boarded, seized 8 infantry guns, and towed away 2 Philippine rubber boats. The clash left at least 8 Philippine personnel injured and the BRP Cabra guard ship and two rubber boats damaged. The Chinese Coast Guard detained 4 Philippine personnel and only released them after a preliminary exchange [6].

 

 

Following the collision, the Chinese Coast Guard spokesperson on June 17 accused the Philippines of violating commitments by illegally sending a supply ship and two rubber boats into the waters near Second Thomas Shoal to supply the stranded military ship. He pointed out that the Philippine supply ship intentionally rammed CCG 21556 while the latter was conducting a lawful transit. He further stated that the Chinese Coast Guard had acted to warn, stop, and inspect the Philippine ship, forcing it to leave in an appropriate manner [7]. He affirmed that the Philippines’ efforts were useless since the Chinese Coast Guard were always readiness to protect China's sovereignty, maritime rights, and interests.

 

At a press conference on the same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian rejected the Philippines' extended continental shelf claim submitted to CLCS on June 15, deeming it a violation UNCLOS, DOC, and China's sovereignty [8]. Lin Jian also asserted that Chinese Coast Guard's “necessary measures” taken against Philippine ships were professional, self-restrained, and lawful, in accordance with law enforcement procedures [9].

 

On June 19, in response to the Philippines’ condemnation, Chinese Foreign Ministry accused the Philippines of secretly transporting construction materials, weapons, and ammunition as an attempt to permanently occupy Second Thomas Shoal. The Ministry also asserted that the current situation was caused by the Philippines' deliberate invasion, and that Chinese Coast Guard enforced the law with restraint, thereby stopping illegal supply ships without targeting Philippine personnel. China demanded that the Philippines cease provocative acts and affirmed its commitment to safeguarding sovereignty and national interests [10].

 

Following the incident, Chinese media agencies reported that in May 2024, China had announced the "Provisions on Administrative Enforcement Procedures for Coast Guard Agencies," effective from June 15, 2024, which was an extension of Coast Guard authority prescribed in 2021 "Coast Guard Law of the People's Republic of China." This incident marked the first enforcement of these regulations against foreign countries to “protect the maritime order in accordance with international law and practices” [11].

 

Regarding Chinese scholars’ perspective, Dr. Ding Duo, Deputy Director of the Center for Maritime Policy and Legal Research at the China Institute for South China Sea Studies, argued that given the Philippines' denial of the "Gentlemen’s Agreement" and continued its provocative acts, the Chinese Coast Guard responded accordingly to protect China’s sovereignty by inspecting Philippine ships and deterring challenges. He suggested that the Philippines caused the collision in Second Thomas Shoal to (1) attract international sympathy for being a victim of a stronger nation, (2) strengthen its continental shelf claims and (3) seek “dual victory” – a successful resupply mission would encourage internal confidence while failing to do so would still generate international support [12].

 

Together with diplomatic and propaganda measures, following the incident, the Chinese Navy had conducted large-scale military exercises to deter the Philippines and the U.S, involving China’s most advanced military equipment and warships. China's Southern Theater Command deployed four destroyers, including three 055-class destroyers (Xianyang, Zunyi, Yan'an) and one 052C-class destroyer (Haikou), for a six-day exercise at an unknown location in the South China Sea. The exercise focused on simulating island seizure, defending bases, mobilizing force, and joint operations between anti-air, anti-submarine and anti-ship capabilities [13]. On June 19, two additional PLA destroyers, including the 055-class Dalian, appeared near Palawan, which was the closest approach to shore [14].

 

 

Following the collision with China at Second Thomas Shoal on June 17, the Philippine’s national special force in the South China Sea region admitted its failure to conduct the mission of rotating troops and supplies for the BRP Sierra Madre. The agency expressed doubts about China's sincerity in calling for peace and dialogue.

 

The Philippine Ministry of National Defense, in a statement on June 18, condemned aggressive actions of the Chinese Coast Guard against its legitimate and humanitarian mission, urging China to "exercise self-restraint and avoid escalating tensions." [15] Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro labeled China's actions as “an obstacle" to peace and stability, vowing that the Philippine armed forces would carry out countermeasures against China's "dangerous and reckless actions."[16] In another response, the head of the Philippine Armed Forces Office asserted that the Philippines "cannot accept" China's bullying words, stating that tougher actions by the Chinese Coast Guard would only escalate tensions.

 

Philippine Ambassador to the United States Jose Manuel Romualdez, along with other officials, reiterated that while they hope the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Philippines would never be invoked, they were prepared to do so if necessary. Besides, they warned that China was underestimating the potential of escalation as the Philippines had tried to expand the Mutual Defense Treaty to cover the Sierre Madre in Second Thomas Shoal, and called for reconsideration of tactics from China side to avoid serious consequences [17].

