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Activities of the Claimants

Vietnam

Vietnam to complete the map of potential oil reserves in Vietnamese waters

Vietnam Petroleum Institute has completed the map of potential oil reserves in Vietnamese waters and continental shelf, in which the Vietnamese sovereignty on Vietnamese waters and continental shelf was made clear. Mr Phan Ngoc Trung, director of Vietnam Petroleum Institute, said that this is the result of the implementation of the “General Project on basically investigate and manage resources – sea environment to 2010, envisioned for 2020” ratified by Vietnamese Prime Minister on 1st March 2006 (Project 47).

New book on East Sea (South China Sea) makes debut

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The Vietnamese Information and Communications Publishing House has launched a book entitled “Vietnamese mark in the East Sea” by Dr. Tran Cong Truc, former Chairman of the Government’s Committee for Boundaries. Published at a time when the Law of the Sea of Vietnam was just adopted by the National Assembly, the book provides accurate information on the East Sea situation to people of all strata, as well as affirming the Vietnamese State’s sound and objective position on the disputes. At the same time, a book entitled “Continental Shelf in International Law” compiled by the Department of Foreign Information under the Ministry of Information and Communications has also been published.

Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam Luong Thanh Nghi:”All activities of parties in the East Sea must conform to international law”

In response to the question:”Please advise Viet Nam’s position on reports that China sends a large fleet of vessels for fishing in waters in the East Sea?”, Mr Luong Thanh Nghi said:” “All activities of parties in the East Sea must conform to international law, especially the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the spirit of the Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), on the basis of respecting the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of all countries, contributing to peace, stability in the region and preserving the maritime environment and resources”.

China

Taiwan to strengthen its defenses on Spratly Islands

The Taiwanese ministry of National Defense said Tuesday (7th August) that it is working with the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) to beef up Taiwan's defenses on Ba Binh Island in the disputed South China Sea. Everything is going according to schedule," military spokesman Luo Shou-he said. He declined to comment on media reports that a Navy vessel carrying 40-mm anti-aircraft guns and 120-mm mortars had embarked from Kaohsiung an was expected to arrive at Ba Binh in a week.

Chinese Foreign Minister to visit Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi will pay official visits to Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia from 9th to 13th August, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said on Wednesday (8th August). Yang will make the visits at the invitation of his counterparts from their respective countries, according to Qin.

Chinato put on combat duty aircraft carrier

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Russian media ITAR-TASS on 9th August reported that the Chinese Navy will put on the first carrier to celebrate Chinese National Day (1/10). The still-unnamed carrier was originally built by the former Soviet Union.

The US

The US countinues to cooperate with ASEAN on the South China Sea issue

According to the US statement on the South China Sea, Patrick Ventrell, US State Department spokesman said this is a very comprehensive statement which is very clearly laid out the US policy and the US belief that there needs to be a collaborative diplomatic solution without coercion to all aspects of the South China Sea. And the US issued the statement because it has some concerns about the recent increase in tensions. On the part of ASEAN, he said:” We remain and continue to think that a code of conduct in order to establish clear rules of the road would be a good thing, and so we endorse the recent ASEAN six-point principles on the South China Sea, and we continue to look to our partners as they work on this collaboratively.”

The Philippines

Philippines to support US statement on the South China Sea

“We welcome the 3rd August statement of the State Department because it supports the Philippines’ rules-based approach to resolving disputes in the South China Sea,” Raul Hernandez, spokeperson of The Philippine Department of Foreign Affair, said in a text message. “The threats to peace and stability, along with the threats to freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce, will negatively impact not only on claimants but many other nations,”

Cambodia recalls envoy to Philippines

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Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs spokesman Raul Hernandez said Friday morning (10th August) that the Cambodian Foreign Ministry and the Cambodian Embassy in Manila separately informed the DFA of the Ambassador Hos Sereythonh’s recall.

Indonesia

Indonesia Warns of Further South China Sea Tension

Indonesiawarned on Wednesday (8th August) of a “risk of further tensions” between nations with overlapping claims to swathes of the South China Sea if a “collective and common approach” is not soon agreed. “This is an issue that demands Asean’s and China’s collective and common approach and action, otherwise the risk of further tensions are very much ahead of us”, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa told reporters on the sidelines of Asean’s 45th anniversary celebrations.

Regional Snapshots

Japan, South Korea, U.S. to hold naval exercises off Hawaii

Japan, South Korea and the United States will hold joint exercises in waters of Hawaii. The U.S. Pacific Fleet said Monday (6th August) the drills will include a search-and-seizure exercise, a counter-piracy event, a search-and-rescue exercise and officer exchanges. Three U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships will participate. They are the guided-missile cruiser USS Port Royal, the guided missile destroyer USS Chafee, the dry cargo ship USNS Matthew Perry and the cutter USCGC Galveston Island. The drills scheduled for Tuesday (7th August) and Wednesday (8th August) come shortly after monthlong Rim of the Pacific multinational exercises were held in Hawaii.

