One year ago, we proposed several ways in which the United States could try to deter further Chinese encroachments. But, as the recent Shangri-La Dialogue demonstrated, tensions in the region have only risen since then. The Chinese have only accelerated their bellicose behavior, and nothing the United States has done has seemed to have any effect. The United States and its partners now have no choice but to consider a wider range of more assertive responses.
We are not seeking a conflict with China, nor do we advocate a war. We do not believe that China is an inevitable adversary of the United States. But we are increasingly concerned that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, if left unopposed, will give it de facto dominance of an area that is a vital strategic interest to the United States. More direct U.S. actions would involve significant risks — but so would failing to act, and those risks are far less appreciated.
Why does the South China Sea matter? It is one of the world’s most important shipping lanes, transited by about one-third of global commercial goods each year. It lies atop at least seven billion barrels of oil and an estimated 900 million cubic feet of natural gas. Conflicting claims to these important waters abound. These involve several U.S. allies and friends and will likely be exacerbated by the pending outcome of an international court case between China and the Philippines. Chinese efforts to establish sovereign claims over these key international waters not only threaten unimpeded access to global shipping lanes and U.S. partners in the region, but also set a dangerous global precedent. Beijing’s forceful efforts are intended to establish regional hegemony by creating a zone of “near seas” over which it can claim sole control.
During the past year, Chinese actions have grown bolder. They have completed land reclamation efforts at the three largest outposts in the South China Sea and are now focusing on developing infrastructure. Each one already has an airfield with a 9,800-foot runway, which is long enough to land most military aircraft. They have also landed a military jet on Fiery Cross Reef and deployed advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels. Taken together, these capabilities provide forward-positioned power projection platforms for Chinese fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. Aircraft from these bases could easily reach — and possibly enforce — Chinese claims out to the so-called “nine-dash line” that borders the easternmost rim of the South China Sea. Chinese Navy ships and maritime militia can also use these outposts as refueling and provisioning stops that extend their sea presence across this vast expanse. U.S. aircraft carriers are at best transient visitors in these same waters, and no other country in the region can project and sustain the air and naval presence in the South China Sea that these fixed bases now offer.
The United States has responded to this continued expansion with ever stronger warnings and actions. Most notably, the United States conducted its first freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea in October 2015, when a U.S. destroyer sailed within 12 miles of Subi Reef to demonstrate that the United States rejects any Chinese maritime claims emanating from its artificial islands. At least two other FONOPs have been conducted since then, and the head of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, has stated that future FONOPs will increase in number, scope, and complexity.
Yet Chinese confrontational actions are nevertheless continuing and even escalating. In recent months, for example, Chinese fighter jets have flown dangerously close to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in both the South and East China Seas, violating an agreement that the United States and China signed last year on safe conduct in the air. And the Chinese government recently announced that it is considering establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea as a further signal of its security claims to this key region.
China has subtly but forcefully established a permanent presence across a series of outposts on territory that did not exist five years ago. This is the new reality of the South China Sea. As a result, the United States and its regional partners now have little choice but to consider a broader and stronger range of options. These actions should be designed to achieve two primary objectives: to deter China from further expansion and combative behaviors and to better position the United States and its partners for military action to defend the international commons, if required.
We readily acknowledge that these objectives may conflict with each other, and that more options risk provoking precisely the type of conflict that the United States seeks to avoid. But failing to take stronger action also runs the very serious risk that the Chinese will gradually but inevitably gain control of this critical maritime region. That would weaken the regional position of U.S. allies and partners, but even more importantly, it would challenge the vital and longstanding U.S. interest in maintaining global freedom of navigation.
We suggest six options that the United States and its partners should now consider, listed in increasing order of assertiveness.
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