 

In subsequent actions, Philippine Coast Guard dispatched two patrol vessels to ensure the safety of Filipino fishermen in Scarborough Shoal, located about 640 km off Second Thomas Shoal, which was also potential flashpoint. At the same time, however, the Philippines also sought diplomatic measures to de-escalate the tension. On June 21, Philippine Chief of Staff Lucas Bersamin stated that the collision was not regarded as an armed attack and suggested it might be a misunderstanding [18]. On June 25, Foreign Secretary Manalo expressed hope for a bilateral meeting in early July 2024 to discuss the incidents, affirming that the Philippines would only accept solutions that did not harm its sovereignty and rights in the South China Sea [19].

 

 

Following the collision and rising tensions between China and the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal, several countries, including the UK, Canada and the US had issued diplomatic statements opposing China's actions.

 

On the political front, on the same day of the incident, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller affirmed US support for the Philippines and condemned China for its irresponsible, escalating acts, which prevented humanitarian supplies to the BRP Sierra Madre. The State Department called China's use of water cannons, ramming, and blocking of Philippines ships reckless and a threat to regional peace and stability [20].

 

US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell also expressed concern to his Philippine counterpart, Maria Theresa Lazaro, about China's irresponsible and escalating acts which hindered the Philippine’s lawful maritime activities and freedom of navigation principle [21]. Campbell reaffirmed that Article IV of the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applies to military attacks on Philippine forces – including official vessels, aircrafts and coast guard personnels – in the South China Sea [22].

 

Two days after the incident, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken reiterated to Philippine Foreign Secretary Manalo that China's actions undermined regional peace and stability and reaffirmed the US commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty [23]. US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink also condemned China's aggressive and destabilizing acts [24]. In a speech at the East-West Center on June 26, Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson said that the international momentum against threats to peace and stability in the South China Sea had become more vibrant, and that the US called on China to halt harassment of Philippines ships lawfully operating in the latter’s EEZ, and cease any activities that violate the principle of freedom of navigation and aviation of regional countries [25].

 

For Japan, its Foreign Ministry on June 18 expressed concern over actions impeding freedom of navigation and causing damage and injuries to Philippine vessels and sailors. Japan opposed the use of coast guard forces in these confrontations. The ongoing tensions at Second Thomas Shoal highlight the complex dynamics and risks in the South China Sea. The incident underscores the need for effective management and resolution of disputes to maintain regional stability and security. Japan firmly opposed the coercive use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels in the South China Sea, and appreciated the Philippine government's compliance with the International Court of Arbitration's rulings, highlighting Japan’s commitment to peaceful dispute resolution [26]. In early May 2024, Japan announced plans to sign the RAA Agreement with the Philippines in July 2024, facilitating cooperation and visits between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Philippine military.

 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam on June 21 expressed deep concern about the incident at Second Thomas Shoal, urging all parties to exercise restraint, adhere to international law, and respect sovereign rights and jurisdictions as established by UNCLOS. Vietnam also called for the full implementation of the DOC Declaration and peaceful dispute resolution [27].

 

On June 19, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for peaceful dispute resolution between China and the Philippines, emphasizing the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea for regional peace and stability. Taiwan opposed any forceful actions or military intimidation that violate international maritime order under UNCLOS [28].

 

On the military front, US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby expressed deep concern over the injury of Philippine sailors and China's provocative behavior, warning that China’s reckless acts would cause miscalculations and in turn even more dangerous encounters [29]. On June 27, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin reaffirmed US support for the Philippines and discussed protecting navigational rights under international law with Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro. Austin also emphasized the persistent support of the US for the Philippines as well as the importance of the freedom of navigation and aviation in the international maritime and airspace [30].

 

After a two-day maritime exercise with Canada, Japan, and the Philippines in the Philippines’ EEZ [31], the US and the Philippines conducted a live-fire exercise on June 17 near Luzon, focusing on attacking virtual maritime targets. The exercise involved US deployment of F-35 aircraft from Clark Airbase to destroy targets located 3 knots off Philippine coast. The US also moved part of the Valiant Shield 2024 exercise from Japan to the South China Sea, involving significant naval assets of Canada, Japan, France and the US [32].

 

 

In light of the tensions between China and the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal, scholars and international media have extensively analyzed the motives and actions of both sides and their impacts on maritime safety, regional security, and international relations.

 

Many deems the collision as a serious incident, as this was the first time the Philippines used special operations forces alongside civilian maritime rescue teams to resupply the Sierra Madre, as well as the first enforcement of the new Chinese Coast Guard Law, which allowed for boarding foreign ships for inspection and arrests, thus raising the risk of an uncontrolled armed clash.

