1. China's “Grey Zone” Activities in the South China Sea Targeting the Philippines
For many years, China has been employing what some observers refer to as the “grey zone” activities, instead of using force to avoid causing direct armed conflicts in the South China Sea, which could provoke resistance from other claimant states in the region and attract the involvement or even intervention of the international community—particularly the United States [1]. This strategy has helped China in pursuing its claims and acquiring additional features in the South China Sea. The forces that China employs in implementing these “grey zone” activities include maritime militias, fishing vessels, coast guard ships, naval ships, and maritime patrol aircraft. They have reportedly been used to harass and threaten the economic activities of coastal nations, while gradually asserting China's sovereignty claims and rights over the South China Sea.
The Philippines is a key claimant in much of the South China Sea, which it refers to as the West Philippine Sea [2]. The Philippines has been frequently opposing China’s actions, including (i) Harassment of Filipino fishing vessels; (ii) Interference with oil and gas exploration; (iii) Scientific exploration and research within the maritime zones claimed by the Philippines.
Over the years, the Philippines has suffered a series of maritime incidents due to China's "grey zone" strategy, including:
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- Occupy and fortify artificial islands at Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines [3];
- Maintain presence at Scarborough Shoal, claimed by the Philippines since 2012 [4];
- Blockage of Filipino fishermen from fishing in areas where the Philippines has fishing rights [5];
- Prevention of Philippine vessels from exploring and exploiting oil and gas resources in maritime zones claimed by the Philippines [6];
- Sinking a Philippine fishing boat near Recto Bank in June 2019[7].
- Issue radio warnings to threaten Philippine patrol aircraft [8];
- Target Philippine maritime patrol vessels with radar during sea patrols [9];
- Deploy hundreds of Chinese fishing vessels to anchor in areas such as Whitsun Reef and other parts of the West Philippine Sea, claimed by the Philippines, with the highest numbers recorded since 2021 [10];
- Use high-intensity radar on Philippine Coast Guard vessels during patrol [11];
- Cut off Philippine Coast Guard vessels, leading to a near-collision incident [12];
- Block the Philippines’ resupply missions to troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal [13];
- Deploy nearly 10 Chinese vessels to surround and obstruct Philippine resupply missions in early July 2023 [14];
- Use water cannons on Philippine Coast Guard ships during a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal in early August 2023 [15];
- Fire water cannons and collide with a Philippine resupply vessel near Second Thomas Shoal in early December 2023. [16].
2. The Philippines' Countermeasures Against China's “Grey Zone” Tactics
2.1. Diplomatic and legal measures
Affirming the Value of the Arbitration Award. On July 12, 2020, for the first time in four years since setting aside its victory in the South China Sea arbitration case, Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. issued a statement commemorating the anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal's ruling on the South China Sea dispute. Since then, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs has consistently issued such statements to celebrate this occasion. In his statement on July 12, 2020, commemorating the fourth anniversary of the Tribunal's decision, Foreign Secretary Locsin emphasized that the ruling is a historic milestone in international law. He underscored its importance role in peacefully resolving disputes, upholding a rules-based order, and rejecting China's excessive and unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea [17].
During the first four years following its 2016 victory, the Philippines refrained from raising the ruling at high-level and official discussions under President Rodrigo Duterte's administration. This restraint aimed to improve Sino-Philippines bilateral relations and strengthen cooperation on infrastructure investments, economic trade, and development. However, in the latter half of Duterte's term, the Philippines shifted its South China Sea policy. Following Secretary Locsin's statement, on September 23, 2020, President Duterte, at the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, officially mentioned the ruling before the international community. President Duterte declared that "The Philippines is committed to adhering to UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award…The Arbitral Award is part of international law, beyond compromise, and no nation can diminish, erase, or abandon it. The Philippines opposes actions that undermine the value of the Award"[18]. This declaration was deemed as the official policy of the Philippines concerning disputes in the South China Sea.
On July 12, 2021, marking the fifth anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal's ruling, Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin issued his second statement on the award, affirming its legally-binding and definitive nature in resolving disputes between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea. He also reiterated the Philippines' commitment to enforce the ruling and oppose actions that undermined the ruling’s value [19]. On July 12, 2022, in celebrating the sixth anniversary of the Tribunal's ruling, Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo – Locsin's successor, issued another commemorative statement. He emphasized that UNCLOS and the award are the "twin anchors" of the Philippine government’s policies and actions in the South China Sea. He reiterated that the ruling invalidated China's historical claims to resources within the nine-dash line and affirmed that the ruling is definitive, and The Philippines opposed any actions that seek to weaken or nullify it [20]. On July 12, 2023, at the seventh anniversary of the ruling, Secretary Manalo issued another statement. He highlighted that the award had invalidated China's claims to historic rights and excessive maritime claims over South China Sea features, affirming its role as part of international law [21].
