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Activities of the Claimants

China

China unveils its secretive nuclear submarine fleet for the first time in four decades

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For more than 40 years, Chinese fleet of nuclear submarines has been shrouded in mystery. But now, China has unveiled the older generation of vessels, which can fire destructive rockets from under the sea. The country disclosed the fleet - one of its most secretive military programs - for the first time in four decades as a sign of its growing strength and confidence.

Vietnam

Vietnam to get Russian Black Hole Submarine

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Vietnam in November will take delivery of a Russian submarine dubbed “a black hole in the ocean” by the US Navy for its undetectability when submerged, a military industry source told RIA Novosti on October 28th. All total of six boats are being built for Vietnam at the Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg. They are due for delivery by 2016.

Indonesia

Indonesia to hold workshop on South China Sea

In an effort to prevent the dispute from further escalating, Indonesia organized a workshop on the South China Sea territorial dispute from October 31st to November 2nd in Yogyakarta, the Foreign Ministry announced. The 23rd Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea was organized by the Policy Analysis and Development Agency at the Foreign Ministry and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. “The workshop aims to: 1) Manage the potential conflict through cooperation. 2) Promote confidence building measures to increase mutual understanding. 3) Promote an exchange of views through dialogue on certain issues,” the ministry said in a statement posted on its website.

The U.S.

World must oppose China maritime claims

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China’s maritime claims in the East and South China Seas are dubious and its grand designs must be opposed by the free world if peace in the region is to be preserved, Dana Rohrabacher, chairman of the US House subcommittee on foreign affairs, said. At a subcommittee hearing on China’s maritime and other geographic threats on October 30th, Rohrabacher – a Republican from California – said Beijing’s long-standing, deliberate strategy was to extend, provoke, challenge and ultimately dominate the region. The US pivot to Asia is hollow if America is not clear about the threat in this theater, he said.

Regional Snapshots

Vietnam, Malaysia beef up defence links

Senior Vietnamese and Malaysian officials discussed ways to beef up defence cooperation in the time ahead at talks in Hanoi on November 1st. Vietnamese Defence Minister Gen. Phung Quang Thanh and his Malaysian counterpart Dato Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussien touched upon the exchange of all-level delegations, the establishment of a deputy ministerial-level defence dialogue mechanism and personnel training, especially in foreign languages.

Vietnam, US hold major defence dialogue

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The fourth defence policy dialogue between Vietnam and the US at the deputy ministerial level was held in Washington on October 28th-29th. The discussion was co-chaired by Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh and US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for South and Southeast Asia Vikram Singh. Speaking after the function, Deputy Minister Vinh said the talks were a success, meeting the demands of each country and benefitting the interests of the region. During the dialogue, Singh reassured that despite difficulties in the budget, the commitments made by the US in the Asia-Pacific remain unchanged.

Commentaries & Analyses

Philippines Should Apologize for False Scarborough Claims

By  Carl Thayer

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Six weeks after Defense Secretary Gazmin’s highly charged allegations about the concrete rocks in Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines was forced to back down. On October 23rd, President Benigno Aquino revealed that the blocks shown in the photographs were “very old” and “not a new phenomenon.” “Some of them,” he said, “have barnacles attached to them.” Aquino then undercut the Philippines’ argument that China had virtually annexed Scarborough Shoal by admitting that local Filipinos freely go there to fish. Two days later, Gazmin tried to explain the contradiction between his earlier testimony and the president’s remarks. Gazmin stated that “the president is right that some of the blocks have barnacles meaning that they are already old. But this is new to us because we just saw them recently.” Gazmin admitted that the Philippines Air Force had no way of knowing how old the concrete blocks were. Gazmin also noted that “we conduct regular air patrols there” but high tide might have prevented aerial reconnaissance from spotting the blocks on previous missions.” The “rocks versus blocks” episode raises important questions about the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to maintain maritime domain awareness in areas of strategic interest. The Philippines claims it conducts regular reconnaissance flights over Scarborough Shoal. Was allowance made for low and high tide conditions? If the concrete blocks have been place since the late 1980s, why has it taken military imagery analysts so long to identify them? Surely there must be files of past imagery going back years if not decades. Why weren’t historical records held by the Department of National Defense consulted immediately? The “rocks versus blocks” episode also raises the question whether the Philippines’ lack of strategic trust in China has resulted in a skewing – if not politicization – of intelligence analysis. Why the rush to judgment? Finally, the “rocks versus blocks” controversy has embarrassed not only the Philippines government but damaged the credibility of the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Further, this episode unnecessarily strained Manila’s relations with Beijing at a time when China is promoting joint maritime cooperation with ASEAN states. The Philippines owes its regional partners, friends and allies a detailed explanation. The Philippines should retract its allegations against China and apologize for the misunderstanding.