 

In the same vein, Collin Koh at Nanyang Technological University calls China’s coast guard personnel boarding Philippine military ship “unprecedented”, an action that signals significant changes in the South China Sea situation [33]. Meanwhile, Dennis Wilder – a former US security expert – speculates that this could be Beijing's intentions to test US reactions [34] and possibly an attempt to establish a military base. A military base near the Philippines could act as a front to obstruct US forces in case of conflicts in the Taiwan Traits [35]. Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund warns of the risk of direct military confrontation as the US may have to respond if Philippine forces are attacked by Beijing [36]. Moreover, Jeff Smith from the Heritage Foundation suggests the US could take a tougher stance, including joint missions with the Philippines and modernizing the country’s armed force. He also argues that the US should repeat its mistake, as in 2012, China forcefully occupied the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines [37].

 

Therefore, the situation at Second Thomas Shoal underscores ongoing instability in the South China Sea. It undermines global efforts and negatively affects the efficacy of international agreements like UNCLOS and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The tension even escalated following diplomatic condemnations, military activities and retaliations from both sides. Within such a context, ASEAN needs to uphold its role, act in a balanced manner and take measures to promote compliance with the DOC, encourage and support common efforts for regional peace and prosperity, and propose initiatives to strengthen maritime and aviation security and safety in the South China Sea. Achieving such goals requires all parties to comply with UNCLOS and the DOC in both rhetoric and actual actions.

 

In addition, analyses also suggest that the South China Sea issue could become a dominating issue in the US election year, potentially pressuring the Biden administration a harder stance towards China. This policy shift is extremely urgent as China is evading UNCLOS by making use of ambiguous terms, for example, “waters under PRC’s authority” instead of EEZ or territorial sea [38]. At the same time, China is using its Coast Guard Law and relevant provisions, selective legal tools, coercive diplomatic and economic measures in order to expand control over the South China Sea [39]. Hence, while the next US President is yet to be determined, the South China Sea would likely be a key focus on their agenda.

 

 

 

