Weekly Bulletin (15 October - 21 October)

Activities of the Claimants

China

China: two new oil fields in the South China Sea start poduction

China National Offshore Oil Corporation Limited announced that two new oil fields, Weizhou 11-2 and Weizhou 6-9/6-10, commenced production. Weizhou 11-2 oil field, located in the South China Sea with an average water depth of about 35.4 meters, currently has 4 producing wells. Weizhou 6-9/6-10 oil field is located in the South China Sea with an average water depth of about 32.5 meters.

China's maps to be closely monitored for more accuracy

“Maps have been found that contain a number of mistakes relating to Chinese territory, including marking the wrong borders, or identifying sensitive or classified geographical information. The map information should be regulated in accordance with the law” a notice issued by the Chinese National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geo-information. The publication of maps will be more strictly overseen by the mapping authorities, and publishing houses will be required to have the relevant qualifications before they publish maps, said the notice.

China approves marine functional zoning of coastal regions

China has approved marine zonal schemes of eight major coastal regions for the 2011-2020 period in order to effectively protect ecology and environment of the sea. “Marine functional zoning provides a legal basis for effective protection of marine ecology and environment and rational exploitation of marine resources," the approval documents, released by the Chinese State Council said.

China to name territorial islands

China is planning to name the country's nameless islands and islets, according to an official newspaper with the State Oceanic Administration. As of the end of last year, China had given official names to 1,660 islands and placed marks, such as stone tablets, on these territories, the newspaper said. The naming and marking of another 1,664 islands will be completed by August next year.

Chinese new surveillance ship launched

China launched a new marine surveillance ship on October 14^th in Guangzhou, Guangdong province. he 1,337-ton ship, Haijian 8002, is 79.9 meters long and can travel up to 5,000 nautical miles (9,260 km) without refueling. The new ship, which was built in eight months, was the first of those to be put to use.'

Philippines

Philippines sees improved relations with China

A “very gradual warming up” of relations with China has begun and would likely continue as “ultra nationalist” sentiment in Beijing is likely to ease after a leadership change next month, Philippine President Aquino said. “We hope these domestic pressures on China will be lessened after the transition, so we will have more room to negotiate and discuss in more reasonable terms and less ultra-nationalist terms,” Aquino told reporters.

The U.S.

US pledges South China Sea neutrality

The United States will remain impartial in South China Sea conflicts and wants territorial disputes to be solved peacefully, Samuel J Locklear III, commander of the US Pacific Command, was quoted as saying during his visit to Thailand. The US military also wants South China Sea territory disputes to be solved through dialogue and peaceful measures, Col Thanathip quoted Adm Locklear as saying.

US ship to sail through Scarborough shoal on way to Manila

The USS George Washington, one of the US Navy’s largest aircraft carriers, is set to arrive on Oct. 24 in the country for a “goodwill visit,” and will enter the Philippines’ 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone via the South China Sea. The 104,200-ton carrier is expected to pass through the Scarborough Shoal, which is situated 124 miles off Zambales. According to a statement from the US Embassy in Manila, the carrier’s “goodwill visit” is aimed at enhancing the strong historic ties between the United States and the Philippines.

US urges transparency over China's naval moves

The commander of the US Pacific fleet says the Chinese naval vessels have the right to cruise in the international waters but called for the transparency of their activities. Admiral Cecil Haney made the comment in a meeting with Japanese media in Tokyo. Haney referred to 7 Chinese naval vessels that were seen just outside Japan's territorial waters west of Okinawa.

Regional Snapshots

China-Philippines talks tackle sea dispute

Several aspects of Philippines-China relations,  including  the ongoing  territorial dispute in the West Philippine Sea  or South China Sea,  will  be  tackled  when top senior foreign ministers from both countries meet in the 18th Foreign Ministry Consultation at the Philippine Foreign Affairs building in Pasay City. Philippine Foreign Affairs spokesman Raul Hernandez said the consultation will review “the existing cooperation and chart future direction of Philippine-China diplomatic relations.”

Indonesia, India defense ministers meet for further cooperation

Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro and visiting Indian Defense Minister Shri AK Antony met on Tuesday (October 16^th) to seek further defense cooperation between the two countries. "I expect this bilateral meeting would improve our cooperation in the defense sector to higher level," Purnomo said in his remarks to welcome his Indian counterpart and his entourage. Defense cooperation between India and Indonesia was officially enacted in a strategic partnership pact established in 2005. The pact constitutes military of both countries to take part in cooperation implemented in various programs.

U.S.navy vessel harbors in Indonesia's Bali for drill

U.S. navy vessel USS Green Bay ( LPD-20) harbored in Bali in a peace mission, carrying troops scheduled to undertake joint military drill with Indonesian troops, local media reported. USS Green Bay Commander AM Browne said that the 28,000 ton- deadweight ship, which is loaded with high technology equipment and designed as a training vessel, was made in 2005 and commenced service in 2009.

Commentaries & Analyses

America Cannot ‘Lead From Behind’ in Asia

In recent months,Washington has subtly tacked back towards a more accommodating stance. Amidst warnings from some China watchers that the pivot had deepened distrust and could trigger a competitive spiral, the Obama administration has looked for ways to soften its tone and reassure Beijing about its intentions. And now, Washington aims to put some distance between itself and its allies in Asia, reminding them that it takes no stand on the ultimate resolution of their maritime disputes with China.  A striking case in point is the administration’s repeated refusal to clarify whether it would come to the aid of the Philippines in the event of an attack on its forces in the South China Sea. The latest shift in U.S. strategy is premature and could prove counterproductive. As the reception accorded Secretary Clinton suggests, China’s leaders are in no mood to be placated. And as it seeks to soothe Beijing, the administration risks undermining much of what it has already accomplished. As China grows stronger other countries are going to have to work harder to preserve a balance of power that safeguards their interests and helps keep the peace.  Taken together, the United States and its Asian friends and allies have more than sufficient means to maintain such a balance.  But if Washington wants others to do their part it needs to stand firm in its dealings with Beijing.  Even more important, it needs to make costly, long-term investments in the military capabilities that will be needed to counter China’s own.  When it comes to Asia, the United States does not have the option of leading from behind.

