Weekly Bulletin 14/10-20/10

Activities of the Claimants

China

New CNOOC oil fields start production

China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) Ltd., China's largest offshore oil producer, said Thursday that production has begun at two of the company's newest oil fields in the South China Sea. One of the fields is Wenchang 19-1, located to the west of the Pearl River Estuary basin. It has an average water depth of 120 to 130 meters. The other field is Weizhou 12-8 situated at the Gulf of Tonkin with an average water depth of 34 meters. It has five wells in operation.

The Philippines

Philippines to defend its sovereignty at sea

Philippine President Benigno Aquino paid an official visit to South Korea on October 17^th-18^th. In his visit, President Aquino reiterated the Philippines’ decision to take a “rules-based approach” in resolving conflicting claims to territory in the South China Sea and thanked South Korea for its support. “We do not want to pick a fight with anybody, but we will do what is needed to protect our sovereignty. As we respect other nations’ rights, we expect them to respect ours,” Aquino said. “When we feel a greater sense of security, we are able to do more to improve the lives of our people,” he added.

India

India building Tsunami warning device in South China Sea

With an aim of avoiding a repeat of the 2004 catastrophe, India is building a tsunami early warning system in the South China Sea, which is likely to be operational in the next 10 months. India wants to set up Bottom Pressure Recorder- the devices in the South China Sea that will record changing sea levels in an event of an earthquake- and setting up of tidal stations. "For this, we would have to install these devices in the seas and this would require assistance from the countries in the region. The location for these devices is very important as it should neither be too far from fault line nor too close from it," Shailesh Nayak, Secretary, Ministry of Earth Science (MoES), said.

Russia

Conference calls for peaceful settlement of East Sea issue

An international conference on security and cooperation in the East Sea was held in Moscow, Russia on October 18^th. The conference, the first of its kind held by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, drew the participation of representatives from Russian authorities and researchers of issues on Asia-Pacific and East Sea security, as well as scholars from the EU, the US, Australia, India, Japan and Singapore. Addressing the one-day event, Alexander Tokovinin, an official from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called on concerned parties to refrain from the use of force and to resolve the issue by political-diplomatic means on the basis of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Regional Snapshots

Vietnam, China issue joint statement

Vietnam and China have issued a joint statement on further deepening their comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in the new period, on the occasion of Premier Li Keqiang’s official visit to Vietnam from October 13^th-15^th. On cooperation at sea, both sides agreed to observe the common perception reached by leaders of the two Parties and States, and stringently implement “the agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea issues between Vietnam and China”. The two sides agreed to exercise tight control of maritime disputes and not to make any move that can further complicate or expand disputes, making good use of the hotline between the two Foreign Ministries to manage and control disputes at sea as well as the one between the two Agriculture Ministries to promptly and suitably deal with problems arising from fishery activities at sea. At the same time, the two sides will continue to actively discuss and seek efficient measures to control disputes and maintain the overall good relations between Vietnam and China, and peace and stability in the East Sea.

ASEAN chief visits China

Secretary General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Le Luong Minh is paying an official visit to China from October 16-19 at the invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. At a press conference on October 16, Minh stressed that the ASEAN-China partnership is among the most dynamic and fast-growing relationships in the world.

Japan’s naval defence ships visit Da Nang

Three Japanese c oastal defence ships with a total crew of 750 people aboard docked at Da Nang Port on October 19, beginning their friendship visit to the central city. During the three-day stay in the city (October 19–21), the ship captains will pay courtesy visits to leaders of the municipal People’s Committee, the Military Zone 5’s High Command, and the Navy Zone 3’s High Command.

Commentaries & Analyses

China's 'maritime silk road' linking Southeast Asia faces a rocky birth

By Kristine Kwok

Armed with a plethora of trade deals and investment funds, Beijing's vision of reviving the "maritime silk road" with Southeast Asia has caught the imagination of policymakers and observers in the region. While no concrete details are available on how the modern "maritime silk road" will be forged, many expect a web of trade links and better connectivity between ports and maritime co-operation. Analysts say the initiatives could further enhance economic ties between China and Southeast Asia. The revival of the maritime silk road was proposed by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang during their visits to the region recently. It is seen as part of China's charm offensive to sidestep lingering tensions over the South China Sea and to counter the United States' rebalancing of economic and security commitments towards Asia, know as the "pivot". Recalling the historic sea trade route that linked China with the world in the 15th century, the vision of a new maritime silk road signals a systematic approach to expanding China's economic, political and security clout in the region. "The maritime silk road is more of a symbolic concept," said Yang Baoyun, a professor of international relations at Peking University. Yang said while the concept still needed fleshing out, enhancing trade and economic co-operation between China and the region could ease tensions over territorial disputes. But lingering political mistrust towards Beijing and unwillingness to compromise on territorial disputes remain the biggest challenges. Many analysts consider the China-Asean Maritime Co-operation Fund - set up at the peak of the South China Sea tensions in late 2011 - to be part of the silk road initiative. Both Xi and Li in their speeches called on ASEAN members to "make better use" of the fund. But the 3 billion yuan (HK$3.8 billion) fund has faced reservations from Asean due to political mistrust, according to one Chinese scholar. "They think China is too assertive in protecting its sovereignty and using the fund might compromise their interests," the scholar said. Professor Aileen Baviera, of the University of Philippines, says many Asean countries are reluctant to draw on the fund as they fear there would be political strings attached. Kusnanto Anggoro, a lecturer at the Indonesian Defence University, says conflicting interests are a key reason why Asean countries held back from using the fund. While China prefers to focus on non-sensitive dimensions such as preserving biodiversity, Asean prefers trickier projects such as joint law enforcement patrols and navigational safety. "And the Chinese are not very good at following up and implementation," he says.