[1] Ekata Malhi, “China Philippines: Second Thomas Shoal Conflict intensifies, India support?”, India at present info, June 22, 2024.: https://indiapresentinfo.in/2024/04/china-philippines-second-thomas-shoal.html 
[2] Bernard Orr, Liz Lee… “Philippines summons China diplomat over 'aggressive' actions in South China Sea”, Reuters, Mach 6, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-coast-guard-says-it-takes-measures-against-philippine-vessels-second-2024-03-04/ 
[3] “中华人民共和国驻菲律宾共和国大使馆,” n.d., http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/zfgx/202403/t20240326_11271057.htm. 
[4] Ekata Malhi, “China Philippines: Second Thomas Shoal Conflict intensifies, India support?”, India at present info, June 22, 2024.
[5] “Philippines muốn mở rộng thềm lục địa ở Biển Đông”, RFI Vietnamese, June 16, 2024.https://www.rfi.fr/vi/ch%C3%A2u-%C3%A1/20240616-philippines-mu%E1%BB%91n-m%E1%BB%9F-r%E1%BB%99ng-th%E1%BB%81m-l%E1%BB%A5c-%C4%91%E1%BB%8Ba-%E1%BB%9F-bi%E1%BB%83n-%C4%91%C3%B4ng 
[6] “Philippines, China trade blame over South China Sea clash”, The Asahi Shimbun, December 10, 2023. www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15080164. 
[7] “中华人民共和国驻菲律宾共和国大使馆,” n.d., June 17, 2024. http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/zfgx/202403/t20240326_11271057.htm. 
[8] “2024年6月17日外交部发言人林剑主持例行记者会_中华人民共和国外交部,” 中华人民共和国外交部, June 17, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202406/t20240617_11437274.shtml. 
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] “中国海警首提对菲船只‘登临检查’，如何理解这一新表述？,” 中国海警首提对菲船只“登临检查”，如何理解这一新表述？, CCTV, June 19, 2024, https://news.cctv.com/2024/06/19/ARTIEfP0ydAJv1CloyUXXbNQ240619.shtml. 
[12] ““中国海警‘登临检查’菲擅闯船只，专家：对菲挑衅行为进行强有力震慑,” 新华网客户端, XinhuaNews, June 18, 2024 https://app.xinhuanet.com/news/article.html?articleId=96a58f145ba1e543cb2c8fc912c028cd. 
[13] 中国, “中国海警‘登临检查’菲擅闯船只，专家：对菲挑衅行为进行强有力震慑,” 新华网客户端, June 19, 2024, https://app.xinhuanet.com/news/article.html?articleId=96a58f145ba1e543cb2c8fc912c028cd. 
[14] 陈筠, “美中在南中国海军力较量：盟友VS万吨大驱,” 美国之音, June 21, 2024, https://www.voachinese.com/a/the-rivalry-between-the-united-states-and-china-over-their-military-presence-in-the-south-china-sea-20240618/7660738.html. 
[15] “Report: China Coast Guard Stole Two Philipine Boats, Dumped Cargo”, The Maritime Executive, June 18, 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/article/report-china-coast-guard-stole-two-philippine-boats-dumped-cargo 
[16] “Philippines says to resist China’s ‘reckless behaviors’ in South China Sea”, Reuters, June 17,2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-says-resist-chinas-reckless-behaviour-south-china-sea-2024-06-17/
[17] Sebastian Strangio, “Biden to Warn China on South China Sea, Report Claims”, The Diplomat, Apr 8, 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/biden-to-warn-china-on-south-china-sea-report-claims/ 
[18] “Đụng độ với Trung Quốc gần Bãi Cỏ mây: Philippines tuyên bố chưa kích hoạt Hiệp ước phòng thủ chung với Mỹ”, RFI Vietnamese, June 21, 2024. 
[19] “Manila muốn đối thoại sau vụ đụng độ giữa hải cảnh Trung Quốc và hải quân Philippines ở Biển Đông”, RFI Vietnamese, June 25, 2024. 
[20] Mathew Miller, “U.S. Support for Philippines in South China Sea”, U.S. Department of State, June 17, 2924. http://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-philippines-in-the-south-china-sea-10/ 
[21] “Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Call With Philippine Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Lazaro - United States Department of State,” United States Department of State, June 18, 2024, https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-campbells-call-with-philippine-undersecretary-of-foreign-affairs-lazaro/. 
[22] “Report: China Coast Guard Stole Two Philipine Boats, Dumped Cargo”, The Maritime Executive, June 18, 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/article/report-china-coast-guard-stole-two-philippine-boats-dumped-cargo
[23] Kanishka Shingh, “Blinken discusses China’s action in South China Sea with Philippine counterpart”, Reuters, June 20, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/blinken-discusses-chinas-actions-south-china-sea-with-philippine-counterpart-2024-06-19/ 
[24] “Mỹ nói tình hình Biển Đông rất đáng lo ngại”, VOA Vietnamese, June 23, 2024. https://www.voatiengviet.com/a/my-noi-tinh-hinh-o-bien-dong-rat-dang-lo-ngai/7666451.html 
[25] Louella Desiderio, “US to China: Stop harassing Philippine vessels”, Philstar, June 27, 2024. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/06/27/2365990/us-china-stop-harassing-philippine-vessels 
[26] “Japan raises concerns over recent incidents in the South China Sea”, RFI Chinese, June 19, 2024.
[27] “Việt Nam quan ngại sâu sắc trước vụ việc va chạm ở khu vực Bãi Cỏ Mây giữa Philippines và Trung Quốc”, Government News Portal, June 21, 2024. https://baochinhphu.vn/viet-nam-quan-ngai-sau-sac-truoc-vu-viec-va-cham-o-khu-vuc-bai-co-may-giua-philippines-va-trung-quoc-102240621121240484.htm 
[28] “有關中國與菲律賓本（6）月17日在南海仁愛暗沙海域爆發船艦碰撞衝突事，外交部回應如下：,” 中華民國外交部全球資訊網, June 19, 2024. https://www.mofa.gov.tw/news_Content.aspx?n=97&sms=75&s=117580. 
[29] “Haley Ott, “As Phillippines sailor hurt in South China Sea incident, U.S. cites risk of ‘much more violent’ confrontation”, CBS News, June 18, 2924. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/south-china-sea-philippines-us-condemns-china-warns-violent-confrontation/ 
[30] US Defense Sec Austin Calls Philippine Counterpart Teodoro Jr”, Mirage, June 27, 2024. https://www.miragenews.com/us-defense-sec-austin-calls-philippine-1264077/ 
[31] “U.S., Canada, Japan and Philippines Conduct Multilateral Operations”, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, June 17, 2024. https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3808577/us-canada-japan-and-the-philippines-conduct-multilateral-operations/ 
[32] Ibid
[33] 新聞編輯, “中國登掠菲律賓海軍船 學者：可能被視為「戰爭行為」,” Rti 中央廣播電臺, June 21, 2024, https://www.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2210355. 
[34] Kathrin Hille, “Biden to warn Beijing over aggressive South China Sea tactics”, Financial Times, Apr 8, 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/be5f840a-28f7-4bb0-91f9-1aedd3d10d9e 
[35] Ibid
[36] Ibid
[37] Ibid
[38] “China’s Coast Guard is Deliberately Creating Legal Ambiguity”, The Maritime Executive, June 20, 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/china-s-coast-guard-is-deliberately-creating-legal-ambiguity 
[39] Ibid