Continuous Diplomatic Protests. The Philippines has consistently filed diplomatic protests against China's actions in the South China Sea. According to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, from 2016 to 2021, under former President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines filed 262 diplomatic protests against China’s activities in the South China Sea [22], and is number for the year 2022 was 195 [23]. The peak of these protests occurred in 2021, when over 200 Chinese vessels—mostly fishing boats and maritime militias—anchored and formed clusters in the waters around Whitsun Reef and other areas claimed by the Philippines. At the time, then-Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin declared that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs would file diplomatic protests daily until the Chinese vessels left Philippine waters [24]. From the beginning of 2023 to August 2023, the Department sent 34 diplomatic protests concerning maritime incidents between the Philippines and China [25].
Summoning Chinese Embassy Representatives in Manila for Direct Protests. In addition to filing diplomatic protests, the Philippine government has summoned representatives of the Chinese Embassy in Manila to directly convey its objections. During the period of heightened tensions in March-April 2021 when hundreds of Chinese fishing vessels, maritime militia ships, and coast guard vessels were present in the waters around Whitsun Reef (part of Vietnam’s Spratly Islands), the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs repeatedly summoned Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian to lodge protests. On April 13, 2021, Acting Philippine Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Elizabeth Buensuceso met with Ambassador Huang at the Department of Foreign Affairs to protest the presence of Chinese vessels in the area. She demanded that China withdraw its ships from the "Whitsun Reef and other areas within the Philippines' maritime zones," describing the presence of these vessels as the source of tensions in the region [26]. On March 14, 2022, Acting Undersecretary Buensuceso again summoned Ambassador Huang to protest the unauthorized intrusion of a Chinese naval vessel into Philippine waters in the Sulu Sea from January 29 to February 1, 2022. The vessel had entered without permission and refused to leave despite repeated requests [27]. On April 13, 2022, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs summoned senior diplomatic staff from the Chinese Embassy in Manila to protest the harassment of Philippine scientific research activities by Chinese Coast Guard vessels within the Philippines' maritime zones [28].
At the highest level, Philippine President Marcos has also summoned the Chinese ambassador to protest directly. On February 14, 2023, following an incident in which Chinese vessels directed high-powered lasers at a Philippine Coast Guard ship, President Marcos summoned Ambassador Huang Xilian to formally express the Philippines’ objection to the laser incident [29]. On August 5, 2023, after a Chinese Coast Guard vessel used water cannons against a Philippine Coast Guard ship during a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal, Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo met with Ambassador Huang. He handed over a diplomatic protest along with visual evidence of the incident [30]. On December 11, 2023, following another water cannon incident involving Chinese vessels targeting Philippine resupply ships at Second Thomas Shoal, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs announced that it had summoned Ambassador Huang Xilian to deliver a formal diplomatic protest [31].
Issuing Joint Statements with the U.S. To bolster its diplomatic influence and oppose China's “grey zone” activities that hinder Filipino fishermen's economic activities, the Philippine government has sought to issue joint statements with its ally, the United States, during bilateral engagements. On March 20, 2023, during a phone call between Philippine Defense Secretary Carlito Galvez and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, both sides strongly condemned China's “grey zone” activities in the South China Sea, which disrupt the livelihoods of Filipinos and other coastal nations. They also expressed concern over the presence of over 40 Chinese vessels within the territorial waters of Thitu Island [32].
Nationwide Advocacy Approach. In April 2021, as Chinese vessels assembled around Whitsun Reef and other areas in the South China Sea, many Filipino politicians, economic associations, and social organizations demanded that the Philippine government take action to compel China to withdraw its vessels. On April 15, 2021, a group of eight major economic associations in the Philippines, including the Makati Business Club, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Philippine CEO Group, and the Management Association of the Philippines, issued a joint statement urging the government to protest and demand the withdrawal of Chinese vessels from Whitsun Reef [33]. On April 27, 2021, 11 Philippine senators jointly signed a resolution condemning China’s incursion into Philippine waters [34].
2.2. Publicizing “Grey Zone” Activities in the Media
In addition to diplomatic protests, the Philippines has countered China's “grey zone” tactics by continuously disclosing information through the media, including photos, videos, and audio recordings of Chinese vessels “intruding” into areas such as Whitsun Reef and the broader South China Sea as well as footage of Chinese ships, patrol aircraft, and Chinese obstruction of Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal.
From 2021 onward, when a large number of Chinese vessels began assembling and anchoring in the South China Sea, major Philippine newspapers such as ABS-CBN, Inquirer, and Philstar, as well as international outlets like Agence France-Presse, have widely reported on these maritime incidents, the government's responses, and reactions from the public [35]. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) even praised ABS-CBN journalists for reporting on the South China Sea [36]. Following the incident on February 6, 2024 in which a Chinese Coast Guard vessel used laser against a Philippine Coast Guard vessel, Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Jay Tarriela declared that the Philippines had adopted a strategy of publicizing images and information about similar coercive incidents at sea as a way to counter China's “grey zone” tactics [37]. On August 22, 2023, during the second resupply mission to troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal, Philippine Coast Guard ships escorting the resupply vessels brought along an Agence France-Presse’s journalist to capture and report on the event, documenting the situation through photos and videos [38].