ADMM-Plus meeting took place in Hanoi

The second Expert’s Working Group (EWG) meeting of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) opened in Hanoi on August 8 on the theme of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). The meeting, co-chaired by Vietnam and China, was attended by officials of 18 ADMM-Plus member countries as well as representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat. Discussions at the meeting focused on legal aspects of the use of military in regional and international HADR activities, the training of personnel engaging in HADR, cooperation initiatives among ADMM-Plus, and experiences of armed forces in coping with such natural disasters as storms, floods and landslides.

ASEAN celebrates 45th founding anniversary 

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A solemn ceremony was held in Jakarta, Indonesia on August 8 to mark the 45 th founding anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Delivering an opening speech, the ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan reviewed the 45-year development of ASEAN, stressing that ASEAN has now become a prestigious regional organisation with an important role and position in Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific. The Secretary-General stressed that the celebration offers an opportunity for ASEAN to not only affirm its achievements and successes but also strengthen solidarity and unity, and consolidate its determination to fulfil the common goal of building the ASEAN Community in 2015.

China ‘Willing to Work with Indonesia’ on Maritime Row

China’s foreign minister said on Friday (10th August) that his country was willing to work with Indonesia as an informal mediator to “maintain peace and stability” in the South China Sea, amid tensions with neighboring nations over rival claims to the area. “To maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea and in the region, China is willing to work with Indonesia,” Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said in Jakarta. “The very difficult issue of the South China Sea requires countries in the region, Asean and China to work closely,” Natalegawa said.

Commentaries & Analyses

The Bully of the South China Sea

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In a 2000 white paper, Beijing claimed that the source of its "indisputable sovereignty" over the Spratly Islands, the most important features in the South China Sea. This basis is disputed. First, China may have some of the oldest surviving maps of the area, but aboriginal, Malay, Indian and Arab traders traversed these seas before Han Chinese began their explorations. A second irony is that the People's Republic's current claims date to a 1947 map issued by the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek, which drew a u-shaped line of 11 dashes around more than 90% of the South China Sea. Mao's regime republished that map with a simplified nine-dashed line after it routed the nationalists, claiming the sea as China's "historic waters." Now Beijing accuses its neighbors of stirring up tensions. But in June it staged its biggest provocation since 1994: putting up for bid oil exploration blocks that lie within Vietnam's EEZ and overlap with blocks that Vietnam has already leased. Beijing has shown that it has no interest in a negotiated settlement and will use force to claim and dominate the entire South China Sea if it can. Washington needs to call out the U-shaped line as the travesty of international law that it is, and state clearly that it will fight to keep the sea lanes open.

China’s Navy in the Mediterranean?

The People’s Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) has developed alongside Beijing’s ambitions as a global power, allowing it not only to show the flag, such as in multilateral anti-piracy missions off the Gulf of Aden, but also to back up its evolving strategic imperatives. For evident reasons, activity by Chinese warships in the region comports risks, especially at a time of high tensions involving between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea. The more friction points there are, the more likely it is that, at some point, accidental or intentional clashes will occur. And given Beijing’s growing sense of victimhood, it is not impossible that an incident involving a PLAN ship in the Mediterranean could add institutional pressures for retaliation elsewhere. This would be especially likely if decision-makers in Beijing, who have a tendency to regard China as the “victim,” interpreted that incident as a plot against it, thus making it possible for Beijing to claim it is retaliating for purely defensive reasons. While claims that we are seeing the emergence of an “authoritarian axis” may be premature, we are nevertheless witnessing the rise of a new power — one with global seafaring reach — whose strategic considerations, or the values of their political leaders, are often times diametrically opposed to those of the West

South China Sea Dispute: The Farce of Chinese Multilateralism

Although Beijing accords multilateralism a more central place in Chinese foreign policy, it however subordinates it to the principle of sovereignty. This was palpable during the 1995 Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting, which laid out three stages of development of regional security cooperation: confidence building; preventive diplomacy; and, conflict resolution strategies. While adhering to the first stage, the PRC has displayed serious reservations about the second and third stages since the preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution processes conflicted with China’s sovereignty issues. Needless to point out, the bilateral mechanism allows China to keep the multiple claimants divided and confused about the territorial resolution and offers Beijing greater manoeuvrability in the negotiating process. . In other words, resolution of the South China Sea dispute has been crippled from the beginning on account of China’s limited and pretentious multilateralism and its strong emphasis on the principle of national sovereignty. This has clearly rendered China’s multilateralism as a completely farcical foreign policy formulation. For China, the South China Sea dispute is merely a sovereignty issue in which it brooks no interference of external forces. It opts to settle the issue on its own terms rousing nationalism, constructing false historiography and displaying military muscle.

