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Activities of the Claimants

China

Chinese navy launches new patrol route in the South China Sea

After fortifying its naval outposts in the South China Sea, China has established a maritime surveillance patrol route that covers practically all disputed reefs, shoals and islets in the sea, even those within 85 nautical miles of the Philippines' westernmost island province of Palawan, a classified military report seen August 5th by Kyodo News says. The report says China's People's Liberation Army Navy's South Sea Fleet established the new patrol pattern this year, resulting in several incursions that have heightened tensions in the region. The route sweeps through contested islands, reefs and shoals within China's nine-dash line claim to most, if not all, of the South China Sea.

China warns against rush to set code of conduct in South China Sea

The envisaged Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) cannot be set in a rush as it concerns the interests of many countries and lots of work is required, said Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on August 5th. China and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have agreed to work on COC within the framework of the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), Wang told reporters. China believes that there should be no rush. Certain countries are hoping that COC can be agreed on overnight. These countries are having unrealistic expectation and taking unserious attitudes, said Wang. COC concerns the interests of various parties and its formulation demands a heavy load of coordination work, he said.

Taiwan lifts sanctions vs Philippines

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Taiwan has finally lifted all of its sanctions against the Philippines after President Benigno Aquino III apologized over the fatal shooting of a Taiwanese fisherman in waters off Batanes last May. The development came after Amadeo Perez, chairman of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO), travelled to Taiwan to express the apology of Aquino and of the Filipinos to the family of crewmember Hong Shi-cheng, the victim of the fatal shooting incident involving a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel. "Given that the Philippines has expressed its good will and apology both in writing and in deed, the ROC (Repuplic of China) government hereby pronounces that all sanctions imposed against the Philippines are lifted as of today," Taiwan's foreign ministry said in a statement.

The Philippines

Philippines vows intensified sea patrols

The Philippines promised intensified sea patrols on August 6th as it welcomed the arrival of a second warship from the United States to bolster its defenses during a maritime dispute with China. "Now that BRP Alcaraz has arrived, we will surely intensify our patrols in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone," Philippine President Aquino said in a speech as the US envoy to Manila and other officials cheered.

Philippines rejects anew China’s ‘indisputable claim’ over South China Sea

The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) rejects China’s “indisputable” claim over the entire South China Sea – the “core issue” of the territorial dispute between the two countries, a spokesman for the DFA said on August 6th. “We once again redirect China to the core issue which is its claim of indisputable sovereignty over nearly all of the South China Sea under its ‘nine dash line’ position,” said assistant secretary Raul Hernandez.

The U.S.

Philippines, US to start negotiations on larger American troop presence

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Philippine officials say they will soon begin negotiations with the United States on a larger American military presence to help deter what they say is increasing Chinese aggression in Philippine-claimed waters in the South China Sea. In a letter to Philippine congressional leaders, the secretaries of national defense and foreign affairs said that allowing American troops to have an "increased rotational presence" will help the country attain a "minimum credible defense" to guard its territory while it struggles to modernize its own military, one of Asia's weakest.

Regional Snapshots

Vietnam, Japan hold second defence policy dialogue

Vietnam and Japan have emphasised the necessity of solving disputes and differences by peaceful means to avoid armed conflicts when it comes to sea and island sovereignty issues. Both have underscored the compliance to international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in doing so. These remarks came out from the second Vietnam-Japan Defence Policy Dialogue in Tokyo on August 9th. At the dialogue, an agreement on supporting each other in research capacity building and management for sea areas and actively participating in international forums to build rules and code of conduct applied at sea in conformity with international law was reached.

Russia helps Vietnam improve military capacity

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Cooperation with Russia in military technology, personnel training and technology transfer is important for Vietnam in improving its army’s capacity and combat readiness to protect the national sovereignty and integrity. The remarks were made by Vietnamese Defence Minster Phung Quang Thanh while briefing Moscow-based Vietnamese media agencies of his freshly-finished visit to Russia. He recalled Russia’s cooperation and assistance to Vietnam in all fields, including defence, through the years, and mirrored quantitative and qualitative developments in the current military technology and defence cooperation as part of the two countries’ strategic partnership.

Vietnamese Chief of General Staff visits Thailand

Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army, Sen. Lt. Gen. Do Ba Ty met with Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Army Thanasak Patimaprakorn on August 11, the last day of his two-day visit to Thailand. At the meeting, Thanasak spoke highly of Sen. Lt. Gen. Ty’ visit, which, he said, demonstrates the tightened defence ties between the two countries. He added that the visit will contribute to enhancing the fruitful friendship between the two armies following the signing of an agreement on defence cooperation in 2012 and the joint statement on the establishment of the strategic partnership issued by the two countries’ leaders earlier this year.

Commentaries & Analyses

Back against the wall no more: How ASEAN can stand up to China in the South China Sea disputes