Memo to China: Size Isn’t Everything

For more than three decades, China has been courting its neighbors to the south. Enticing the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) into closer cooperation, and it has brought great rewards. But now, with its aggressive attitude on demarcation lines in the South China Sea, China risks throwing it all away. Why? Because of underwater resources or nationalist public opinion in China? But the root of the problem lies exactly what Yang alluded to in Hanoi. Because of a heritage that goes back to the deeper past, China regards its position within the region as unique. It is the big country and other countries must treat it as such. This does not preclude meaningful negotiations or a respect for the sovereignty of others. But it does imply a position for China that puts its views and its claims in a different category than those of other states. Especially in the long run, it is an attitude that will not serve China well. China’s approach to Asean on the South China Sea disputes points to a country whose diplomacy is still remarkably immature and not ready to take on a regional leadership role. The best thing that China could do now would be to define its actual demands. This would include coming to terms with the fact that the country, at best, can only lay claim to a 12- nautical-mile zone around the islets. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, small islands that cannot sustain human habitation do not have the right to a 200 mile exclusive economic zone. So instead of the “right” to all of the South China Sea, which many Chinese think they claim, the real maximum demand will be much more modest. In the meantime, China and the other countries should adopt the new Indonesian proposal for an interim international code of conduct in the South China Sea. It calls for concrete confidence building and conflict prevention measures, including a reduction of military activity in the region.

China’s Aircraft Carrier: Implications For Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia shouldn’t be overly concerned about the introduction into service of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning. First, the accepted consensus amongst naval analysts is that building a full-fledged carrier capability takes time. Second, the Chinese carrier programme should not have come across as a surprise regionally. Third, Given that a full-fledged CBG capability for China will require more time to materialise, it is premature to strike the alarm bells; the actual use of a carrier is arguably more crucial than the mere possession of it. And it could have a benign impact as well. Given that a full-fledged CBG capability for China will require more time to materialise, it is premature to strike the alarm bells; the actual use of a carrier is arguably more crucial than the mere possession of it. And it could have a benign impact as well. Fourth, if Southeast Asians are worried that the new carrier could be used to assert Beijing’s maritime claims in the region, based on recent patterns of Chinese gunboat diplomacy, this worry could be exaggerated. China has been relying increasingly on lightly-equipped civilian law-enforcement vessels for such functions instead of PLAN warships and this trend is projected to continue as China rapidly builds up such capacities. Also, rather than an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea, greater efficacy and credibility can be achieved through ‘less glamorous’ power projection capabilities such as Beijing’s rapidly expanding amphibious assault forces, or fourth-generation land-based airpower supported by mid-air refueling aircraft. That would provide more immediate ramifications to the regional naval balance. In the shorter term, these aspects instead of the carrier programme deserve greater attention of China’s Southeast Asian neighbours.

ASEAN: regional stabiliser in Southeast and East Asia?

ASEAN has taken several regional economic and political initiatives within Southeast Asia and East Asia: it has established the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN+3. ARF and ASEAN+3 are crucial fora for preserving peace and security within Southeast Asia and East Asia, for example by contributing to maritime security in the Malacca straits, a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Southeast Asia and a confidence building initiative in East Asia. In addition, significant political progress in Myanmar can contribute positively to the political image of ASEAN. ASEAN countries can support Myanmar in its transition to democracy and assist in its economic development. These economic and political developments could increase ASEAN’s leverage vis-à-vis its external partners in East Asia and the Asia Pacific. ASEAN may use the Axis of Symmetrical Interests, by balancing regional and global interests when negotiating with and relating to external parties. Regional organisations such as ASEAN can serve as a focal point for inter-regional cooperation based on mutual benefits. ASEAN can strengthen its position as a regional stabiliser between the Southeast and the East Asian regions in order to create balance and synergy among actors — including the US and China. ASEAN can help drive regional forums such as ARF and EAS in order to develop dependability of action within the political and economic cooperation between ASEAN and its external partners. 

China Stops Putting Economics First

Tensions with Japan led China’s leaders to stay away from a meeting of global finance chiefs held in Tokyo last week. This is an example of China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, which is endangering the mutually beneficial economic environment it built with the United States and other trading partners. It wasn’t always this way. From 1997 to 2005, China had an exceptionally adept foreign policy focusing on economic development. Since about 2005, however, China has pursued a much more assertive, less cooperative foreign policy. China has taken an aggressive stance on a series of territorial issues, from the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to disagreements with the Southeast Asian states over the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. What should we make of this new, more strident Chinese foreign policy? It is possible that maneuvering behind the scenes over the current political transition is exacerbating nationalist trends in China and no one wants to take the unpopular step of stopping protests and taming the rhetoric. It is also possible that, because of censorship and government control of research institutes, many in the Chinese leadership and the Chinese public more broadly actually believe that the Senkaku Islands and the entire South China Sea belong to China. However, China is unlikely to give up its mercantilist diplomacy, so the United States should pose choices for Beijing. If China’s next leaders want a cooperative economic environment, then they need to pursue a less abrasive foreign policy. If the stridency continues, then we know that the peaceful rise was only a phase—and the United States is in for a more direct challenge.