 

Salami Slicing in the South China Sea

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Chinais having a slow, patient approach to dominating Asia. The increase in U.S. military power in the region, called for by both the CSIS report and by U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in a June speech in Singapore, is designed in part to deter overt aggression, such as a sudden restart of the Korean War or a Chinese blitzkrieg against Taiwan. But what about an adversary that uses "salami-slicing," the slow accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change? The goal of Beijing's salami-slicing would be to gradually accumulate, through small but persistent acts, evidence of China's enduring presence in its claimed territory, with the intention of having that claim smudge out the economic rights granted by UNCLOS and perhaps even the right of ships and aircraft to transit what are now considered to be global commons. With new "facts on the ground" slowly but cumulatively established, China would hope to establish de facto and de jure settlements of its claims. Both the United States and ASEAN members would greatly prefer a negotiated code of conduct for resolving disputes in the South China Sea. But should China opt to pursue a salami-slicing strategy instead, policymakers in Washington may conclude that the only politically viable response is to encourage the small countries to more vigorously defend their rights, even if its risks conflict, with the promise of U.S. military backup.

Beijing and US tense up over fresh South China Sea dispute

Recently, the United States and China splashed unusually harsh words on each other, but it may prove just a ripple in a larger dispute. What appears to be the worst spat between the US and China over the South China Sea shows Beijing’s nervousness about the US getting involved in an Asian territorial dispute with so much at stake for China: seafood, oil, and natural gas. But China seems to realize it’s best not to match its fiery words with actual fire. “The State Department at least wanted to fire a warning shot to all parties to not make the situation worse," says Alexander Huang, strategic studies professor at Tamkang University in Taiwan. It was as if the US was saying "Don’t do anything stupid," he adds. It is in China's interest to use strong language, especially as Politburo leaders in Beijing posture ahead of a leadership reshuffle this year to show its power, but it wants to avoid real conflict that could upset other nations and reel the US into the dispute. Analysts have said Washington tacitly sides with the smaller claimants, not China, although it officially doesn’t take sides.

Keeping calm over ASEAN’s troubled waters

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ASEAN is at a crucial stage in its dream to build a community by 2015. The forefathers saw ASEAN as a regional security arrangement based on the value of berkampung, meaning to get together, from which kampung, the Malay word for village, comes from. This indigenous notion of “togetherness”, which has an equivalent in many parts of Southeast Asia, such as bayanihan or dagyaw in the Philippines, is an informal way of achieving a shared community objective. Second, it was believed that the cost of losing the region’s grip on its political and diplomatic force was too high a price to pay for economic gain. How do we apply these principles given the present controversy? Another principle which ASEAN need to harness in the coming months is look for the lowest common denominators, because this is what works for “us” as a community and then build on them, slowly and steadily. The next step is to build trust instead of sowing fear. In November, Cambodia will have the noble opportunity of keeping the calm over the waterways that link ASEAN with China and the world. It is another shot at leadership.

The silver linings of the crisis

ASEAN suffered a major loss of face, at least in the perceptions of some international media and academic experts, owing to its failure to issue its customary joint communique at its last ministerial meeting (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, or the AMM) in Cambodia held during July 9-13. But the crisis may have some silver linings. It will be a useful wake-up call for ASEAN. One of the most critical challenges facing ASEAN is the need to strengthen the ASEAN secretariat. First, it is noteworthy that none other than the current ASEAN Secretary-General, Dr Surin Pitsuwan, had provided a detailed account (entitled "ASEAN's Challenges") of his secretariat's shortcomings with recommendations for improving its efficiency. Next, ASEAN's original members like Indonesia still have a special responsibility to rise up to the occasion and guide ASEAN at this critical juncture. Even more important, just after the Cambodia AMM, Thailand and Cambodia pulled out their troops from the disputed Preah Vihear temple area, thereby diffusing a major point of intra-ASEAN conflict for the past years. Finally, the degree of cohesion expected of ASEAN, including by experts who had suddenly taken an interest in the organization because of its growing prominence during the past few years, is unrealistic. It is useful to keep in mind what regional organizations can and cannot do. To conclude, the idea of ASEAN centrality is under challenge, but it is too early to pronounce it as dead.

Toward a code of conduct for the South China Sea

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In discussing a proposed code of conduct, some facts ought to be taken into consideration and certain issues must first be resolved. One fact to be recalled is the downgrading of the initial 2002 document from a legally binding code to a political declaration — the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The question of where a ‘legally binding’ code would apply was the ultimate cause of this downgrade. Thus, is the uncertainty over its area of application still an obstacle to the document’s adoption? If it is, how do the supporters of a code of conduct propose to overcome this problem? Next, Should ASEAN members consult among themselves before holding discussions with China on the South China Sea? A related question is at what stage China should be involved in the formulation of a proposed code of conduct. Some in ASEAN think this should occur after ASEAN has reached a consensus; others insist that China should be involved from the beginning. Timing is another point to consider. The longer the prospect of a code of conduct tantalises those impatiently waiting for it, the more the Chinese and their sympathisers can claim that others, like the US, should stay out of the debate, since negotiations are already taking place. Perhaps the most fundamental reason why the conflicting claims in the South China Sea are so difficult to resolve is that all the claimants feel their footholds in the South China Sea are essential to their national interest. Therefore, the document should, at the very least, declare that national interests might be pursued, but not at the expense of other countries.

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