China’s Achilles’ heel in Southeast Asia

By Benjamin Schreer

For many reasons, Beijing’s goal to bolster its position in Southeast Asia at Washington’s expense is very likely to fail. First, regional leaders understand very well that one cancelled presidential trip to Southeast Asia doesn’t equal a change in the US’s Asia strategy. Secretary of State John Kerry attended ASEAN meetings and delivered the key message Southeast Asian countries wanted to hear: America expects China and its neighbours to peacefully resolve their territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Second, this message exposed China’s Achilles’ heel in Southeast Asia: while ASEAN claimants are eager to talk, Beijing isn’t willing to compromise on its extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea. Third, the result is that some Southeast Asian nations show signs of  ‘internal’ and/ or ‘external balancing’ behaviour against China. After decades of preoccupation with internal security issues, the Philippines is attempting to build a ‘minimum credible defense’ posture against China. Others are clearly hedging against the possibility of more tensions in the South China Sea. Fourth, interpretations that Obama’s absence is evidence of a lack of commitment to the rebalance are problematic. Typically, two main arguments are advanced. The first is that Washington is too preoccupied with the Middle East and the second that the US doesn’t have the money anymore to support the Pentagon’s shift to the Asia-Pacific. The first claim doesn’t recognise that the US still is a global power with global responsibilities—just because Obama’s recent speech before the UN General Assembly had far fewer references to the Asia-Pacific than the Middle East doesn’t mean the US suddenly has lost interest in Asia. The second claim isn’t convincing either. Despite pressures on the US defence budget, the Pentagon continues to shift key military systems into the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, US allies appear willing to shoulder a greater burden to support America’s pivot. Australia is a case in point. Prime Minister Abbott just announced his government’s decision to share the financial costs of an enhanced US Marine presence in the North. Of course, this doesn’t mean that Australia and America’s Southeast Asian allies and partners are now on an anti-China course. But they have a key interest in maintaining an American presence in the region and an acute awareness of when to step up the plate. China is a long way from undermining America’s position in Southeast Asia.

New Commitment to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea?

By Carlyle A. Thayer

Unlike 2012, China now faces a more unified and determined ASEAN. Cambodia’s spoiling role at the 45th AMM overshadowed the fact that ASEAN reached unanimous agreement on the Proposed Elements of a Regional Code of Conduct prior to the wrangling over the joint communiqué. ASEAN then reached unanimous agreement on the Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea. Brunei, as ASEAN chair, is playing a leading role in building consensus, while Cambodia is no longer playing a disruptive role on South China Sea discussions. Thailand, as ASEAN’s country coordinator for relations with China, has been proactive in facilitating progress on COC discussions. China cannot afford to ignore the diplomatic role of Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest country and member of the group of twenty (G-20). Foreign Minister Natalegawa took the initiative in gaining unanimous ASEAN agreement on the Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea and produced a zero draft COC. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has publicly called for an early conclusion of a COC. In addition, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines all support ASEAN’s current diplomatic efforts. ASEAN-China consultations on a COC will be a protracted process. China is likely to insist that the cooperative activities and confidence-building measures in the DOC be implemented first, and this process could take several years. China has only agreed to indirect consultations on the COC as part of ongoing discussions. In the future, it will continue to test ASEAN’s unity and resolve. Beijing can, as it has in the past, manufacture a pretext at any moment to suspend discussions due to the "bad attitude or behavior of some country" (such as the Philippines). The initiation of ASEAN-China consultations on a COC is a significant development. China has taken its first tentative step since 2002 in dealing with ASEAN on a multilateral basis on a COC. China’s engagement with ASEAN on South China Sea issues serves to reinforce ASEAN’s centrality in Southeast Asian security affairs. If China and ASEAN commence cooperative projects under the DOC, this may well lead to mutual confidence-building and thus create a more favorable environment for discussions on a COC. If ASEAN maintains its unity in dealing with China, this will become a major contribution to creating an ASEAN political-security community by the end of 2015. Although ASEAN’s other dialogue partners, including the United States, will not be directly involved, they have an interest in supporting ASEAN and counseling restraint by all the claimant states.

China’s maritime disputes: Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines find common cause

của Robert Attwell

China’s military build-up and increased defence spending, assertive territorial claims and vitriolic public rhetoric have caused no small degree of concern amongst its neighbours, especially Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Unfortunately for Beijing, the inevitable consequence of pushing these claims is that the other parties have found a common cause in their opposition to China’s maritime ambitions. In effect, in terms of maritime security, military spending has, counter-intuitively, made China less secure rather than more secure. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has, in recent months, journeyed to both Hanoi and Manila to meet with his counterparts in Vietnam and the Philippines. For the first time in eleven years, the Japanese Diet (Lower House of Parliament) voted to increase the defence budget and Prime Minister Abe plans on spreading some of that wealth around. In May, for example, Japan and Vietnam held their first ever bilateral talks devoted entirely to the issue of maritime security. The result of this meeting was a white paper which specifically identifies China’s maritime assertiveness as a threat to regional security and outlines Hanoi and Tokyo’s commitment in meeting that threat. Japan has also promised to loan Vietnam more advanced ships with which to patrol the segment of the South China Sea it claims. Similar meetings between high-level diplomats from Manila and Tokyo have yielded near-identical results, with promises of strategic co-operation on maritime issues and Japan reiterating a loan of patrol vessels to the Philippines. With regard to China’s maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, Beijing needs to remember that is essentially operating on two fronts. It is inevitable that the forces opposed to China’s maritime ambitions will find a common cause. Avoiding conflict works with diplomacy, not gun boats. After all, “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.”