By Dylan Loh Ming Hui

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In a refreshingly positive move, China agreed to discuss a ‘Code of conduct’ over the South China Sea disputes, although how this ‘acquiescence’ translates to genuine overtures from China is still a question mark. What is certain though is that, in lieu of this development, ASEAN should seize the initiative and the window of opportunity to push for greater stability and certainty in dealing with territorial disputes in the region vis-à-vis China. First, outstanding SCS disputes between ASEAN claimant countries—for example, the Spratly islands involving Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines (and China)—should be negotiated immediately under the ambit of ASEAN.  The commencement of such a settlement through ASEAN would do three things. First, it enables ASEAN to be ‘tested’ as a resolution mechanism for maritime territorial disputes. Second, this undertaking would, intrinsically, build up the cultural, institutional, and diplomatic repertoires to handle territorial issues, thus placing ASEAN firming in the driving seat for maritime territorial defrayal. Finally, it builds a moral plane on which ASEAN, by getting its own house in order and by proving the efficacy of ASEAN as a settlement device, can better discuss and negotiate with China. And ASEAN can do more. Even non SCS related maritime issues between claimant and non-claimant ASEAN countries—such as maritime boundaries between Indonesia and Singapore—should be expedited to boost intra ASEAN confidence and to send a message of unity and political willingness, increasing bloc solidarity. Pertinently, such an ASEAN exercise would stress that any form of bullying—whether perceived or real—cannot and would not be tolerated anymore. Such consonance would force China’s hands not so much as to give up its claims but to at least cease its bullying strategies and, at the minimum, sincerely listen to what these countries have to say. Essentially, this signals to China that while they respect and welcome China’s rise, ASEAN is not prepared to bow quietly if arm-twisting tactics are repeatedly dispensed. Individually, these countries might be weak but collectively—while still nowhere near China’s military or economic equal—they can pack a real punch.

The Promise and Peril of China’s New Coast Guard

By Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley

Four ships from the newly established China Coast Guard (CCG) were deployed in the East China Sea near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on July 24th, as reported by Kyodo News and Xinhua. The ships have also been sighted in the area around Vanh Khan Reef according to a confidential Philippine government report. While Chinese government vessels have consistently entered both seas over the past year, this marked the first time ships did so under the restructured State Oceanic Administration (SOA). The consolidation has been widely viewed as a positive move both domestically and abroad. There is hope among foreign observers that the move could reduce regional tensions because the combined Chinese maritime law enforcement bodies which had previously been competing for funding and resources will have a consistent, single chain of command under the Ministry of Public Security. This can make coast guard activity more predictable when scenarios arise that have the potential for escalation. U.S. Air Force General Herb Carlisle has noted that command and control of Chinese maritime security operations already appears to be improving. The consolidation could also heighten tensions, however. A highly coordinated maritime law enforcement agency will be better equipped to defend China’s territorial claims and sovereignty, increasing the chances of fatalities if there are clashes between coast guards. It also offers more opportunities to intimidate weaker neighbors, although this depends on the capabilities of the opposing coast guard. The impact that these changes to China’s coast guard will have on regional maritime security dynamics is yet to be seen. The restructure presents significant benefits for both China (efficiency) and others (predictability). However, regional powers – especially those with territorial disputes with China – should not necessarily anticipate a “weaker” coast guard simply based on personnel and ship numbers.  Rather, the restructured CCG yields opportunities for China to be better prepared to defend its claims than it has been in the past. The cumulative effect on maritime security, and China’s interaction with regional coast guards, will be determined in part by how the CCG responds to extenuating circumstances, and how those actions are perceived abroad.

No maritime agreement at ASEAN meeting

By John Chan

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi was visiting Thailand, Malaysia, Laos and Vietnam. It was his third trip to the region since his appointment as foreign minister in March, underscoring Beijing’s concern over US interventions in South East Asia. Wang’s diplomatic forays sought to counter Obama’s “pivot” strategy, which is aimed at undermining China diplomatically and encircling it with a network of US military bases and alliances. Attending a meeting with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers in Bangkok on, Wang emphasised that China was not a threat, but an opportunity for South East Asia. Referring to the South China Sea, Wang stressed the need for the “joint exploitation of mineral resources.” He added: “It will also send signals to other parts of the world that countries in the region are willing to solve their disputes in a cooperative way.” Wang’s stance at the ASEAN meeting reflected a tougher line in Beijing. President Xi Jinping declared recently at a Communist Party Politburo meeting that turning the country into a “maritime power” was now a key national policy. “No way will the country abandon its legitimate rights and interests, nor will it give up its core national interests,” Xi stated. That means, as Xi explained, China will build a stronger military to “safeguard” its maritime interests.

China’s salami-slicing strategy

By Brahma Chellaney

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China’s furtive, incremental encroachments into neighboring countries’ borderlands have emerged as a key destabilizing element in Asia. Beijing’s favored frontier strategy is pivoted on “salami slicing.” This involves a steady progression of small actions, none of which serves as a casus belli by itself, yet which over time lead cumulatively to a strategic transformation in China’s favor. To assert its claims in the South China and East China seas, the incremental tools China employs range from granting hydrocarbon-exploration leases to asserting expansive fishing rights — all designed to advance its territorial and maritime claims. China’s aim in the South China Sea is to slowly but surely legitimize its presence in the 80 percent of the sea it now claims formally. Through repeated and growing acts, China is etching a lasting presence in these zones. Among the ways Beijing has sought to establish new “facts” on the ground in the South China Sea is to lease hydrocarbon and fishing territories inside other disputant states’ 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones, as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Such leases are designed to circumscribe the treaty-granted economic rights of other claimant states while expanding China’s control of the region’s oil and gas wealth. China has even established the so-called “Sansha City” on Ba Binh Island in the Paracels as its administrative base for the South China Sea, setting up a local civilian government and a military garrison there to oversee the entire region. In its latest effort to present a fait accompli over its occupation of the Paracels, it has started tourist cruises to those disputed islands. To be sure, Beijing usually is careful to slice very thinly so as to avoid any dramatic action that could become a cause of war. Indeed, it has shown a knack of disaggregating any action into several parts and then pursuing each element separately in such a manner as to allow the different pieces to eventually fall in place. China’s tactics and strategy thus pose an growing challenge to several of its neighbors, which face a deepening dilemma over how to thwart the aggression. Exchanging notes with each other — and with the United States, the geographically nonresident Asian power — may be necessary to find ways to try and stop this creeping, covert warfare. After all, China’s multipronged actions, cumulatively, carry the potential of fundamentally altering the Asian power dynamics to shape a Sino-centric region.