Read the original article in Vietnamese here
On 28 November, The Diplomat published a commentary by Aristyo Rizka Darmawan (Australian National University), arguing that the engagement of extra-regional actors in the South China Sea has been largely unilateral/militarized, rendering it largely ineffective.
Specifically, the author highlights a range of naval deployments by the United States, European countries (including Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and others), and Asian countries (Japan and India) in the South China Sea. These activities include freedom of navigation operations, patrols, and military exercises. According to Darmawan, such forms of engagement have limited effectiveness for Southeast Asian claimant states for several reasons:
First, these activities are largely perceived as part of broader efforts to contain China, an objective that does not enjoy unanimous support from Southeast Asian states.
Second, given Southeast Asia’s historical experiences as former colonies of Western powers or as arenas of Cold War rivalry, regional states tend to maintain a degree of skepticism toward the military presence of extra-regional actors.
Third, Southeast Asian countries prefer ASEAN centrality, expecting ASEAN to play a leading role in shaping and guiding the participation and activities of external partners in the region.
Finally, military presence inherently carries the risk of unintended escalation, as illustrated by previous encounters between U.S. and Chinese forces in the South China Sea. In the event of such escalation, Southeast Asia would likely bear a substantial cost.
As an alternative, the author proposes “a more effective approach” centered on enhanced, multi-dimensional cooperation with Southeast Asia. This could include joint exercises, capacity-building initiatives, and technology transfers, not only with navies, but also with coast guards, and should encompass both traditional and non-traditional security domains (such as maritime cyber security).
Darmawan identifies Australia as a model for this approach, noting its consistent efforts to listen to Southeast Asian perspectives on maritime security and its extensive capacity-building initiatives and cooperative programs with regional partners.
According to the author, this approach aligns well with the strategic preferences of many Southeast Asian countries, particularly as ASEAN seeks international cooperation to implement key strategic documents such as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and the ASEAN Maritime Outlook. These frameworks could be further operationalized through mechanisms such as a Coast Guard Forum or flexible, issue-based ASEAN groupings (ASEAN-X). Australia, for its part, has launched several capacity-building initiatives consistent with ASEAN priorities, most recently the ASEAN Maritime Partnership.
However, the author’s argument is not without limitations. Several of the countries he critiques continue to implement a wide range of paramilitary and non-military capacity-building initiatives related to the South China Sea in cooperation with Southeast Asian states. Examples include the European Union’s ESIWA+ initiative, which has expanded to include activities related to submarine telecommunications cables, and India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), which encompasses seven maritime pillars. Moreover, unilateral European naval deployments in the South China Sea are not conducted on a regular basis and are often accompanied by extensive cooperative activities with Southeast Asian partners during the same deployments.
In addition, while the author presents Australia as a benchmark for extra-regional engagement, Australia itself has shown a growing tendency toward increased military involvement in the South China Sea. In 2025, for instance, Australia reportedly conducted a freedom of navigation operation without official public disclosure and expanded the scope and frequency of Maritime Cooperative Activities (MCA) with the Philippines.