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea will not hold back oil exploration

The ASEAN community have actively seeked to engage with China on a diplomatic level to resolve the dispute at last month’s 16th ASEAN-China Summit in Brunei. First things first, Benigno Aquino III, President of the Philippines, has diplomatically decided to refer to the region as “this sea known by many names”, but was clear in his desire to resolve the conflict, or risk damaging the region’s economic growth. “Our development as a region cannot be realised in an international environment where the rule of law does not exist,” he said, pushing for a Code of Conduct to be drawn up under the watchful eye of the UN, designed to settle each country's claim. China, whose claim over the Sea, is by far the largest, has the most to lose from any formal international agreement, so has actively begun seeking cooperation with neighbouring states on the joint development of hydrocarbons. Chinese Premiere Li Keqiang recently visited Hanoi with the aim of boosting economic cooperation between Vietnam and China, following similar agreements worth $5 billion with Malaysia and $28 billion with Indonesia. This follows rocky relations between Petrovietnam and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), who in 2012, called for international bids to explore the Gulf of Tonkin, an area claimed by both countries. Relations have since improved though, with the extension and expansion of a joint agreement to explore the gulf. The agreement will now be in place until 2016 and expand the area covered from 1541km2 to 4076km2. Such agreements could be a sign of things to come, with China realising that joint development of contested resources is better than no development at all. Its recent diplomatic blitz with members of the ASEAN community could yet bear more fruit, or more oil.

China Amps Up Its Soft Power in the South China Sea While Washington Shows the Flag

By William Bradley

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China's new president, Xi Jinping, made great hay out of President Barack Obama having to cancel his long-planned participation in two key rounds of East Asian summitry during the shutdown, pointedly visiting two countries Obama had cancelled on at the last minute and making the point that China abides. Xi buttered up ASEAN as he talked up Chinese backing for an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and fast action on the Pan-Asia Railway linking Southeast Asian nations with China's Yunnan Province. Since then Xi and Premiere Li Keqiang have continued the intensive diplomacy, brandishing trade and investment deals that a still troubled American economy cannot match while seeking joint oil and gas deals with their intimidated neighbors. So, what do you do when you can't send the president, thanks to Washington craziness? Send a ship named after a president, that's what. The nation's first president, George Washington, the super-carrier named after him, and its strike force, perhaps the US Navy's most powerful. While Obama was sidelined from key East Asian summitry by the shutdown debacle, the George Washington aircraft carrier battle group has been cruising around East Asia and related waters all month. After a week sailing up and down the South China Sea, virtually all of which China claims as its sovereign territory, engaging in some joint exercises with countries generally overawed by the PRC, it just spent five days on a port call in Singapore, situated at the opposite end of the South China Sea from the PRC. Since China is not backing off its extraordinary claims and continues its military build-up, most of its neighbors will still look to the US as a counterweight. But even though the George Washington herself is an extraordinarily impressive vessel, there is no substitute for Obama's presence. Missing the Asian summits during the shutdown debacle was very bad. For even though America, a Pacific nation is the Pacific power that Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt intended it to be, Obama, or any American president for that matter, is disadvantaged by distance. First the vast distances involved in the Pacific itself. Then the distance between Washington, across the country on the Atlantic, and America's Pacific Coast. Then there is the matter of finance. Unlike the rising superpower China, America doesn't have it to toss around. After a lost decade of adventures in the desert, America can't afford to bankroll an Asian Infrastructure Bank. China can. Had the U.S. not done a Moon shot in Iraq, followed by another Moon shot in Afghanistan -- with no Moon base to show for it, not even a few Moon rocks – U.S. margin for error, for blowing off important diplomatic work, would be much larger. But it is not.

How much can ASEAN do for a South China Sea code of conduct?

By Rodolfo C. Severino

ASEAN as a group has long been in talks with China and other parties about the South China Sea. But most fundamental is the disagreement about how to reconcile the claimants’ national interests and the rule of international law. Although claimants in the South China Sea often justify their claims in high-minded terms, history shows that these same countries pursue their claims for strategic and commercial reasons. On the other hand, there is international law, with which all countries must comply and which is usually regarded as a refuge of weak states. Which should prevail when they come into conflict — national interest or the rule of law? This is a difficult question. When pursuing its perceived national interest, a country’s ability to compromise is often reduced. It is a reality that negotiators have to take into account. Nevertheless, the ASEAN–China consultations on the proposed CoC would function better if each party clarified what its national interests really are, and if assurances were given that those interests would be protected in any future compromise. They would also be more effective if mutual trust were strengthened, so that disputes over claims do not erupt into violent conflict. This is the most that official consultations on a CoC for the South China Sea can achieve; but they are already considerable triumphs. It must be remembered that neither ASEAN nor any ASEAN–China forum is an adjudicating body that can ‘resolve’ sovereignty or other jurisdictional conflicts. However, everybody has an interest in regional peace and stability, the maintenance of the rule of law in international relations, the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and the cohesion of ASEAN.