2.3. On-site Operations
Continuous Maritime Patrols. In response to the large-scale presence of Chinese vessels in maritime areas claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea, the Philippines has significantly increased the frequency of maritime and aerial patrols in the South China Sea since 2021. During 2021, when over 200 Chinese vessels were concentrated at Whitsun Reef and other disputed areas in the South China Sea, the Philippine government consistently deployed patrol vessels to these areas and demanded that Chinese vessels leave.
According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), from March to May 2021, the Philippines media reported that 13 enforcement vessels had been dispatched to conduct 57 maritime patrols in disputed areas, including Whitsun Reef, Scarborough Shoal, Thitu Island, and Second Thomas Shoal. In contrast, during 2020, only three vessels conducted seven patrols in these areas [39]. Philippine officials have repeatedly stated their commitment to continuing naval and coast guard patrols [40]. When Chinese vessels’ presence in the region diminishes, the frequency of Philippine maritime patrols decreases. However, during periods of heightened tensions or when Chinese vessels reappear in contested areas, the Philippines intensifies its patrols.
In February 2023, following an incident in which a Chinese Coast Guard vessel used a laser against a Philippine Coast Guard vessel [41], the Philippines increased the number of maritime patrols. According to Ray Powell of Stanford University's Project Myoushu on the South China Sea, there was a notable increase in patrols by the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy during February 2023 compared to previous months [42]. Philippine Coast Guard Commander Artemio Abu, in an interview in early February 2023, stated that the Coast Guard would strengthen both maritime and aerial patrols to enhance its presence in the South China Sea. He mentioned that 26,000 coast guard personnel and 25 patrol vessels could be mobilized to protect the country’s sovereignty [43]. On July 10, 2023, the Philippine military released a public report on its maritime patrol activities. The report highlighted that the military had tripled the number of maritime patrols in the South China Sea compared to previous years. It also noted a 30% increase in patrol activity compared to 2022 and that patrol vessels were present in the Kalayaan Island Group (part of the Spratly Islands) for 90% of the time [44].
In addition to increasing the number of patrols, the Philippines has deployed its largest coast guard vessels for longer missions and patrols in more distant areas. For example, in July 2022, the BRP Bonifacio, one of the Philippines’ largest patrol vessels provided by the United States, conducted an extended maritime patrol in the Kalayaan Island Group [45].
On-site activities in coordination with allies and partners. U.S. and allied naval vessels have been spotted several times in the Philippine’s maritime activities, particularly in successful resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal, though the Philippine government has not officially disclosed details of such coordination. For example, during a successful resupply mission by the Philippine Navy to Second Thomas Shoal on August 23, 2023, media reports indicated the presence of a U.S. aircraft carrier and warships from Japan and Australia conducting exercises near the area [46]. In early December 2023, the USS Giffords, a U.S. Navy vessel, was reported patrolling near Second Thomas Shoal [47]. Additionally, for the first time in many years, the Philippine Navy conducted a joint sail with the U.S. Navy near Palawan in early September 2023 [48]. This joint sail marked a significant shift in the Philippines' on-site coordination with the U.S, reflecting deeper maritime collaboration than previously observed.
In recent years, particularly since 2021, the Philippines has adopted a clear policy to counter China's “grey zone” activities in the South China Sea. The country has focused on implementing notable measures such as political and diplomatic protests against China's “grey zone” operations, public dissemination of information about these activities, and on-site efforts to assert its maritime claims through increased patrols. The Philippines' attempts to counter grey zone activities have resulted in the reduction of both the duration and the number of Chinese vessels appearing in areas claimed by the Philippines. According to Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Jay Tarriela, the number of Chinese ships tends to decrease when the Philippines intensifies maritime patrols. Without such measures, the presence and duration of Chinese vessels in these areas would have increased [49]. Moreover, the Philippines' diplomatic and legal efforts to expose China's “grey zone” activities in the South China Sea have garnered international attention. This transparency has helped the international community, particularly countries in the South China Sea region, better understand the situation and voice support for the maritime claims of regional states based on international law.
Within the Philippines, there is significant domestic support for the government's assertive actions to uphold sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea. Former Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio has commended the administration of President Marcos, stating that its robust measures to enforce sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, particularly since the 2016 arbitration ruling, are on the right track and have garnered international backing.
At present, President Marcos' administration, still in its early stage, has undertaken substantial adjustments to its South China Sea policy. This suggests that the Philippines' firm stance against China's “grey zone” activities at sea is likely to continue for the next several years. President Marcos began his six-year term in June 2022, which will run until 2028, providing a clear timeline for sustaining his administration's South China Sea policy. Any significant changes to maritime policies are expected to occur after the next presidential election in 2028.
Nguyen Thai Giang
East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
*The opinions expressed in this article are solely the author’s and do not represent the position of the Institute.
Translated and edited by KT, NN, HD
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